Rationality Through Reasoning

Front Cover
John Wiley & Sons, Aug 5, 2013 - Philosophy - 336 pages
Rationality Through Reasoning answers the question of how people are motivated to do what they believe they ought to do, built on a comprehensive account of normativity, rationality and reasoning that differs significantly from much existing philosophical thinking.

  • Develops an original account of normativity, rationality and reasoning significantly different from the majority of existing philosophical thought
  • Includes an account of theoretical and practical reasoning that explains how reasoning is something we ourselves do, rather than something that happens in us
  • Gives an account of what reasons are and argues that the connection between rationality and reasons is much less close than many philosophers have thought
  • Contains rigorous new accounts of oughts including owned oughts, agent-relative reasons, the logic of requirements, instrumental rationality, the role of normativity in reasoning, following a rule, the correctness of reasoning, the connections between intentions and beliefs, and much else.
  • Offers a new answer to the ‘motivation question’ of how a normative belief motivates an action.
 

Contents

The BlackwellZBrown Lectures in Philosophy
Ought
Obiective Subiective and Prospective Oughts
Reasons
Responding to Reasons
Responding to ReasonBeliefs
Requirements
Conditional Requirements
Rationality and Normativity
HigherOrder Reasoning
FirstOrder Reasoning
Practical Reasoning
Explicit Reasoning
Enkratic Reasoning
Bibliography
Index

Synchronic Rationality
Diachronic Rationality

Other editions - View all

Common terms and phrases

About the author (2013)

John Broome is White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Oxford, a fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, and an Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at the Australian National University. He is the author of amongst others Weighing Goods (1991), Ethics Out of Economics (1999), Weighing Lives (2004), and Climate matters (2012).

Bibliographic information