Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary ExplanationCooperation among humans is one of the keys to our great evolutionary success. Natalie and Joseph Henrich examine this phenomena with a unique fusion of theoretical work on the evolution of cooperation, ethnographic descriptions of social behavior, and a range of other experimental results. Their experimental and ethnographic data come from a small, insular group of middle-class Iraqi Christians called Chaldeans, living in metro Detroit, whom the Henrichs use as an example to show how kinship relations, ethnicity, and culturally transmitted traditions provide the key to explaining the evolution of cooperation over multiple generations. |
Contents
Capacities and Cultural Evolution | 7 |
Evolutionary Theory and the Social Psychology | 35 |
History and the Community Today | 75 |
Copyright | |
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Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation Joseph Henrich,Natalie Henrich Limited preview - 2007 |
Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation Joseph Henrich,Natalie Henrich Limited preview - 2007 |
Common terms and phrases
50 percent altruistic Arabs average beliefs benefits biases Chaldean community Chaldean language chapter close kin coethnics conformist transmission context cooperative dilemma costly costs cues cultural evolution cultural group selection cultural learning culturally transmitted defect Dictator Game domains donations Dual Inheritance Theory economic effect environment ethnic group ethnic identity ethnic psychology ethnographic evolved example experimental experiments explain favor Fehr friends genes give gossip grocers Henrich human imitation immigrants important indirect reciprocity individuals influence interaction interview involving Iraq kin psychology kin selection kinship Machiguenga markers metro Detroit models Natalie natural selection non-Chaldean observed offer parents partners patterns payoffs person players population predictions preferences preferentially prosocial Public Goods Games punish norm violators reciprocity-based recycling relatedness relationship relatives reputational information responder round share situations social groups social norms someone strategies success Telkaif theoretical third-party punishment tion Ultimatum Game vaccination variables