## In ContradictionIn Contradiction advocates and defends the view that there are true contradictions (dialetheism), a view that flies in the face of orthodoxy in Western philosophy since Aristotle. The book has been at the centre of the controversies surrounding dialetheism ever since its first publication in 1987. This second edition of the book substantially expands upon the original in various ways, and also contains the author's reflections on developments over the last two decades. Further aspects of dialetheism are discussed in the companion volume, Doubt Truth to be a Liar, also published by Oxford University Press in 2006. |

### What people are saying - Write a review

We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.

### Contents

I | xvii |

II | 1 |

III | 3 |

IV | 7 |

V | 9 |

VI | 28 |

VII | 39 |

VIII | 51 |

XVI | 141 |

XVII | 159 |

XVIII | 172 |

XIX | 182 |

XX | 205 |

XXI | 207 |

XXII | 211 |

XXIII | 213 |

### Common terms and phrases

abstract apply argue argument assert axioms believe category theory chapter claim classical logic consequence consider consistent construction context contradiction cumulative hierarchy defined denotation dialetheias dialetheism discussion disjunction disjunctive syllogism endorse entailment example extensional fact false finite follows formula function give given Godel's Hegel Hegelean account Hence holds inconsistent arithmetics inference instant interpretation intuitionist issue kind language least Lemma liar paradox logician mathematical meaning metatheory naive proof naive set theory natural negation non-trivial noted notion objects obligations orthodox paraconsistent logic particular philosophical possible worlds precisely Priest principle problem produce propositional parameter provable prove quantifiers quasi-valid question rationally acceptable realism reason recursive relevant logic Roudey rules sect semantic paradoxes sense sentence simply suggested suppose T-scheme Tarski theorem things thought true iff truth and falsity truth conditions truth predicate truth theory truth value gaps valid