The Army Air Forces in World War II, Volume One: Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942

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DIANE Publishing
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Contents

II
3
IV
17
VI
73
VII
101
IX
151
XI
194
XIII
234
XV
269
XXVI
471
XXVIII
484
XXIX
514
XXXI
555
XXXIII
557
XXXV
612
XXXVII
655
XXXVIII
669

XVI
271
XVIII
310
XX
366
XXII
403
XXIV
427
XXXIX
745
XL
751
XLI
761
Copyright

Common terms and phrases

Popular passages

Page 717 - It was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth.
Page 712 - Your statement in The Atlantic Monthly is a fair analysis of the situation except that the final decision had 'to be made by the President, and was made after a complete survey of the whole situation had been made. The conclusions reached were substantially those set out in your article. The Japanese were given fair warning and were offered the terms, which they finally accepted, well in advance of the dropping of the bomb.
Page 26 - But the worst thing is that we are falling down on our promises every single time. We have not fulfilled one of them yet.
Page 710 - ... production. He promptly named Hiroshima and Nagasaki, among others. We sent an ultimatum to Japan. It was rejected. I ordered atomic bombs dropped on the two cities named on the way back from Potsdam, when we were in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. In your letter, you raise the fact that the directive to General Spaatz to prepare for delivering the bomb is dated July twenty-fifth. It was, of course, necessary to set the military wheels in motion, as these orders did, but the final decision...
Page 712 - I must frankly admit that in view of what we knew of Soviet actions in eastern Germany and the violations of the Yalta agreements in Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria, I would have been satisfied had the Russians determined not to enter the war.
Page 357 - It was not my job to protect the Seventh Fleet. My job was offensive, to strike with the Third Fleet, and we were even then rushing to intercept a force which gravely threatened not only Kinkaid and myself, but the whole Pacific strategy.
Page 341 - Should we lose in the Philippines operation, even though the Fleet should be left, the shipping lane to the south would be completely shut off so that the fleet, if it should come back to Japanese waters, could not obtain its fuel supply. If it should remain in southern waters, it could not receive supplies of ammunition and arms. There would be no sense in saving the fleet at the expense of losing the Philippines. That was the reason...
Page 692 - We intend to seek out and destroy the enemy wherever he or she is, in the greatest possible numbers, in the shortest possible time.
Page 623 - I am influenced by the conviction that the present stage of development of the air war against Japan presents the AAF for the first time with the opportunity of proving the power of the strategic air arm. I consider that for the first time strategic air bombardment faces a situation in which its strength is proportionate to the magnitude of its task.
Page 566 - We had nothing in Japan that we could use against such a weapon. From the point of view of the Home Defense Command, we felt that the war was lost and said so.

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