Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence: A Critique of the Mechanistic Theory of MindThis book deals with the major philosophical issues in the theoretical framework of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in particular and cognitive science in general. The researchers in AI are concerned with the issues of consciousness, human subjectivity, creativity, etc. Cognitive Science and AI argue that consciousness can be artificially created and comprehended in the function of robots. The robotic activities explain the mechanism involved in computation, language processing, sensing the information, etc. Contrary to this thesis, the philosophical study tries to show that human consciousness, thinking, imagination, etc. are much larger concepts and need to be delved into in the broad theoretical framework. This book is a critique of the mechanistic theory of mind. It shows the basic foundation of AI and its limitations in explaining the activities of the human mental life. Machine-functionalism fails to account for the subjective nature of consciousness and the creativity involved in the conscious acts. There are two aspects of this thesis-- the epistemological and the metaphysical. Epistemologically, the subject of consciousness intimately knows the raw feelings or the qualia. Metaphysically speaking, however, the raw feelings are real in the sense that they are part of the furniture of the mental world. Therefore, we can hardly deny that the mental world is real. |
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According to Chalmers algorithm argues argument artificial intelligence aspects belief Boden Cambridge Cartesian causal chine cogito cognitive science computational theory computationally computing machine concept of mind conscious experience Dartnall Dennett Descartes digital computer Dimensions of Creativity Dougald Murdoch emergentism essential example existence explanatory gap fact feel first-person Fodor formal func functional functionalist gence H-creativity human brain human intelligence human mind Ibid ideas input intentional intentionality John Cot language of thought logical means mechanical mental processes mental properties mental representations mind and body Nagel nature ness neurons notion objects ontological operations organism pain Penrose perception Philosophical Philosophy of Mind physical symbol system possible problem solving propositional attitudes psychological Putnam qualia question reducible relation representational theory Robert Stoothoff robot sciousness Searle semantic properties sense simulate strong AI structure supervenient theory of mind thinking thing third-person tion tional Turing machine understanding view of mind