The Methods of EthicsThis Hackett edition, first published in 1981, is an unabridged and unaltered republication of the seventh (1907) edition as published by Macmillan and Company, Limited. From the forward by John Rawls: In the utilitarian tradition Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) has an important place. His fundamental work, The Methods of Ethics (first edition 1874, seventh and last edition 1907, here reprinted), is the clearest and most accessible formulation of what we may call 'the classical utilitarian doctorine.' This classical doctrine holds that the ultimate moral end of social and individual action is the greatest net sum of the happiness of all sentient beings. Happinesss is specified (as positive or negative) by the net balance of pleasure over pain, or, as Sidgwick preferred to say, as the net balance of agreeable over disagreeable consciousness. . . . |
Contents
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
If however we include the Moral Sentiments among these motives | 2 |
still it is impossible to me in acting not to regard myself as free | 3 |
or when circumstances have materially altered since it was made | 8 |
CHAPTER II | 15 |
6570 | 68 |
CHAPTER VI | 77 |
especially the principle of living according to Nature | 86 |
But at any rate the primary object of Ethics is not to determine what | 278 |
Nor does the realisation of Freedom satisfy our common conception | 279 |
or Ill Desert in order to realise Criminal Justice There remains | 290 |
For we are neither agreed as to what kind of government is ideally | 297 |
The duty of fulfilling a promise in the sense in which it was under | 303 |
CHAPTER VII | 312 |
CHAPTER VIII | 320 |
CHAPTER IX | 327 |
and define its end as the greatest attainable surplus of pleasure over | 94 |
stituting for right the wider notion good 105106 | 105 |
but | 113 |
EGOISM | 119 |
pleasure being defined as feeling apprehended as desirable by | 129 |
pleasure as feeling cannot be conceived and that a sum | 131 |
that the habit of introspectively comparing pleasures is unfavour | 138 |
that in fact the supposed definite commensurability of pleasures | 146 |
and these judgments when closely examined are found to be | 153 |
CHAPTER V | 162 |
even if we consider not merely | 170 |
176180 | 176 |
or biological 190192 | 190 |
CHAPTER 1 | 199 |
It is certainly an essential condition that we should not believe | 207 |
The existence of apparent cognitions of right conduct intuitively | 214 |
conduct includes the performance of duties as well as praise | 217 |
It may be said that Moral Excellence like Beauty eludes defini | 228 |
Of minor intellectual excellences some are not strictly Virtues | 236 |
as claims may conflict but clearly binding rules cannot be obtained | 246 |
and the wider duties of Neighbourhood Citizenship Universal | 254 |
CHAPTER V | 264 |
and this social order may itself from another point of view be con | 271 |
CHAPTER X | 332 |
We require of an Axiom that it should be 1 stated in clear | 338 |
nor can we state any clear absolute universallyadmitted axioms | 345 |
and even the Duty of Good Faith when we consider the numerous | 352 |
The common moral maxims are adequate for practical guidance | 359 |
CHAPTER XIII | 373 |
Still there are certain abstract moral principles of real importance | 379 |
which needs for its basis a selfevident | 386 |
nor is it in accordance with Common Sense to regard Subjective | 394 |
When these alternatives are fairly presented Common Sense seems | 400 |
and also from any psychological theory as to the nature | 411 |
CHAPTER II | 418 |
We may observe first that Dispositions may often be admired | 426 |
and in the case of other virtues 448450 | 448 |
On the Utilitarian view the relation between Ethics and Politics | 457 |
At the same time it seems idle to try to construct such a code | 467 |
CHAPTER V | 475 |
CONCLUDING CHAPTER | 496 |
The Religious Sanction if we can show that it is actually attached | 503 |
511 | |
517 | |
521 | |