The Methods of Ethics

Front Cover
Hackett Publishing, Jan 1, 1981 - Philosophy - 528 pages

This Hackett edition, first published in 1981, is an unabridged and unaltered republication of the seventh (1907) edition as published by Macmillan and Company, Limited.

From the forward by John Rawls:

In the utilitarian tradition Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) has an important place. His fundamental work, The Methods of Ethics (first edition 1874, seventh and last edition 1907, here reprinted), is the clearest and most accessible formulation of what we may call 'the classical utilitarian doctorine.' This classical doctrine holds that the ultimate moral end of social and individual action is the greatest net sum of the happiness of all sentient beings. Happinesss is specified (as positive or negative) by the net balance of pleasure over pain, or, as Sidgwick preferred to say, as the net balance of agreeable over disagreeable consciousness. . . .

 

Contents

INTRODUCTION
1
If however we include the Moral Sentiments among these motives
2
still it is impossible to me in acting not to regard myself as free
3
or when circumstances have materially altered since it was made
8
CHAPTER II
15
6570
68
CHAPTER VI
77
especially the principle of living according to Nature
86
But at any rate the primary object of Ethics is not to determine what
278
Nor does the realisation of Freedom satisfy our common conception
279
or Ill Desert in order to realise Criminal Justice There remains
290
For we are neither agreed as to what kind of government is ideally
297
The duty of fulfilling a promise in the sense in which it was under
303
CHAPTER VII
312
CHAPTER VIII
320
CHAPTER IX
327

and define its end as the greatest attainable surplus of pleasure over
94
stituting for right the wider notion good 105106
105
but
113
EGOISM
119
pleasure being defined as feeling apprehended as desirable by
129
pleasure as feeling cannot be conceived and that a sum
131
that the habit of introspectively comparing pleasures is unfavour
138
that in fact the supposed definite commensurability of pleasures
146
and these judgments when closely examined are found to be
153
CHAPTER V
162
even if we consider not merely
170
176180
176
or biological 190192
190
CHAPTER 1
199
It is certainly an essential condition that we should not believe
207
The existence of apparent cognitions of right conduct intuitively
214
conduct includes the performance of duties as well as praise
217
It may be said that Moral Excellence like Beauty eludes defini
228
Of minor intellectual excellences some are not strictly Virtues
236
as claims may conflict but clearly binding rules cannot be obtained
246
and the wider duties of Neighbourhood Citizenship Universal
254
CHAPTER V
264
and this social order may itself from another point of view be con
271
CHAPTER X
332
We require of an Axiom that it should be 1 stated in clear
338
nor can we state any clear absolute universallyadmitted axioms
345
and even the Duty of Good Faith when we consider the numerous
352
The common moral maxims are adequate for practical guidance
359
CHAPTER XIII
373
Still there are certain abstract moral principles of real importance
379
which needs for its basis a selfevident
386
nor is it in accordance with Common Sense to regard Subjective
394
When these alternatives are fairly presented Common Sense seems
400
and also from any psychological theory as to the nature
411
CHAPTER II
418
We may observe first that Dispositions may often be admired
426
and in the case of other virtues 448450
448
On the Utilitarian view the relation between Ethics and Politics
457
At the same time it seems idle to try to construct such a code
467
CHAPTER V
475
CONCLUDING CHAPTER
496
The Religious Sanction if we can show that it is actually attached
503
APPENDIX ON KANTS CONCEPTION OF FREE WILL
511
INDEX
517
98100
521
Copyright

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About the author (1981)

Born at Skipton, Yorkshire, Henry Sidgwick studied at Trinity College, Cambridge University, where he was appointed a fellow in 1859. In 1869 he resigned his fellowship when growing religious doubts led him to decide that he could no longer subscribe to the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Anglican church (as fellows were required to do). He was subsequently reappointed when the religious requirements were abolished, becoming professor of moral philosophy in 1883 and continuing to teach at Trinity College until his death. Sidgwick was active in many fields: education, classics, literature, political theory, and history as well as philosophy. He was interested in the cause of women's education and was instrumental in the founding of Newnham College for women at Cambridge. Sidgwick's most important contributions to philosophy lie in the field of ethics, and his most important work is Methods of Ethics (1874). In ethical theory, he was a proponent of utilitarianism; he is generally regarded as the third great representative of that position, along with Bentham and John Stuart Mill (see also Vols. 1 and 3). He rejected the empiricism on which earlier utilitarians had grounded their theory and displayed much greater complexity and sophistication in treating the psychology of moral motivation. In political theory, Sidgwick was more conservative than either Bentham or Mill.

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