Game Theory Evolving: A Problem-Centered Introduction to Modeling Strategic Interaction (Second Edition)

Front Cover
Princeton University Press, Jan 26, 2009 - Business & Economics - 390 pages
0 Reviews

Since its original publication in 2000, Game Theory Evolving has been considered the best textbook on evolutionary game theory. This completely revised and updated second edition of Game Theory Evolving contains new material and shows students how to apply game theory to model human behavior in ways that reflect the special nature of sociality and individuality. The textbook continues its in-depth look at cooperation in teams, agent-based simulations, experimental economics, the evolution and diffusion of preferences, and the connection between biology and economics.

Recognizing that students learn by doing, the textbook introduces principles through practice. Herbert Gintis exposes students to the techniques and applications of game theory through a wealth of sophisticated and surprisingly fun-to-solve problems involving human and animal behavior. The second edition includes solutions to the problems presented and information related to agent-based modeling. In addition, the textbook incorporates instruction in using mathematical software to solve complex problems. Game Theory Evolving is perfect for graduate and upper-level undergraduate economics students, and is a terrific introduction for ambitious do-it-yourselfers throughout the behavioral sciences.

  • Revised and updated edition relevant for courses across disciplines
  • Perfect for graduate and upper-level undergraduate economics courses
  • Solutions to problems presented throughout
  • Incorporates instruction in using computational software for complex problem solving
  • Includes in-depth discussions of agent-based modeling
  

What people are saying - Write a review

We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.

Contents

Probability Theory
1
12 Probability Spaces
2
13 De Morgans Laws
3
16 Probability as Frequency
4
17 Craps
5
110 Aces Up
6
112 Combinations and Sampling
7
116 The Addition Rule for Probabilities
8
642 Haggling at the Bazaar
154
643 Poker with Bluffing Revisited
156
644 Algorithms for Finding Nash Equilibria
157
645 Why Play Mixed Strategies?
160
646 Reviewing of Basic Concepts
161
PrincipalAgent Models
162
72 Contract Monitoring
163
73 Profit Signaling
164

119 Conditional Probability
9
121 Extrasensory Perception
10
124 Color Blindness
11
128 The Principle of Insufficient Reason
12
131 The Value of Eyewitness Testimony
13
133 The Uniform Distribution
16
134 Laplaces Law of Succession
17
Bayesian Decision Theory
18
22 Time Consistency and Exponential Discounting
20
23 The Expected Utility Principle
22
24 Risk and the Shape of the Utility Function
26
25 The Scientific Status of the Rational Actor Model
30
Game Theory Basic Concepts
32
32 The Extensive Form
38
33 The Normal Form
41
34 Mixed Strategies
42
35 Nash Equilibrium
43
36 The Fundamental Theorem of Game Theory
44
37 Solving for MixedStrategy Nash Equilibria
45
38 Throwing Fingers
46
310 The HawkDove Game
48
311 The Prisoners Dilemma
50
Eliminating Dominated Strategies
52
42 Backward Induction
54
43 Exercises in Eliminating Dominated Strategies
55
44 Subgame Perfection
57
45 Stackelberg Leadership
59
47 The Mystery of Kidnapping
60
48 The Eviction Notice
62
410 Military Strategy
63
411 The Dr Strangelove Game
64
413 Nuisance Suits
65
414 An Armaments Game
67
416 Poker with Bluffing
68
417 The Little Miss Muffet Game
69
418 Cooperation with Overlapping Generations
70
419 DominanceSolvable Games
71
420 Agentbased Modeling
72
421 Why Play a Nash Equilibrium?
75
422 Modeling the FinitelyRepeated Prisoners Dilemma
77
423 Review of Basic Concepts
79
PureStrategy Nash Equilibria
80
52 Competition on Main Street
81
54 The Tobacco Market
87
The Trivial Pastime
88
57 NoDraw HighLow Poker
89
58 An Agentbased Model of NoDraw HighLow Poker
91
59 The Truth Game
92
510 The Rubinstein Bargaining Model
94
511 Bargaining with Heterogeneous Impatience
96
512 Bargaining with One Outside Option
97
513 Bargaining with Dual Outside Options
98
514 Huey Dewey and Louie Split a Dollar
102
515 Twin Sisters
104
517 The Rotten Kid Theorem
106
518 The Shopper and the Fish Merchant
107
519 Pure Coordination Games
109
Experimental Evidence
110
522 Introductory Offers
111
523 Web Sites for Spiders
112
MixedStrategy Nash Equilibria
116
62 Lions and Antelope
117
63 A Patent Race
118
64 Tennis Strategy
119
66 Hard Love
120
68 Robin Hood and Little John
122
610 Family Politics
123
612 A Card Game
124
613 CheaterInspector
126
615 Characterizing 2x2 Normal Form Games I
127
616 Big John and Little John Revisited
128
619 Twin Sisters Revisited
129
621 OneCard TwoRound Poker with Bluffing
131
622 An AgentBased Model of Poker with Bluffing
132
623 Trust in Networks
133
624 El Farol
134
625 Decorated Lizards
135
626 Sex Ratios as Nash Equilibria
137
627 A Mating Game
140
628 Coordination Failure
141
630 Number Guessing Game
142
633 Attack on Hidden Object
143
635 Mutual Monitoring in a Partnership
145
637 Altruism? in Bird Flocks
146
638 The Groucho Marx Game
147
639 Games of Perfect Information
151
641 Territoriality as a Correlated Equilibrium
153
74 Properties of the Employment Relationship
168
75 Peasant and Landlord
169
76 Bobs Car Insurance
173
77 A Generic PrincipalAgent Model
174
Signaling Games
179
82 A Generic Signaling Game
180
The DarwinFisher Model
182
84 Biological Signals as Handicaps
187
85 The Shepherds Who Never Cry Wolf
189
86 My Brothers Keeper
190
87 Honest Signaling among Partial Altruists
193
88 Educational Signaling
195
89 Education as a Screening Device
197
810 Capital as a Signaling Device
199
Repeated Games
201
91 Death and Discount Rates in Repeated Games
202
93 Alice and Bob Cooperate
204
94 The Strategy of an Oil Cartel
205
96 Tacit Collusion
206
97 The OneStage Deviation Principle
208
98 Tit for Tat
209
99 Id Rather Switch Than Fight
210
910 The Folk Theorem
213
911 The Folk Theorem and the Nature of Signaling
216
912 The Folk Theorem Fails in Large Groups
217
913 Contingent Renewal Markets Do Not Clear
219
914 ShortSide Power in Contingent Renewal Markets
222
915 Money Confers Power in Contingent Renewal Markets
223
917 Contingent Renewal Labor Markets
224
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
229
Definition
230
102 Properties of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
232
103 Characterizing Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
233
104 A Symmetric Coordination Game
236
106 Symmetrical Throwing Fingers
237
107 Hawks Doves and Bourgeois
238
1010 Evolutionarily Stable Strategies Are Not Unbeatable
240
1012 Rock Paper and Scissors Has No ESS
241
1014 Multiple Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
242
1016 Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Asymmetric Games
244
Dynamical Systems
247
112 Population Growth
248
113 Population Growth with Limited Carrying Capacity
249
114 The LotkaVolterra PredatorPrey Model
251
115 Dynamical Systems Theory
255
116 Existence and Uniqueness
256
117 The Linearization Theorem
257
118 Dynamical Systems in One Dimension
258
119 Dynamical Systems in Two Dimensions
260
1110 Exercises in TwoDimensional Linear Systems
264
1111 LotkaVolterra with Limited Carrying Capacity
266
1113 The HartmanGrobman Theorem
267
1114 Features of TwoDimensional Dynamical Systems
268
Evolutionary Dynamics
270
121 The Origins of Evolutionary Dynamics
271
122 Strategies as Replicators
272
123 A Dynamic HawkDove Game
274
124 Sexual Reproduction and the Replicator Dynamic
276
125 Properties of the Replicator System
278
126 The Replicator Dynamic in Two Dimensions
279
127 Dominated Strategies and the Replicator Dynamic
280
128 Equilibrium and Stability with a Replicator Dynamic
282
129 Evolutionary Stability and Asymptotically Stability
284
1211 Characterizing 2 x 2 Normal Form Games II
285
1212 Invasion of the PureStrategy Nash Mutants II
286
1213 A Generalization of Rock Paper and Scissors
287
1215 The Dynamics of Rock Paper and Scissors
288
1217 Asymmetric Evolutionary Games
290
1218 Asymmetric Evolutionary Games II
295
Markov Economies and Stochastic Dynamical Systems
297
132 The Ergodic Theorem for Markov Chains
305
133 The Infinite Random Walk
307
134 The Sisyphean Markov Chain
308
135 Andrei Andreyevichs TwoUrn Problem
309
136 Solving Linear Recursion Equations
310
137 Good Vibrations
311
138 Adaptive Learning
312
139 The Steady State of a Markov Chain
314
1310 Adaptive Learning II
315
1311 Adaptive Learning with Errors
316
1312 Stochastic Stability
317
Table of Symbols
319
Answers
321
Sources for Problems
373
References
375
Index
385
Copyright

Common terms and phrases

About the author (2009)

Herbert Gintis holds faculty positions at the Santa Fe Institute, Central European University, and University of Siena. He has coedited numerous books, including "Moral Sentiments and Material Interests, Unequal Chances" (Princeton), and "Foundations of Human Sociality".

Bibliographic information