Game Theory Evolving: A ProblemCentered Introduction to Modeling Strategic Interaction (Second Edition)Since its original publication in 2000, Game Theory Evolving has been considered the best textbook on evolutionary game theory. This completely revised and updated second edition of Game Theory Evolving contains new material and shows students how to apply game theory to model human behavior in ways that reflect the special nature of sociality and individuality. The textbook continues its indepth look at cooperation in teams, agentbased simulations, experimental economics, the evolution and diffusion of preferences, and the connection between biology and economics. Recognizing that students learn by doing, the textbook introduces principles through practice. Herbert Gintis exposes students to the techniques and applications of game theory through a wealth of sophisticated and surprisingly funtosolve problems involving human and animal behavior. The second edition includes solutions to the problems presented and information related to agentbased modeling. In addition, the textbook incorporates instruction in using mathematical software to solve complex problems. Game Theory Evolving is perfect for graduate and upperlevel undergraduate economics students, and is a terrific introduction for ambitious doityourselfers throughout the behavioral sciences.

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Contents
Probability Theory  1 
12 Probability Spaces  2 
13 De Morgans Laws  3 
16 Probability as Frequency  4 
17 Craps  5 
110 Aces Up  6 
112 Combinations and Sampling  7 
116 The Addition Rule for Probabilities  8 
642 Haggling at the Bazaar  154 
643 Poker with Bluffing Revisited  156 
644 Algorithms for Finding Nash Equilibria  157 
645 Why Play Mixed Strategies?  160 
646 Reviewing of Basic Concepts  161 
PrincipalAgent Models  162 
72 Contract Monitoring  163 
73 Profit Signaling  164 
119 Conditional Probability  9 
121 Extrasensory Perception  10 
124 Color Blindness  11 
128 The Principle of Insufficient Reason  12 
131 The Value of Eyewitness Testimony  13 
133 The Uniform Distribution  16 
134 Laplaces Law of Succession  17 
Bayesian Decision Theory  18 
22 Time Consistency and Exponential Discounting  20 
23 The Expected Utility Principle  22 
24 Risk and the Shape of the Utility Function  26 
25 The Scientific Status of the Rational Actor Model  30 
Game Theory Basic Concepts  32 
32 The Extensive Form  38 
33 The Normal Form  41 
34 Mixed Strategies  42 
35 Nash Equilibrium  43 
36 The Fundamental Theorem of Game Theory  44 
37 Solving for MixedStrategy Nash Equilibria  45 
38 Throwing Fingers  46 
310 The HawkDove Game  48 
311 The Prisoners Dilemma  50 
Eliminating Dominated Strategies  52 
42 Backward Induction  54 
43 Exercises in Eliminating Dominated Strategies  55 
44 Subgame Perfection  57 
45 Stackelberg Leadership  59 
47 The Mystery of Kidnapping  60 
48 The Eviction Notice  62 
410 Military Strategy  63 
411 The Dr Strangelove Game  64 
413 Nuisance Suits  65 
414 An Armaments Game  67 
416 Poker with Bluffing  68 
417 The Little Miss Muffet Game  69 
418 Cooperation with Overlapping Generations  70 
419 DominanceSolvable Games  71 
420 Agentbased Modeling  72 
421 Why Play a Nash Equilibrium?  75 
422 Modeling the FinitelyRepeated Prisoners Dilemma  77 
423 Review of Basic Concepts  79 
PureStrategy Nash Equilibria  80 
52 Competition on Main Street  81 
54 The Tobacco Market  87 
The Trivial Pastime  88 
57 NoDraw HighLow Poker  89 
58 An Agentbased Model of NoDraw HighLow Poker  91 
59 The Truth Game  92 
510 The Rubinstein Bargaining Model  94 
511 Bargaining with Heterogeneous Impatience  96 
512 Bargaining with One Outside Option  97 
513 Bargaining with Dual Outside Options  98 
514 Huey Dewey and Louie Split a Dollar  102 
515 Twin Sisters  104 
517 The Rotten Kid Theorem  106 
518 The Shopper and the Fish Merchant  107 
519 Pure Coordination Games  109 
Experimental Evidence  110 
522 Introductory Offers  111 
523 Web Sites for Spiders  112 
MixedStrategy Nash Equilibria  116 
62 Lions and Antelope  117 
63 A Patent Race  118 
64 Tennis Strategy  119 
66 Hard Love  120 
68 Robin Hood and Little John  122 
610 Family Politics  123 
612 A Card Game  124 
613 CheaterInspector  126 
615 Characterizing 2x2 Normal Form Games I  127 
616 Big John and Little John Revisited  128 
619 Twin Sisters Revisited  129 
621 OneCard TwoRound Poker with Bluffing  131 
622 An AgentBased Model of Poker with Bluffing  132 
623 Trust in Networks  133 
624 El Farol  134 
625 Decorated Lizards  135 
626 Sex Ratios as Nash Equilibria  137 
627 A Mating Game  140 
628 Coordination Failure  141 
630 Number Guessing Game  142 
633 Attack on Hidden Object  143 
635 Mutual Monitoring in a Partnership  145 
637 Altruism? in Bird Flocks  146 
638 The Groucho Marx Game  147 
639 Games of Perfect Information  151 
641 Territoriality as a Correlated Equilibrium  153 
74 Properties of the Employment Relationship  168 
75 Peasant and Landlord  169 
76 Bobs Car Insurance  173 
77 A Generic PrincipalAgent Model  174 
Signaling Games  179 
82 A Generic Signaling Game  180 
The DarwinFisher Model  182 
84 Biological Signals as Handicaps  187 
85 The Shepherds Who Never Cry Wolf  189 
86 My Brothers Keeper  190 
87 Honest Signaling among Partial Altruists  193 
88 Educational Signaling  195 
89 Education as a Screening Device  197 
810 Capital as a Signaling Device  199 
Repeated Games  201 
91 Death and Discount Rates in Repeated Games  202 
93 Alice and Bob Cooperate  204 
94 The Strategy of an Oil Cartel  205 
96 Tacit Collusion  206 
97 The OneStage Deviation Principle  208 
98 Tit for Tat  209 
99 Id Rather Switch Than Fight  210 
910 The Folk Theorem  213 
911 The Folk Theorem and the Nature of Signaling  216 
912 The Folk Theorem Fails in Large Groups  217 
913 Contingent Renewal Markets Do Not Clear  219 
914 ShortSide Power in Contingent Renewal Markets  222 
915 Money Confers Power in Contingent Renewal Markets  223 
917 Contingent Renewal Labor Markets  224 
Evolutionarily Stable Strategies  229 
Definition  230 
102 Properties of Evolutionarily Stable Strategies  232 
103 Characterizing Evolutionarily Stable Strategies  233 
104 A Symmetric Coordination Game  236 
106 Symmetrical Throwing Fingers  237 
107 Hawks Doves and Bourgeois  238 
1010 Evolutionarily Stable Strategies Are Not Unbeatable  240 
1012 Rock Paper and Scissors Has No ESS  241 
1014 Multiple Evolutionarily Stable Strategies  242 
1016 Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Asymmetric Games  244 
Dynamical Systems  247 
112 Population Growth  248 
113 Population Growth with Limited Carrying Capacity  249 
114 The LotkaVolterra PredatorPrey Model  251 
115 Dynamical Systems Theory  255 
116 Existence and Uniqueness  256 
117 The Linearization Theorem  257 
118 Dynamical Systems in One Dimension  258 
119 Dynamical Systems in Two Dimensions  260 
1110 Exercises in TwoDimensional Linear Systems  264 
1111 LotkaVolterra with Limited Carrying Capacity  266 
1113 The HartmanGrobman Theorem  267 
1114 Features of TwoDimensional Dynamical Systems  268 
Evolutionary Dynamics  270 
121 The Origins of Evolutionary Dynamics  271 
122 Strategies as Replicators  272 
123 A Dynamic HawkDove Game  274 
124 Sexual Reproduction and the Replicator Dynamic  276 
125 Properties of the Replicator System  278 
126 The Replicator Dynamic in Two Dimensions  279 
127 Dominated Strategies and the Replicator Dynamic  280 
128 Equilibrium and Stability with a Replicator Dynamic  282 
129 Evolutionary Stability and Asymptotically Stability  284 
1211 Characterizing 2 x 2 Normal Form Games II  285 
1212 Invasion of the PureStrategy Nash Mutants II  286 
1213 A Generalization of Rock Paper and Scissors  287 
1215 The Dynamics of Rock Paper and Scissors  288 
1217 Asymmetric Evolutionary Games  290 
1218 Asymmetric Evolutionary Games II  295 
Markov Economies and Stochastic Dynamical Systems  297 
132 The Ergodic Theorem for Markov Chains  305 
133 The Infinite Random Walk  307 
134 The Sisyphean Markov Chain  308 
135 Andrei Andreyevichs TwoUrn Problem  309 
136 Solving Linear Recursion Equations  310 
137 Good Vibrations  311 
138 Adaptive Learning  312 
139 The Steady State of a Markov Chain  314 
1310 Adaptive Learning II  315 
1311 Adaptive Learning with Errors  316 
1312 Stochastic Stability  317 
Table of Symbols  319 
Answers  321 
Sources for Problems  373 
References  375 
385  