Security and Game Theory: Algorithms, Deployed Systems, Lessons LearnedGlobal threats of terrorism, drug-smuggling and other crimes have led to a significant increase in research on game theory for security. Game theory provides a sound mathematical approach to deploy limited security resources to maximize their effectiveness. A typical approach is to randomize security schedules to avoid predictability, with the randomization using artificial intelligence techniques to take into account the importance of different targets and potential adversary reactions. This book distills the forefront of this research to provide the first and only study of long-term deployed applications of game theory for security for key organizations such as the Los Angeles International Airport police and the US Federal Air Marshals Service. The author and his research group draw from their extensive experience working with security officials to intelligently allocate limited security resources to protect targets, outlining the applications of these algorithms in research and the real world. |
Contents
| 1 | |
Part I Security Experts Perspectives | 25 |
Part II Deployed Applications | 65 |
Part III Efficient Algorithms for Massive Security Games | 129 |
Part IV Future Research | 191 |
Part V Short Bios | 285 |
| 297 | |
| 311 | |
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Security and Game Theory: Algorithms, Deployed Systems, Lessons Learned Milind Tambe No preview available - 2011 |
Common terms and phrases
actions adversary types agent airport algorithms allocation analysis applications approach ARMOR ASAP assigned attack set attacker types attacker's Bayesian game Bayesian Stackelberg games best response bomb bounded rationality challenges checkpoints Coast Guard COBRA compact representation computational coverage vector defender strategy defender's deployed deployment DOBSS equilibrium ERASER ERASER-C evaluation example expected payoff expected reward FAMS domain feasible Federal Air Marshals Figure flights follower types game instances game theory game-theoretic Homeland Security human implement input IRIS Kiekintveld LAWA police leader linear program method MILP minimax mixed strategy multi-agent multiple Nash equilibrium observe optimal solution ORIGAMI Paruchuri patrolling Pita players potential problem provides pure strategies random strategy real-world runtime Sandholm security activities security domains security efforts security games solution concept solution quality solve SSE strategy target Terminal terrorist Transportation Security Administration uncertainty uniform random utility zero-sum