Political warfare and psychological operations : rethinking the US approach

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Carnes Lord
DIANE Publishing, 1989 - Psychological warfare - 242 pages
 

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Page 190 - You ask, what is our aim? I can answer in one word : It is victory, victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory, however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival.
Page 23 - Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy.
Page 178 - By moral influence I mean that which causes the people to be in harmony with their leaders, so that they will accompany them in life and unto death without fear of mortal peril...
Page 6 - The Tao is the way of humanity and justice; 'laws' are regulations and institutions. Those who excel in war first cultivate their own humanity and justice and maintain their laws and institutions. By these means they make their governments invincible.
Page 159 - Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).
Page 226 - THOMPSON is associate professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.
Page 185 - how to defect" will be broadcast, and programs on defectors living in the West will carefully avoid any suggestion that others should follow their example. 9. Avoidance of any suggestion that might lead audiences to believe that, in the event of international crisis or civil disorder, the West might intervene militarily in any part of the broadcast area.
Page 34 - Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy (McLean, Va.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984), pp. 155-5755. US Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Soviet Active Measures, p. 33. 56. Shultz and Godson, Dezinformatsia, pp. 155-57; Stephen Engelberg, "If It's Too Bad to Be True, It Could Be Disinformation...
Page 101 - Covert Action and Foreign Policy," in Roy Godson, ed., Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Covert Action (Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Center, 1981), pp.
Page 60 - General McClure created a staff with responsibilities for both psychological and unconventional warfare. It was largely as a result of McClure's status and foresight that the Army developed its first capability to conduct unconventional warfare; the inclusion of a Special Operations Division in OCPW and McClure's selection of the key personnel for that office gave officers like Colonel Russel Volckmann and Colonel Aaron Bank the opportunity to form plans for unconventional warfare and the creation...

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