...credibility are like those of conduct which according to Mill do not admit of proof in the ordinary sense. "Considerations may be presented capable of determining the intellect either to give or withhold its assent."4 I must leave it to philosophers to enounce the considerations proper to the standard of credibility....

...to intuition. Moore agrees that no strict proof is possible, but he thinks that, in Mill's phrase, "considerations may be presented capable of determining...intellect either to give or withhold its assent to the doctrine."17 Contrary to Sidgwick, of course, Moore believes that these considerations will lead one...

...amenable to it as any other of the disputed questions of philosophy. The subject is within the cognizance of the rational faculty; and neither does that faculty...assent to the doctrine; and this is equivalent to proof.24 And what, exactly, are the decisive considerations to which Mill adverts? It is the fact that,...

...consideration (enthumema) — a consideration, if I may adapt a famous phrase of John Stuart Mill's, which is capable of determining the intellect either to give or withhold its assent. And that, as Mill also said, is equivalent to proof, that is, to apodeixis in the everyday sense of...

...amenable to it as any other of the disputed questions of philosophy. The subject is within the cognizance of the rational faculty; and neither does that faculty...to the doctrine; and this is equivalent to proof. (1.5) The utilitarian principle, in other words, cannot be offered up as just obvious to those who...

...rejection must depend on blind impulse or arbitrary choice. . . . The subject is within the cognizance of the rational faculty, and neither does that faculty...or withhold its assent to the doctrine, and this is the equivalent of proof.4 Furthermore, at the end of Chapter IV, he says that if the doctrine he has...

...capable of argument or "proof in a broader sense of the word: "The subject is within the cognizance of the rational faculty: and neither does that faculty deal with it solely in the way of intuition." Mill will present an argument for utilitarianism, in this larger sense of rational considerations,...

...species of practical reasoning, in that, though there can be no question of proof as demonstration, yet "considerations may be presented capable of determining...intellect either to give or withhold its assent" to moral and (in general) practical judgments. Mill's arguments for freedom of expression about questions...

...credibility are like those of conduct which according to Mill do not admit of proof in the ordinary sense. "Considerations may be presented capable of determining...the intellect either to give or withhold its assent" (Utilitarianism, p. 6, cp. p. 52). I must leave it to philosophers to enounce the considerations proper...

...meaning of the word," cannot be deductive, even though Mill also says that the considerations he thinks "capable of determining the intellect either to give or withhold its assent to the doctrine (of utility)" are "equivalent to proof." Nevertheless, when Mill actually gives his "proof," it does...