Corruption, Contention and Reform: The Power of Deep DemocratizationMichael Johnston argues that corruption will persist, and even be the rule rather than the exception, until those with a stake in ending it can act in ways that cannot be ignored. This is the key principle of 'deep democratization', enabling citizens to defend their interests by political means. The author analyses four syndromes of corruption in light of this principle: official moguls in Egypt and Tunisia, oligarchs and clans in the Philippines, elite cartels in Argentina, and influence markets in France, Australia and the US. Johnston argues that different kinds of corruption require distinctive responses, each bearing specific risks. Focusing on recent events, including the global economic crisis and the Arab Spring, he shows that we can assess vulnerabilities to corruption and the effects of reforms, and use this information to identify new practices. His book offers a fundamental reappraisal of ways to check abuses of wealth and power. |
Contents
Reform in an imperfect world | 1 |
Deep democratization and the control of corruption | 29 |
reform in fragile | 57 |
power protection and profits | 86 |
high stakes and insecurity | 119 |
hanging on with a little help from my friends | 151 |
Other editions - View all
Corruption, Contention, and Reform: The Power of Deep Democratization Michael Johnston Limited preview - 2013 |
Corruption, Contention, and Reform: The Power of Deep Democratization Michael Johnston No preview available - 2013 |
Common terms and phrases
ABS-CBN abuses accountability agencies agenda Ampatuan anti-corruption Argentina basic benchmarks benefits Botswana build bureaucratic challenge Chapter citizens civil society Clans collective-action problems collusion competition corruption control corruption problems Costigan Commission countries credible dealings deep democratization democracy effective Egypt elections electoral Elite Cartel corruption Elite Cartels example expectations factions four syndromes fragile situations funds goal government performance groups Guillan Montero 2011 idea improvements incentives Influence Market corruption insecurity institutions interests involved issues Johnston 2005a Kohen leaders less levels liberal democracies Maguindanao major Manzetti Menem Mubarak neoliberal Néstor Kirchner networks Official Moguls Oligarch-and-Clan oligarchs Online opportunities organizations participation particularly parties patronage Peronist Philippines political and economic President protect regime risks rules safe political sectors social sorts South Korea specific sustained syndrome of corruption tion today’s trends trust Tunisia viewed February viewed January voters weak