Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial CrisesThe best known and most highly regarded book on financial crises Financial crises and speculative excess can be traced back to the very beginning of trade and commerce. Since its introduction in 1978, this book has charted and followed this volatile world of financial markets. Charles Kindleberger's brilliant, panoramic history revealed how financial crises follow a nature-like rhythm: they peak and purge, swell and storm. Now this newly revised and expanded Fourth Edition probes the most recent "natural disasters" of the markets--from the difficulties in East Asia and the repercussions of the Mexican crisis to the 1992 Sterling crisis. His sharply drawn history confronts a host of key questions. Charles P. Kindleberger (Boston, MA) was the Ford Professor of Economics at MIT for thirty-three years. He is a financial historian and prolific writer who has published over twenty-four books. |
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Contents
Anatomy of a Typical Crisis | 13 |
Monetary Expansion | 49 |
The Emergence of Swindles | 73 |
Copyright | |
8 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises Charles Poor Kindleberger No preview available - 2002 |
Common terms and phrases
American amount assets authorities Bank of England Bank of France bankers bills bonds boom borrowing Britain British bubble called Cambridge capital central bank century changes Chapter collapse Company crash crisis Currency debt December decline deposits depression discount discussion distress early Economic especially Europe exchange expansion expectations failed failure fall Federal financial crises firms followed foreign France French funds Germany gold Hamburg History houses increase interest International investment issue Italy John land last resort later leading lender of last lending less limited liquidity loans London mania March million monetary notes October operations panic Paris percent period produced question raised rational Reserve responsibility rise securities sell South Sea speculation stock market supply Theory tion trade turn United University Press York