Safety-I and Safety–II: The Past and Future of Safety ManagementThis book analyses and explains the principles behind Safety-I and Safety-II and approaches and considers the past and future of safety management practices. The analysis makes use of common examples and cases from domains such as aviation, nuclear power production, process management and health care. The final chapters explain the theoretical and practical consequences of the new, Safety-II perspective on day-to-day operations as well as on strategic management (safety culture). |
Contents
The Issues | 1 |
The Pedigree | 21 |
The Current State | 37 |
The Myths of SafetyI | 61 |
The Deconstruction of SafetyI | 91 |
The Need to Change | 107 |
The Construction of SafetyII | 125 |
The Way Ahead | 145 |
Final Thoughts | 171 |
Glossary | 181 |
Other editions - View all
Safety-I and Safety–II: The Past and Future of Safety Management Professor Erik Hollnagel Limited preview - 2014 |
Safety-I and Safety-II: The Past and Future of Safety Management Erik Hollnagel Limited preview - 2018 |
Safety-I and Safety-II: The Past and Future of Safety Management Professor Erik Hollnagel Limited preview - 2014 |
Common terms and phrases
accident investigations accident pyramid accidents and incidents activity adverse events adverse outcomes aetiology analysis Appreciate Inquiry assume assumption barriers bimodal blunt end Buizingen causality credo ceteris paribus Chapter Charles Perrow components consequences consider decision matrix deconstruction defined definition described effects engineering ensure environment everyday explain failures Fault Tree Figure focus function goes HAZoP Heinrich human error human factors Human Reliability improve industrial instance intractable karl Weick learning linear look major injury malfunction means Moore’s Law myths necessary number of adverse ontology operations organisational performance adjustments performance variability phenomenology possible practice prevent principle proactive safety management problem reason recognised reliability root cause Root Cause Analysis safe Safety–I and Safety–II Safety–II perspective sense serious sharp end simple situation socio-technical habitat socio-technical systems specific Swiss cheese model things go right things go wrong things that go thinking train types unacceptable understand Work-As-Done Work-As-Imagined