The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in the Public Sector

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Cambridge University Press, Nov 24, 1995 - Political Science - 263 pages
This book applies the basic ideas and models of economics to develop a single transactions framework to explain the key institutional arrangements across the whole range of public sector organization: the regulatory commission, the executive tax-financed bureau, and the state-owned enterprise. This book also explores the link between agency form and administrative function, agency independence from the legislature, the rights extended to private interests to influence administrative decision making, the role of civil service arrangements that are so often seen as simply frustrating efficiency and responsiveness, and the boundary between public and private sectors. This book should be of value to those with a practical interest in public administration as well as students of political science, public administration, economics, and public policy.
 

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Contents

Introduction
1
Basic theory and method A transactions cost approach
7
Regulatory institutions
40
Bureaus and the budget
79
Bureaus and the civil service
95
Public versus private enterprise
134
Public enterprise versus public bureau
170
Conclusion
182
Appendixes
195
Notes
213
Bibliography
241
Name index
257
Subject index
260
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