The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in the Public Sector
This book applies the basic ideas and models of economics to develop a single transactions framework to explain the key institutional arrangements across the whole range of public sector organization: the regulatory commission, the executive tax-financed bureau, and the state-owned enterprise. This book also explores the link between agency form and administrative function, agency independence from the legislature, the rights extended to private interests to influence administrative decision making, the role of civil service arrangements that are so often seen as simply frustrating efficiency and responsiveness, and the boundary between public and private sectors. This book should be of value to those with a practical interest in public administration as well as students of political science, public administration, economics, and public policy.
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Basic theory and method A transactions cost approach
Bureaus and the budget
Bureaus and the civil service
Public versus private enterprise
Public enterprise versus public bureau
ability admin administrative agents agency costs agency loss agency problems Aharoni appointments argues behavior beneficiaries benefits budget bureau heads bureaucratic chapter characteristics civil service commitment problem compensation competition compliance Congress constituents constraint courts create delegation difficult dominated easier effect employees employment enacting coalition enacting legislature example expenditure face favor fiscal grade groups impact important imposed incentives increase incumbent legislature independent industries influence information asymmetry institutional choice instruments judicial review legislative decision-making costs less level of effort McCubbins ment merit system monitoring natural monopoly noncommercial objectives officials organization output oversight patronage pension political position private firms private interests private sector procedural production public enterprise public ownership public sector reduce regulation regulatory agencies relatively restrictions reward risk risk-averse role sabotage salary senior shirking suggests taxpayers tenure tion tive transaction problems transactions approach transactions cost typically U.S. Congress uncertainty workers Zealand Zealand Business Roundtable