The Social Psychology of Bargaining and NegotiationThe Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation focuses on the integrative survey of work done in social psychology on the processes of negotiation and bargaining. The publication first takes a look at bargaining relationship, an overview of social psychological approaches to the study of bargaining, and the social components of bargaining structure. Discussions focus on the number of parties involved in the bargaining exchange, factors affecting bargaining effectiveness, structural and social psychological characteristics of bargaining relationships, and availability of third parties. The text then examines the issue components of bargaining structure and bargainers as individuals, including individual differences in personality and background, interpersonal orientation, issue incentive magnitude and reward structure, and intangible issues in bargaining. The book ponders on social influence and influence strategies and interdependence. Topics include motivational orientation, parameters of interdependence in bargaining, overall pattern of moves and countermoves, and appeals and demands. The publication is a valuable source of data for researchers interested in the social psychology of bargaining and negotiation. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
An Overview of Social Psychological Approaches | 19 |
Social Components of Bargaining Structure | 41 |
Copyright | |
26 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation Jeffrey Z. Rubin,Bert R. Brown Limited preview - 2013 |
The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation Jeffrey Z. Rubin,Bert R. Brown Snippet view - 1975 |
Common terms and phrases
Acme-Bolt Trucking game alliances analysis attempt bargainer's bargaining behavior bargaining effectiveness bargaining relationship behave more cooperatively Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union Benelux Bilateral Monopoly Bixenstine coalitions communication competitive MO complex concerned concessions conflict cooperative choices cooperative MO coordination game Deutsch and Krauss discussion dyads equal power exchange expect experiment experimental experimental literature exploitative findings found that subjects function given greater groups high IO high IOs important incentive increase influence initial instructions intangible issues interaction interpersonal investigators involved Kelley manipulated matrix Monopoly game mutual occur operative MO orientation other's behavior outcomes pairs paradigm Parcheesi payoffs PD game perimental person player position present pressures Prisoner's Dilemma Proposition Radlow relatively reported reward situation social order social psychologists Soviet Union stake status strategy structural studies subjects play suggest task Tedeschi tend third party threat tion tive triads trial union variables variations varied