nature of the human mind. It never can view, clearly and dis tinctly, more than one object at a time. If it must look at two or three together, especially objects that have resemblance or connexion, it finds itself confused and embarrassed. It cannot clearly perceive in what they agree, and in what they differ. Thus, were any object, suppose some animal, to be presented to my view, of whose structure I wished to form a distinct notion, I should desire all his trappings to be taken off; I should require it to be brought before me by itself, and to stand alone, that there might be nothing to divide my attention. The same is the case with words. If, when any one would inform me of his meaning, he also tells me more than what conveys it; if he joins foreign circumstances to the principal objects; if, by unnecessarily varying the expression, he shifts the point of view, and makes me see sometimes the object itself, and sometimes another thing that is connected with it, he thereby obliges me to look on several objects at once, and I lose sight of the principal. He loads the animal he is showing me, with so many trappings and collars, that I cannot distinctly view it; or he brings so many of the same species before me, somewhat resembling, and yet somewhat differ ing, that I see none of them clearly. When an author tells me of his hero's courage in the day of battle, the expression is precise, and I understand it fully: but if, from the desire of multiplying words, he should praise his courage and fortitude; at the moment he joins these words together, my idea begins to waver. He means to express one quality more strongly, but he is in truth expressing two courage resists danger; fortitude supports pain. The occasion of exerting each of these qualities is different; and being led to think of both together, when only one of them should be considered, my view is rendered unsteady, and my conception of the object indistinct.

All subjects do not equally require precision. It is sufficient, on many occasions, that we have a general view of the meaning The subject, perhaps, is of the known and familiar kind, and we are in no hazard of mistaking the sense of the author, though every word which he uses is not precise and exact.

Many authors offend against this rule of precision. A considera ble one, in describing a bad action, expresses himself thus: "It is to remove a good and orderly affection, and to introduce an ill or disorderly one to commit an action that is ill, immoral, and unjust; to do ill, or to act in prejudice of integrity, good nature, and worth

A crowd of unmeaning or useless words is brought together by some authors, who, afraid of expressing themselves in a common and ordinary manner, and allured by an appearance of splendour, surround every thing which they mean to say with a certain copious loquacity.

The great source of a loose style in opposition to precision, is the injudicious use of the words ternied synonymous. They are called synonymous, because they agree in expressing one prin

cipal idea; but, for the most part, if not always, they express it with some diversity in the circumstances.

The following instances show a difference in the meaning of words reputed synonymous, and point out the use of attending with care and strictness, to the exact import of words.

Custom, habit.—Custom, respects the action; habit, the actor By custom, we mean the frequent repetition of the same act by habit, the effect which that repetition produces on the mind or body. By the custom of walking often in the streets, one acquires a habit of idleness.

Pride, vanity.-Pride makes us esteem ourselves; vanity makes us desire the esteem of others. It is just to say, that a man is too proud to be vain.

Haughtiness, disdain.-Haughtiness is founded on the high opinion we entertain of ourselves; disdain, on the low opinion we have of others.

Only, alone.~Only, imports that there is no other of the same kind; alone, imports being accompanied by no other. An only child, is one that has neither brother nor sister; a child alone, is one who is left by itself. There is a difference, therefore, in precise language, between these two phrases: "Virtue only makes us happy" and "Virtue alone makes us happy."

Wisdom, prudence.-Wisdom leads us to speak and act what is most proper. Prudence, prevents our speaking or acting im properly.

Entire, complete.-A thing is entire, by wanting none of its parts: complete, by wanting none of the appendages that belong to it. A man may have an entire house to himself, and yet not have one complete apartment.

Surprised, astonished, amazed, confounded.-I am surprised with what is new or unexpected; I am astonished at what is vast or great; I am amazed at what is incomprehensible; I am confounded by what is shocking or terrible.

Tranquillity, peace, calm.--Tranquillity, respects a situation free from trouble, considered in itself; peace, the same situation with respect to any causes that might interrupt it; calm, with regard to a disturbed situation going before or following it. A good man enjoys tranquillity, in himself; peace, with others; and calm, after the storm.

These are some of the numerous instances of words, in our language, whose significations approach, but are not precisely the same. The more the distinction in the meaning of such words is attended to, the more clearly and forcibly shall we speak or write. It may not, on all occasions, be necessary to pay a great deal of attention to very nice distinctions; yet the foregoing instances show the utility of some general care to understand the distinct import of our words.

While we are attending to precision, we must be on our guard, lest, from the desire of pruning too closely, we retrench all Lopiousness. Scarcely in any language are there two words

that convey precisely the same idea; a person thoroughly con versant in the propriety of the language, will always be able to observe something that distinguishes them. As they are like different shades of the same colour, an accurate writer can employ them to great advantage, by using them so as to heighten and complete the object which he presents to us. He supplies by one what was wanting in the other, to the strength, or to the finishing, of the image which he means to exhibit. But, for this purpose, he must be attentive to the choice of his words, and not employ them carelessly, merely for the sake of filling up a period, or of rounding or diversifying his language, as if their signification were exactly the same, while in truth it is not. To unite copiousness and precision, to be full and easy, and at the same time correct and exact in the choice of every word, is no doubt one of the highest and most difficult attainments in writing.

PART II.

Of Perspicuity and Accuracy of Expression, with respect to the Construction of Sentences.

SENTENCES, in general, should neither be very long, nor very short: long ones require close attention to make us clearly perceive the connexion of the several parts; and short ones are apt to break the sense, and weaken the connexion of thought. Yet occasionally they may both be used with force and propriety; as may be seen in the following sentences.

"If you look about you, and consider the lives of others as well as your own; if you think how few are born with honour, and how many die without name or children; how little beauty we see, and how few friends we hear of; how much poverty, and how many diseases there are in the world; you will fall down upon your knees, and instead of repining at one affliction, will admire so many blessings which you have received from the Divine hand." This is a sentence composed of several members linked together, and hanging upon one another, so that the sense of the whole is not brought out till the close. The following is an example of one in which the sense is formed into short, independent propositions, each complete within itself. "I confess it was want of consideration that made me an author. I wrote, because it amused me. I corrected, because it was as pleasant to me to correct as to write. I published, because I was told I might please such as it was a credit to please."

A train of sentences, constructed in the same manner, and with the same number of members, should never be allowed to succeed one another. A long succession of either long or short sentences should also be avoided; for the ear tires of either of them when too long continued.

Whereas, by a proper mixture of long and short periods, and of periods variously constructed, not only the ear is gratified; but animation and force are given to our style.

We now proceed to consider the things most essential to an accurate and a perfect sentence. They appear to be the four

following: 1. CLEARNESS. 2. UNITY. 3. STRENGTH. 4. A JUDI

CIOUS USE OF THE FIGURES OF SPEECH.

CHAPTER I. Of the Clearness of a Sentence.

PURITY, propriety, and precision, in words and phrases sepa rately considered, have already been explained, and shown to ba necessary to perspicuous and accurate writing. The just relation of sentences, and the parts of sentences, to one another, and the due arrangement of the whole, are the subjects which remain to be discussed.

THE FIRST requisite of a perfect sentence is clearness.

Whatever leaves the mine in any sort of suspense as to the meaning, ought to be avoided. Obscurity arises from two causes; either from a wrong choice of words, or a wrong arrangement of them. The choice of words and phrases, as far as regards perspicuity, has been already considered. The disposition of them comes now under consideration.

The first thing to be studied here, is grammatical propriety. But as the grammar of our language is comparatively not ex tensive, there may be an obscure order of words, where there is no transgression of any grammatical rule. The relations of words, or members of a period, are, with us, ascertained only by the position in which they stand.

Hence a capital rule in the arrangement of sentences is, that the words or members, most clearly related, should be placed in the sentence as near to each other as possible, so as to make their mutual relation clearly appear. It will be proper to produce some instances, in order to show the importance of this rule.

1 In the position of adverbs. "The Romans understood liberty at least, as well as we." These words are capable of two different senses, according as the emphasis, in reading them, is laid upon liberty, or upon at least. The words should have been thus ar ranged: "The Romans understood liberty as well, at least, as we," "Theism can only be opposed to polytheism, or atheism." Is it meant that theism is capable of nothing else besides being opposed to polytheism, or atheism? This is what the words literally import, through the wrong placing of the adverb only. It should have been, "Theism can be opposed only to polytheism or atheism."

"By the pleasures of the imagination, I mean only such pleasures as arise originally from sight." When it is said, "I mean only such pleasures," it may be remarked, that the adverb only is not properly placed. It is not intended here to qualify the word mean, but such pleasures; and therefore should have been placed in as close connexion as possible with the word which it limits or qualifies. The style becomes more clear and neat, when the words are arranged thus: "By the pleasures of the imagination, I mean such pleasures only as arise from sight."

In the following sentence, the word more is not in its proper place. "There is not, perhaps, any real beauty or deformity more in one piece of matter than another." The phrase ought

to have stood thus: "Beauty or deformity in one piece of matter more than in another."

2 In the position of circumstances, and of particular members. An author, in his dissertation on parties, thus expresses inself: "Are these designs which any man, who is born a Briton, in any circumstances, in any situation, ought to be ashamed or afraid to avow ?" Here we are left at a loss, whether these words, "in any circumstances, in any situation," are connected with "a man born in Britain, in any circumstances or situation," or with that man's" avowing his designs in any circumstances or situation into which he may be brought." "As it is probable that the latter was intended, the arrangement ought to have been conducted thus: "Are these designs which any man, who is born a Briton, ought to be ashamed or afraid, in any situation, in any circumstances, to avow?"

The following is another instance of a wrong arrangement of circumstances. "A great stone that I happened to find, after a long search, by the sea shore, served me for an anchor." One would think that the search was confined to the sea shore; but as the meaning is, that the great stone was found by the sea shore, the period ought to have run thus: "A great stone, that, after a long search, I happened to find by the sea shore, served me for an anchor."

It is a rule, too, never to crowd many circumstances together but rather to intersperse them in different parts of the sentence, joined with the principal words on which they depend. For instance: "What I had the opportunity of mentioning to my friend, sometime ago, in conversation, was not a new thought." These two circumstances, "sometime ago," and "in conversation," which are here put together, would have had a better effect disjoined, thus: "What I had the opportunity, sometime ago, mentioning to my friend in conversation, was not a new thought." Here follows an example of the wrong arrangement of a member of a sentence. "The minister of state who grows less by his elevation, like a little statue placed on a mighty pedestal, will always have his jealousy strong about him." Here, so far as

of

can be gathered from the arrangement, it is doubtful whether the object introduced, by way of simile, relates to what goes before, or to what follows. The ambiguity is removed by the following order. "The minister of state who, like a little statue placed on a mighty pedestal, grows less by his elevation, will always," &c.

Words expressing things connected in the thought, ought to be placed as near together as possible, even when their separa. tion would convey no ambiguity. This will be seen in the following passages from Addison. "For the English are naturally fanciful, and very often disposed by that gloominess and melancholy of temper which are so frequent in our nation, to many wild notions and extravagancies, to which others are not so liable." * Here the verb or assertion is, by a pretty long circumstance, separated from the subject to which it refers. This might have