What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Other editions - View all
action admitted appears asserted Athenian Athens Bentham Cairnes capable character civilized common condition conduct consequences consider Constitution cultivation democracy Deontology desire despotism dicastery doctrine duty England equal ethics evil exist expediency fact faculties feeling foreign France freedom French give Grecian Greece Grote habit happiness human idea individual influence injustice institutions interest justice labor Lamartine legislation liberty Lord Brougham Louis Blanc Louis Philippe mankind means ment mind mode moral philosophy moral rules nation nature never object obligation oligarchical opinion pain party Pericles person philosophy Plato pleasure political popular practical present principle of utility produce profess Provisional Government punishment question reason regard Revolution selfish sense sentiment slave Slave Power slavery social society Socrates Sparta standard supposed sympathy theory Theramenes thing thought Thucydides tion truth unjust utilitarian virtue Whewell Whewell's women writers wrong
Page 312 - It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.
Page 323 - As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as you would be done by, and to love your neighbour as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.
Page 315 - According to the greatest happiness principle, as above explained, the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable — whether we are considering our own good or that of other people — is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality...
Page 311 - Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures ; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs.
Page 165 - What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog, is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer...
Page 310 - But there is no known Epicurean theory of life which does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation.
Page 374 - To recapitulate: the idea of justice supposes two things— a rule of conduct and a sentiment which sanctions the rule. The first must be supposed common to all mankind and intended for their good. The other (the sentiment) is a desire that punishment may be suffered by those who infringe the rule.
Page 325 - He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right, whether his motive be duty or the hope of being paid for his trouble; he who betrays the friend that trusts him is guilty of a crime, even if his object be to serve another friend to whom he is under greater obligations.