As a final matter, it should be noted that Jens did state to the investigators that at first he didn't know if the Commission would be interested in the existence of criticality but following additional questioning stated that in today's climate criticality would affect licensing. The preponderance of the evidence is that Jens did not know of the criticality until July 13th, three days after the Commission meeting. In any event, the fact that he acknowledged after the Commission meeting that knowledge of criticality might impact the Commissioners and after the staff and OI were actively looking into the matter gives no indication that he had the view before the Commission meeting or, if he did have that view before the Commission meeting, whether it was for that reason he failed to correct Davis' statement. IV. In sum, I conclude that there is insufficient evidence compiled in the investigation report to believe that the staff could prove by a preponderance of the evidence, the requisite legal standard, a material false statement by omission for the failure to provide NRC information concerning the July 2nd rod pull error or the failure to correct Mr. Davis' statement. SUMMARY OF THE EXHIBITS TO OI REPORT 3-85-013 1/ B. July 2, 1985, Rod Pull Error Shortly before midnight on July 1, 1985, Fermi 2 was in the process of start-up (Kline 1-8). Kline, the reactor operator, had expected the reactor to go critical at step 156 (Kline 6 and 7). At step 56 he realized that he had made an out-of-sequence rod pull (Kline 13-14). At about the same time that Kline had noted indications of errors. Dewes, the Shift Technical Advisor in Training who had been observing Kline, told Kline, "Bill, I think you are critical." (Dewes 5 and 8). The out-of-sequence pull involved pulling 11 group three rods from 00 to 48 instead of from 00 to 04 (Aniol 14 and Myers 27) (Exhibit 13). As soon as Kline became aware of the out-of-sequence rod pull, he started to put the rods back in (Kline 14). Kline instructed Dewes to notify Aniol, the Shift Supervisor (Kline 14). Dewes notified Aniol (Dewes 13-14). Aniol instructed Kline to re-insert all of the group three misaligned rods back to their initial position and then start over (Aniol 14). Aniol was apparently calm and not in an excited state during this incident. Kline did not make an entry in the control room log. It is the responsibility of the Nuclear Supervisory Operator to do that (Kline 23). The entry was not made apparently because Burt, the NSO, did not know of the event until his next shift (Burt 7). But Kline said the mistake is shown in the rod pull sheet, "you can see where the rod was right here. It was 1851 [sic] when I realized I made a mistake---it was all there in black and white (Kline 51-53). [The pull sheet which is not part of the Exhibits shows that an error had been made. The pull sheet appears to be a quality record that is required to be maintained.] Kline stated repeatedly that the facility had not gone critical (Kline 17, 18 and 27). Corrections to Reactor Engineer's Log Myers, the Reactor Engineer, was told by Dewes of the rod pull error (Myers 8). He originally recorded in his log: 1/ Citations have been made to the page where the witness' statement is made in the exhibit. "A" following a page refers to a page in an "A" exhibit. - 2 C. "The operator at the panel pulled the Group III rods to He later amended his log by lining out portions of the the original entry and amending it to read: "The operator at the panel pulled the Group III rods to Myers made his original entry in his log book relying on the statement of Dewes that the plant had gone critical (Myers 8 and 27). After looking at the log, Aniol told Myers that the plant had not gone critical (Myers 9). Aniol statements and clarifications from Dewes (id). Myers states Myers agreed to amend the log based on that he made up his mind to clarify his log before talking to the shift supervisor. Myers said it is not true that Aniol directed the changes (id). He based the changes on information from Dewes (Myers 12-13). However, he also responded "that is true" to the question that the sole basis for changing the log was what the shift supervisor told him (Myers 21). said he interviewed Myers on July 2, 1985 and asked him why he But Arora, Myers' supervisor, made the change. Myers said he wanted to convey the information Dewes wanted him to convey (Arora 5). evaluation of the criticality (Arora 6) (Myers 9, 12). Myers had not done an engineer's log appears to be a quality record that is required to be [The reactor maintained.] Deviation Event Report (DER) Aniol called Preston, Operations Supervisor, at home about 12:30 a.m. on July 2, 1985 (Preston 8) and informed him there had been an operator error in that a number of rods had been withdrawn past their withdrawal limit that was specified on the rod pull sheet (Preston 9). Preston was informed that the reactor did not go critical (id). Preston reminded Aniol that a DER should be prepared (Preston 9). Preston wanted to have a DER on record even though it appeared to be an administrative matter (id). Preston noted to OI that it - 3 was his impression that even if not asked Aniol would have prepared a DER (Aniol 11). Lessor, Nuclear Consultant, said Aniol would probably have initiated the DER without Preston's instructions (Lessor 12). Flint, Assistant Shift Supervisor, stated at the time Aniol called Preston the DER was half written (Flint 11). Preston stated that there was no procedural requirement specifying that an out of sequence withdrawal error be documented on a DER or any other document other than the pull sheet (Preston 12). The error was not documented on either the Reactor Operator's or Shift Supervisor's logs. 2/ It was documented on the pull sheet (Kline 53). There was no dispute that it should have been in the logs (Overbeck 29A). In contrast to the Shift Supervisor log, which is read by only Preston and, according to Preston, maybe the NRC inspectors, a DER is the most widely published paper made as it is viewed by every level of management (Preston 16 and 17). Overbeck, Assistant Plant Superintendent, stated a "cover-up" is inconsistent with writing a DER since by writing a DER it was telling everybody that there was an out-of-sequence rod pull (Overbeck 27A and 29A) (Preston 26A). Lessor stated if they were going to cover up, you would not prepare a DER (Lessor 18A). A DER was prepared and it stated that the reactor did not go critical (Exhibit 13). During the turnover process on July 2, Preston discussed the DER with Aniol. Lenart, Assistant Manager, was present (Preston 3A). Preston told Lenart that the DER would be processed at the Corrective Action Review Board Meeting that afternoon and that the reactor had not gone critical (id). After Lenart left, Aniol mentioned 2/ Preston also noted that the content of control room logs is somewhat subjective (Preston 12). He would have expected to have the matter logged (Preston 13). Overbeck had the same view (Overbeck 24A). There was a need to improve the quality of logs (Preston 43). Overbeck noted that there had been a number of problems with events not being properly logged and the absence of any control room logs is indicative of the history the plant had of very bad logs (Overbeck at 26A). Aniol complained to Preston that logs in the control room were not factual (Preston 21, 44). Aniol was referring to the correction of Myers' log (Preston 22 and 23). Lessor said in his investigation of the logging issue that Aniol noted his logs had been criticized and that he was afraid to log (Lessor 12). 3/ B. the need to have more controls over various logs in the control room citing the revision of Myers' log (Preston 3A and 4A, see footnote 1). It was at that time, after Lenart left, that Preston learned that Myers had originally logged that the reactor went critical (Preston 5A). However, Preston was under the assumption that Myers' original entry was in error (Preston 6A). 3/ July Afternoon Corrective Action Review Board Meeting (CARB) In a morning meeting on July 2, 1985 Preston gave the DER to Overbeck (Overbeck 6). Overbeck's reaction was "shit, what happened?" (id). Preston said based on the DER the reactor was not critical (Overbeck 7). Overbeck said we will discuss it at the CARB that day. (id). At the CARB meeting Overbeck stated that the DER was discussed including the positions of the operators that the plant did not go critical and the "feeling on my reactor engineering side" that possibly it had been critical (Overbeck 10 and 3A). However, Lessor said criticality was not discussed (Lessor 3A). Overbeck said he (personally) did not have, at that time, indications of criticality (Overbeck 12), but he knew there was a difference of opinion (Overbeck 3A). Overbeck directed that the event be independently evaluated by reactor engineering. He knew what the operators said. He wanted someone separate from the operators to do the evaluation. (Overbeck 10) He assigned a due date of July 9, 1985 because in his view it was a significant event and wanted a review in a week (Overbeck 11). In the morning of July 3rd, prior to the larger meeting (Preston 4A), Preston met with Reactor Engineering people who informed him that the reactor had gone critical based on SRM charts. They had coupled the charts with actual rod withdrawal times and the notches drawn to (Preston 13A). It appeared to Preston the reactor was very definitely critical (Preston at 14A). However, upon further questioning it was determined that the wrong section of the chart had been looked at (id). They were looking at approximately 16 hours before the incident (Preston 16A). The reactor engineer, There is no indication that Preston was advised by Aniol that Myers had a "differing professional opinion" as suggested by the OI report. In fact Myers had not done an evaluation (Arora at 6) (Myers 59) and he was relying on Dewes' statement (Arora at 5). He acted as recordThere is no statement by anyone that Myers had a "differing professional opinion." er. |