movement became less and less prominent; and that the Dervish horde was kept together only by the sure knowledge that desertion would entail the murder of their women and children and relatives, as well as the loss of their stock, and by the generally accepted belief, carefully fostered in the haroun, that successful deserters were subjected by the British Government to tortures even more terrible than those practised in the Dervish camp. Although the similarity is more apparent than real, it is difficult to consider the Dervish movement in Somaliland without making some comparison with Mahdism in the Sudan. The rebellion of the Mahdi was primarily a revolt against the injustices and corruption of the Egyptian officials, which had turned fertility into soareity, and the native eontent of the savage into the misery of the oppressed. The Dervish movement in Somaliland was also a revolt against the rule of the foreigner, but against a foreigner who had come to give peace to warring tribes, to replace corruption by justiee, and penury by prosperity. The political revolt in the Sudan was only made possible by the fire of religion or fanaticism, call it what you will, which the Mahdi kindled in the humble breasts of his starving and naked followers, uniting them proudly under his inspiring leadership. The Somaliland Mullah also invested his political object, the expulsion of the foreigner,

with the glamour of a divine mission. In the Sudan, the Mahdi turned indifferent Mohammed ans suffering from political oppression into fanatics and patriots. In Somaliland, the Mullah traded upon the superstition and independent spirit of his fellowcountrymen to convert them into robbers and out-throats. In short, Somaliland dervishism was but a despicable imitation of a genuine patriotic and religious revolt.

To resume, the Mullah followed up his first coup of April 1899 by further successful foray against the Habr Yunis in August, and he reoccupied Burao with a force estimated at 5000 men. He gave himself out as the Mahdi; and ominous rumeurs spread foretelling an advance on Berbera. The ConsulGeneral urged an expedition on the Home Government, but our commitments elsewhere, more particularly in South Africa, were such as to preclude the immediate adoption of this course. During the first seven months of 1900, the Mullah was comparatively inactive, but in August he suddenly swooped down upon the Aidegalla tribe and caused all the friendly tribes to evacuate the Haud in confusion. Next month the Habr Awal tribe suffered severely at his hands.

It would be superfluous to discuss here in any detail the campaigns which followed. They are exhaustively described in the 'Official History of the Operations in Somaliland, 1901.

04,' published by the War Office in 1907; and it will be suffieient for the purposes of this paper to outline very briefly the general course of events.

The first expedition started in April 1901, and operations terminated in the following July. The force employed consisted of a locally-enlisted and hurriedly-trained levy of 1500 men, of whom 500 were mounted. The casualties inflioted on the Dervishes were estimated at some 1200 killed and wounded, and, in addition, 800 prisoners were taken, inoluding some notable head

men.

The Mullah's power had thus been appreciably shaken, and for a time he remained quiescent. But not for long. In October 1901 he renewed his activities, and, thanks to the illicit arms traffic, he had, by January 1902, not only recovered from his losses, but had forced the majority of the Dolbahanta tribe to return to his standard. By the time our second expedition was launched in June 1902, his following was estimated at 15,000, of whom 12,000 were said to be mounted and 1500 armed with rifles. Against this, our Expeditionary Force consisted of some 2000 rifles, partly King's African Rifles, but principally locally-enlisted and locally-trained Somalis. During this expedition, which culminated in the severe but successful action fought at Erigo in October 1902, the Dervishes sustained some 1400 casualties, lost a large number of prisoners and some 25,000

VOL, CCVIII.-NO. MCCLVII.

camels, in addition to many sheep, cattle, and horses. But disorganised transport and the shaken moral of the Somali levies prevented the pursuit of the Mullah to his retreat in the Mudug distriot.

It was now evident that the situation was such as to demand regular and seasoned troops. At the time of the action of Erigo, the force in Somaliland had consisted of 2400 rifles, of which no less than 1500 were local levies. This force was immediately increased by a further contingent of 900 King's African Rifles, and by 300 Indian infantry. A strong column was to advance from Obbia in Italian Somaliland and occupy the Mudug. Another column was to operate on the Berbers-Bohotleh line. And, simultaneously, an Abyssinian force of 5000 rifles, accompanied by British officers, was to advance along the Webi Shebeli, to prevent the Mullah's retreat westward. The advance from Obbia commenced on the 22nd February 1903; and the enemy immediately fell back on Walwal and Wardair, denying us an opportunity of trying conclusions with his main force. On two occasions, however, small advance parties engaged large forces of Dervishes. At Gumburu, a reconnaissance of two companies of the 2nd King's African Rifles and 48 rifles of the 2nd Sikhs came up with the Mullah's main force, commanded, so it is said, by their chief in person. The fight which ensued appears to have lasted two and a half hours. The Dervishes charged the Brit

H

ish square from dense bush some 300 to 600 yards distant, their horsemen and riflemen being driven back time and again with cruel losses. The square was eventually broken by a rush of spearmen, but not before all our ammunition had been exhausted. The Dervish casualties, estimated by some at 2700, are unknown: for no British officer survived to tell the true story of Gumburu. Our casualties were all officers (9) and 187 men killed and 29 men wounded. Another action at Daratoleh-in which were engaged some 800 Dervishes, flushed with their victory at Gumburu, with their leaders wearing the uniforms of the dead British officers-resulted in the infliction of heavy casualties on the enemy, our losses amounting to 2 officers and 13 men killed, and 4 officers and 25 men wounded. In the meantime the Abyssinians inflicted a crushing defeat on the Dervishes, claiming to have killed 1000 of their spearmen. Immediately after this engagement, which took place on the 31st May 1903, the Mullah made a daring but successful movement eastward to the Nogal valley. Unfortunately, however, it was impossible to intercept this movement, as, owing to camel transport and other difficulties, our troops were being withdrawn to Bohotleh.

His Majesty's Government now decided on a further inorease to our force in Somaliland in view of the Mullah's position in the Nogal and its proximity to our sphere.

More than 8000 troops, of which 1000 were British, were employed, in the hope that the Mullah's power would be permanently shattered. The enemy's force, which numbered between 6000 and 8000 fighting Dervishes, was concentrated at Jidballi, where the Mullah, deciding to make a stand, received a most crushing defeat. His casualties in the actual fight at Jidballi (10th January 1904) must have been very large; but far greater were his losses during the course of his subsequent flight northwards to Jidali, and thence eastward into Italian territory. On the other hand, our casualties were slight, except in officers, of whom 3 were killed and 9 wounded, out of a total of 27 killed and 37 wounded of all ranks. It appears that the Mullah only sought sanctuary in Italian territory after receiving solemn assurances of a safe passage from Osman Mahmoud, the Sultan of the Mijjertein, the Italian Somali tribe, who was equally solemnly pledged to us to prevent him from orossing the Italian frontier. Had it not been for this breach of faith, the Mullah would doubtless have had no alternative but to surrender.

Thus, this fourth expedition was completely successful in all but bringing the Mullah himself to bay, and so putting an end to his movement. The greater portion of his wealth, which among a desert-dwelling nomad people consists of the flooks and herds upon which their very existence depends,

had been captured. The moral of his Dervishes as a fighting body had been utterly destroyed; and their numbers, estimated at 6000 to 8000 before Jidballi, could not have exceeded 800 on the conclusion of the campaign. Above all, the Mullah's personal prestige was temporarily shattered; and the discredited refugee in Italian territory must have out a poor figure as compared with the defiant enemy who, during the third expedition, indited the following letter to the British people:

"I wish to rule my own country and protect my own religion. If you will, send me a letter saying whether there is to be peace or war. I intend to go from Burao to Berbera. I warn you of this-I wish to fight with you. I like war, but you do not. God willing, I will take many rifles from you, but you will get no rifles will get no rifles or ammunition from me. I have no forts, no houses, no country. I have no cultivated fields, no silver, no gold for you to take. I have nothing. If the country were cultivated er contained houses or property, it would be worth your while to fight. The country is all jungle, and that is of no use to you. If you want wood and stone, you can get them in plenty. There are also many ant-heaps. The sun is very hot. All you can get from me is war-nothing else. I have met your men in battle, and have killed them. We are

Our

greatly pleased at this. men who have fallen in battle have won paradise. God fights for us. We kill, and you kill. We fight by God's order. That is the truth. We ask for God's blessing. God is with me when I write this. If you wish for war, I am happy; and, if you wish for peace, I am content also. But if you wish for peace, go away from my country back to your own. If you wish for war, stay where you are. Hearken to my words. I wish to exchange a machine-gun1 for ammunition. If you do not want it, I will sell it to some one else. Send me a letter saying whether you desire war or peace.

In March 1905, the Illig or Pestalozza Agreement was concluded between the Italian Government and the Mullah, whereby peace was declared between the Dervishes on the one hand and the British and Italian Governments on the other.

The Mullah was assigned a port and certain territories in Italian Somaliland, beyond which he and his Dervishes undertook encroach.

The Mullah also agreed to become an Italian protected subject. This agreement was, however, nullified soon after it was concluded, as the Mullah left Italian territory, and by 1907 had re-established himself on the British side, raiding and looting far and wide.

In 1909 the Home Government decided upon a change

military and political, was entirely withdrawn from the interier, and all direct control was abandoned. Active administration was limited to the three coast towns; and the friendly Somali tribes in the interier were given arms and ammunition with which to defend themselves against the Mullah. This policy had been carried into fall effect by Mareh 1910. Disorder, which beggars description, ensued. The friendly tribes abandoned themselves to an orgy of internecine warfare, using against each other the arms which had been given them to defend themselves against the common enemy. The motive was not a desire for supreme control on the part of any one tribe, but the Somali's besetting sin of acquisitiveness, which impels him to raid his neighbour's flocks and herds-if he can. It was impossible to control such a situation from Berbera. Loss of confidence in the British Government, the disaffection of Somali Government servants in the coast towns, and a collapse of trade, were the immediate sequela of this state of unchecked anarchy. In the meantime, the Mullah was not slow to take advantage of so deplorable a situation. By sudden and unexpected attacks upon the friendly tribes, whom he found scattered and unprepared, he obtained the stock, food, olothing, and ammunition which he so urgently required; and by the ineffable atrocities and mutilations which he practised upon the

Such a state of affairs could not be permitted to continue indefinitely; and in 1912, with a view to keeping the main trade routes in the vicinity of the coast towns clear, it was decided to form a small Somali Camel Constabulary, 150 strong, to maintain order among our friendlies within a radius of fifty miles or so of Berbera. This expedient proved an immediate success, and comparative peace was restored among the friendly tribes-s0 much so that the force, encouraged by initial successes, was subsequently based Burao, eighty miles inland. But in August 1913 they encountered at Dalmadoba and engaged a party of Dervishes estimated at 2000 rifles. The heaviest casualties-estimated at between 200 and 600—were inflicted on the enemy; but 50 per cent of our small force, including the Commandant, were killed.

on

After this set-back the Camel Constabulary was reorganised en military lines and its numbers raised to 500, and the Indian contingent was also increased to 400 strong. This addition to the military establishment at the disposal of the Protectorate Government was sanctioned for the purpose of enabling the friendly tribes to avail themselves of their grazing grounds and water without molestation by the Mallah. The objects in view in Somaliland were defined in the House of Lords on the 13th April 1914 by Lord Emmett, then