pistol landed within their territory by the gun-runners. The difficulties of dealing with the situation, therefore, were great, for the importation of arms from Europe to Masqat could not be stopped, nor could these arms be seized anywhere within the Sultan's dominions, or at sea within the three-mile limit of his coast-line. Strictly speaking, also, once they were landed on Persian soil they were immune from capture; so it was desirable to seize them on the high seas during their transit in dhows from the Arabian coast to Makran. During the cold weather of 1908-9 a few insignificant captures were made at sea by the few out-of-date patrolling ships available for this purpose; and attempts were also made to intercept the passage of arms caravans into Afghanistan by the posting of British troops in the neighbourhood of Robat, where the three kingdoms of Britain, Persia, and Afghanistan meet, south of Sistan. But that these measures were quite inadequate to deal with the growing evil is clearly evidenced by the fact that, in spite of them, some 30,000 rifles had found their way into Afghanistan. Operations on a far more extended soale were obviously essential; and as reports pointed to the probability of 3000 Afghans visiting the Gulf in the cold season of 1909-10, during which they hoped to acquire over 50,000 rifles, a really ambitious scheme was put into train to checkmate their activities. Now these Afghan gunrunners were men of great enterprise, and richly endowed with daring, ounning, and ingenuity of a high order. They were well provided with money, by the skilful outlay of which they counted on reaping profits of not less than 200 to 300 per cent on the season's operations. Much of the capital collected for the venture it was known was borrowed; so it was pretty certain they would not easily be balked from their intentions to procure the arms which were in such great demand in their country and on our border. Information at hand pointed to the Ghilzais from Afghanistan, who had previously been the most persistent gun-runners, being joined by Afridis, and other olans nominally under our control; so the danger was patently being brought home to us. Hitherto the modus operandi of the Afghans had been quite straightforward and simple. Arrangements were made in their own country for large caravans of camels to be marched from Kabul, Herat, and other places during the cold season, to the Makran and Biaban coasts in Persian territory, under suitable guard. Meanwhile, those men told off for the actual purchase of the arms proceeded by rail through India to Karachi, with the necessary money concealed about their persons, and there took steamer to Masqat. On arrival they openly purchased such weapons as they desired Arabian coast in the vicinity of from the various wholesale Masqat. arms merchants, with whom they arranged to leave them until they had completed their preparations for having them conveyed by dhows to the opposite coast. Much ingenuity was displayed in selecting landing-places where they would be met by their accomplices with camels, in order to elude the vigilance of the patrolling ships and their cutters, and to remove immediately the arms landed into the interior. The common procedure then was to store their arms along the coast under charge of neighbouring Baluch chieftains. Certain meeting - places and dates having been pre- arranged for various parties to join up together, the united caravans would later march homewards in considerable strength through these parts of Persian territory where possibility of attack was most to be apprehended. Once safely back within their own borders, the parties again split up, and conveyed their valuable purchases to their most promising home markets. The first measure of check adopted was to institute arrangements whereby Afghans should be denied permission to land at Masqat, from British India S.N. Company steamers plying to and from the Gulf. The Afghan reply to this was to take tickets to other ports, such as Chahbar, Jashk, and Bandar Abbas, whence they found their way in native sailing crafts to points on the Arrangements were then made to dam the flow of Afghans from British territory by refusing them passages on British steamers to any of the Gulf ports; and in November 1909 a system of information was organised at both Bombay and Karachi to deal with Afghans who were suspected of being likely to endeavour to book passages under disguise. The British India S.N. Company had agreed to refuse tickets to Afghans; but another loophole still remained, as the Bombay-Persian S.N. Company also plied between Bombay, Karachi, and Gulf ports, and was under native management. Intending travellers by this line, therefore, required careful watching. Many were the cunning disguises and ingenious concealments of money resorted to by Afghans, who posed as Indian "bunniahs," Arab horse-dealers, and pious Moslems bound on pilgrimage to the holy places in Mesopotamia and Arabia, in order to escape the vigilance of our alert police at British-India ports. But it was a case of diamond cut diamond; and when thousand - rupee notes were found innocently sewn up between the inner and outer soles of boots and shoes of guileless travellers and other equally orafty stratagems employed-it was any odds their ultimate destination was the Arms Emporium at Masqat. These police precautions proved effective to some ex tent; and at the beginning of December a party of 150 Afghans assembled at Karachi were dispersed by the capture and imprisonment of 25 of their number, on the eve of their departure by steamer. By these measures, however, we could only hope to touch the fringe of the movement; for there was no efficient means as yet of preventing the more enterprising spirits amongst the Afghans from secretly chartering sailing craft at more secluded Indian ports, and in them making the voyage across to the Arabian coast. One was faced, therefore, with the practical certainty that 8 considerable portion of the Afghans who had set forth from their homes well supplied with money, would persist in leaving no stone unturned to reach Masqat. The continued running of the gauntlet of the patrolling ships by fast - sailing dhows from the Arabian coast had still, therefore, to be reckoned with; and much importance naturally hinged on timely information being conveyed of these intended trips, and their probable destination on the Persian coast, in order to facilitate the capture of arms on the high seas. The task of the Navy was difficult and onerous to a degree; for it must be borne in mind there were some 350 miles of coastline in Persian Baluchistan, between Gwatar to the east and Minab to the west, which were open to the gun-runners whereon to land their consign ments of arms from Masqat, and other points along the Arabian coast. The distance across from Masqat to any point on the Persian coast between the Indo-European Telegraph - stations of Jashk and Chahbar nowhere exceeded 150 miles; so fast dhows could make the trip, under favourable conditions of wind and weather, in little more than twenty-four hours. But by coasting north from Masqat, in territorial waters, towards Ras Masandam, and then darting across the intervening space to the Biaban coast, the distance would be reduced to forty or fifty miles. This passage could therefore be accomplished during the hours of darkness, and the landed and removed inland before daylight. The problem confronting the naval authorities, who were ill-found in patrolling ships, and received little or no timely information as to sailings from the Arabian coast, nor the likely destination of these dhows on the opposite coast, was in consequence practically insoluble under the conditions obtaining up to the the cold weather of 1909-10, and easily explains the comparative illsuccess of their previous endeavours to disorganise the traffic in arms. In fact, little more than a happy fluke, such as dhow being becalmed within the beat of a patrolling ship, was in the least likely to lead to an important capture. As a first measure towards improving existing matters at sea, Rear-Admiral Sir Edmond but there was little else of mystery about, her, as one could hear her churning her way through a choppy sea, in the dim distance, almost before she appeared in sight herself. Her speed was not excessive ; and as a dhow. would always locate her, even if she didn't see her, and could, without much difficulty, make rings round her, the chances of this battle-ship overhauling a dhow, except in a dead calm, were distinctly remote. Still, she could patrol a beat. Slade, the Naval Commander- provided with paddle-wheels, in-Chief, East Indies, had proposed to the Admiralty that his ships in Eastern waters should be augmented by three second- and third-class oruisers, in order the more effectively to patrol the sea between the Arabian and Persian coasts. These did not, however, reach (in their entirety) the Gulf until the season was somewhat advanced; and early in Deoember 1909 Captain Hunt, R.N., of H.M.S. Fox (4600 tons), the senior naval officer in the Gulf, had at his disposal only three ships his own, which was broken down in one engine, and therefore barely capable of steaming eight knots with one propeller; the Lapwing, an antiquated R.I.M. ship of 850 tons, with a speed of about seven knots; and H.M.S. Philomel (2600 tons), which had lately arrived from Bombay. To these must be added the Whimbrel, a sailingboat of about 5 tons register, whose cheery captain and crew enjoyed a spicy and adventurous career, particularly when a stiff "shamal" was blowing and Afghans were lying in wait for her, in the hope that they might be able to greet her with a fusilade should she attempt to seek shelter in some neighbouring oreek. The Royal Indian Marine further added to the gaiety of nations by lending a hand, at times, with two other old tubs of theirs, dating back, I should say, to to the "early 'forties," and yolept the Sphinx and Redbreast. The former was At a later date, too, when the activities of the gunrunners embraced a still wider stretch of the Persian coastline, extending well to the west of Bandar Abbas, a fleet of mosquito craft, consisting of some eight tugs and launches, armed with maxims, and a three-pounder in the bow, were added to the patrolling strength of the ships in the Gulf, and performed most useful service. These were "mothered" by another R.I.M. ship, the Minto, which was a small up-to-date trooper. The next step was to arrange for timely information being conveyed to the patrolling ships of intended sailings by dhows loading up with arms on the Arabian coast, as also of their probable destinations on the Persian coast. By this means it was hoped that even if the ships at sea were eluded, the dhows might run into ships' outters carefully concealed in creeks or inlets near the proposed landing-places. With the object of acquiring this information, and to keep in close touch with the Navy, arrangements were made for stationing secret-service agents in and about Masqat, and along the Makran coast. It was their duty to supply news as gained to some one in authority either at Masqat, Jashk, or Chahbar, whence the information would be passed on at once to the Navy. In furtherance of these plans I was ordered from Simla to the Persian Gulf in November 1919, with instructions to make my headquarters at Jashk. Here it was intended shortly to erect a wireless installation, by means of which I could communicate freely in cipher all information received to the ships patrolling at sea. Admiral Slade, in a letter to the Government of India in November, had pointed out the fatility of confining his operations to the sea alone; and strongly advocated the fitting out of a transport ship to carry a mixed force (the composition of which could be subsequently decided upon), which would enable him to make raids on those stores of arms and ammanition that were still within striking distance of the coast -pending the arrival of the Afghan caravans from the interior to remove them. To discuss this and other problems with Admiral Slade, in my new capacity as Naval Intelligence Officer, I was directed first to report to the Naval C.-in-C. at Bombay, and then to proceed to Karachi by mail steamer in time to catch the next fast Gulf mail leaving that port for Masqat. Between Bombay and Karaohi I had as a fellow-traveller Mr Gregson of the Punjab Police, who was chiefly responsible for the admirable police arrangements denying facilities to Afghans to proceed to Masqat from Indian ports. As we were to 00-. operate in this important particular, it was of great advantage to both of us to meet in this way, and to discuss matters before we reached Karachi, whence I continued by fast mail to Masqat on 4th December 1909. That steamer was also boarded at Karachi by two highly-trained secret-service agents, whom I will designate as A. and B., and with whom I was very closely associated during the next few months. Both proved themselves men of great intelligence and resource, and rendered most valuable services in connection with the operations to be described. A. was to be landed at Masqat, which would remain his special sphere of activity; whilst B. was to proceed to Bandar Abbas, and join me later at Jashk by the next down-mail calling at that place. It is perhaps unnecessary for me to add that, to all outward appearances, these men were complete strangers to me during the time we travelled together between Karachi and Masqat. |