ponent) had found it impossible to obtain | being kept out of his property; and that the lord chancellor's decision upon his I have to contend against the bitter feelcause; and that, having bitter complaints ings of his relations. Under this distressmade to him by his clients of delay, and ing circumstance, knowing that your lordfinding that the cause had not been placed ship will pardon the liberty I have taken in the lord chancellor's paper, according in thus addressing you, and which nothing to the lord chancellor's order-finding but the imperious necessity of the case these things, he had heen induced, on the could have induced me to have done, I 15th of July, 1820, to write a letter to the have the honour, &c." lord chancellor to the following effect : "Ware v. Horwood.-My Lord; my clients have great reason to complain of the great injury suffered by them in consequence of these causes not keeping their station at the head of your lordship's paper, agreeably to your lordship's order repeatedly given in my hearing. It is now nearly seven years since they have been waiting for your lordship's judgment; and upwards of two years and a half ago, they had arrived at the top of the paper; at which I humbly entreat they may, until you can decide upon them, remain. There is a fund in Court of 10,000l. and upwards, locked up until your lordship decides on these causes; and it is therefore matter of great importance to my unfortunate clients that your lordship's decision may not be delayed by the circumstances to which I have above alluded. It is painful to me to state to your lordship, that I have learnt from authority, which I have no reason to doubt, that the infant, for whose benefit those suits were instituted twenty years ago, died of a broken heart,* on account of Shortly after this debate a pamphlet was published, by Mr. Murray of Albemarle-street, intitled, "Observations on the Judges of the Court of Chancery and the Practice and Delays complained of in that Court." It was written anonymously, but generally attributed to a gentleman who was formerly a solicitor of the court of chancery, but who, at the time of the publication, had taken his name off the rolls and had retired from practice. The following extract therefrom relates to the above case of Ware v. Horwood. "This assertion appeared to my mind so improbable, that, being a man unencumbered by any profession or employment, I determined to search into its truth, and I applied to a professional friend, who is generally and deservedly esteemed in the parish where the infant died, to make similar inquiries: the result of our inquiries was the same, and we learnt from the infant's friends, and the medical gentleman who attended him on his death-bed, that there was not any reason to suppose his death was occasioned by a chancery suit, or anything connected with one; and I shall prove he had not any cause to grieve about it. Before his death The affidavit which he held, deposed that the lord chancellor had, in conse quence, given immediate direction to have the case reinstated in its former position on the paper; that the case was accordingly brought on speedily for hearing, and the deponent was thereupon required to attend in his lordship's private room, which he accordingly did, and held fre quent conversations as to the subject of drawing up the decree, after judgment he used often to lament that there could be no salvation, no grace, for such a sinner as himself; but he did not make any unkind allusion to the court of Chancery, or to the noble lord, or other judges who preside there. I am in possession, through the information of those who knew him, of the particulars of the offence that grieved him, and greatly depressed his spirits, which he refused to disclose to his doctor; but delicacy forbids my entering into the detail. This sentimental suitor, represented to have died of a broken heart, occasioned by a chancery suit, was a labouring gardener, and he lived with a person at Peckham. He was buried at Linfield, in the twenty-third year of his age, in July 1816; and during his infancy there had been spent for his maintenance and education 4667. which was paid to his uncle Charles, he having been allowed that sum by the report of a master in chancery, dated the 1st day of July, 1822. The infant in his will disposes of what, " if anything," should come to him from the chancery suit relating to his father's affairs; and the sum of 10,000l. ingeniously made use of in the letter, seems to have been, as regarded this infant suitor, (exclusive of what was due to his uncle for maintenance), about 134. From searching at Doctors' Commons, I find that his uncle Charles, who was administrator to his father, administered to this infant's estate, sworn not to exceed 600l.; and out of this 600l., 4661. was due to this uncle, which had been expended upon the infant during his minority, he never having received, or been in a situation to receive, anything out of court in his life-time; and therefore 134l. was all the infant's interesting suit, unless we can suppose his uncle Charles to have sworn to a false amount on taking out letters of administration. I find on searching at the proper office, that this infant was never arrested, and I cannot learn that he was ever known to be in pecuniary difficulties.” erful magistrate, as to the justice due to the parties, that he should have endured the writing of a letter to him in terms upon a case depending? Not only so, but that he should, to a suitor of his court, or as the phrase of another jurisdiction was, an orator to this process, pray for further delay, and entreat that the time until the morrow should be allowed him for'preparation-that he should endure in any man the audacity of writing to him, the highest magistrate and subject in the state, to importune him for his particular and partial attention to the case of one suitor in a cause? These things he must leave to the consideration of the House, without a single comment of his own. given in the court. He had procured the office-copy of the bill of costs put in by the solicitor who made this affidavit. He would submit the facts without any comments of his own, only premising, that the opposite parties had been led to suspect, and were informed of the fact subsequently, of these repeated audiences had of the Chancellor by one solicitor in the absence of the other solicitors in the suit, by the items in this bill. It began with charges for attendance, agreeably to the order of the court. Then the letter was charged in these terms-" for writing a long letter to his lordship, on the subject of the cause, and importuning particular attention to it, 9s. 6d.; attending the court to get the cause reinstated on the paper, 13s. 4d.; attending the court at the time of hearing the petition, 2l." &c. It happened well for this felicitous man, that he was solicitor also for one of the defendants in the cause. That which had been denied to the wishes of the historian, the power of a divisible identity, had been kindly imparted by Chancery to this solicitor, against the manifest law of nature. He was enabled to represent several individuals in different places at the same juncture of time, though possessing but one personal identity. Accordingly, each of the items was accompanied with a corresponding fee for attendance upon the original cause for the other side. One of these items would be almost incredible to the house" Attending the lord chancellor in his private room, when his lordship begged for further indulgence till tomorrow, 13s. 4d." There were repeated charges for attendance in his lordship's private room concerning the decree, in which a variety of observations were made by his lordship, as to the terms of it; the same fee being invariably charged for attendance in the original cause. Having stated thus much upon the nature and quality of the attendances (which consisted of little more than fixing the times of postponement, and latterly trifling alterations in the terms of the decree) he had now only to state the gross charge for them in the bill. The sum was no less in amount than 1,0801. for these attendances alone [Hear, hear]. Upon the circumstance of this solicitor attending the private room of the court, without any other solicitor in the cause being present, he would say nothing, but leave it to the reflections of those who heard him. But, what must be the sense of that great, eminent, and pow It was his duty next to advert to the condition of the only other two courts from which any relief could be given in equity to the claims of suitors, to see if in them also the accumulation of business was of such a kind as to come powerfully in aid of his conclusion, that inquiry should be made into the causes of the delay. In so doing, he was aware that he undertook an invidious task; but, although it was an office unwelcome and ungracious, and one from which he should derive no credit, but on the contrary, much obloquy, even from his own profession, he felt that no personal consideration should prevent the discharge of his duty. He would now call the attention of the House to the state of the court of Exchequer, the only court, in the opinion of the noble marquis, who proposed the measure to which he had alluded, which from its constitution had any tendency to relieve the higher courts. With respect to this court, he would state, not from surmise, but from what might be called history, that since the latter end of autumn, the time at which lawyers returned to their avocations, the Chief Baron had been precluded by illness from performing the duties of his station. It was known to the House that when the business was found increasing, this Judge was empowered by act of parliament to sit apart from the bench, and decide cases in equity. In consequence of his illness, this duty devolved upon certainly a most valuable gentleman, Mr. Baron Graham, of whom he, in common with others, must speak in the most handsome terms; but in his case, as in all others, time must do its work. The excellent individual of whom he spoke had attained the age of $1. It one suspected in him even the approach of decay. By that departure, as much as by the excellence of his judicial conduct in examining and his prompt decisions, he had set a bright example to his bre among them who valued the real honour of their employments would gladly follow (Loud cheers]. These accumulations in the courts of Exchequer and the Rolls suggested additional reasons for carrying the motion which he had to propose into effect. In the Exchequer court there was an arrear of 170 causes at the end of the term. The late chief Baron had sat and very assiduously dis charged the business of equity, and the consequence was, that from the firmness of his decisions and the despatch together, a great portion of the causes died a natural death, and dropped out of the paper. He felt justified in assuming, that there were distinct admissions of the growing nature of the evil which it had been his business to describe, and that it was now no longer a question that some saving remedy must be applied, in order to prevent a change perfectly radical in the system. Men of skill should be ex. amined-sound opinions should be taken would therefore be unreasonable to expect the despatch of extraordinary business from that honourable and aged person. The next in seniority was Mr. Baron Garrow, who, from unavoidable circumstances, had been absent from the court since Feb-thren on all the benches, which those ruary last. But, had he been present, expert and justly renowned as he was for his knowledge of common law, it would be praise most absurd, it would be irony most indecent, to say of him, that his forte lay in equity trials. The junior, Mr. Baron Hullock, was a respected friend of his, of intelligence and ability altogether unquestionable: but he was yet fresh in the Court, and it would be indecorous to thrust him over the heads of two others, to give judgment in this separate branch of the jurisdiction. Such was the condition of that Court, upon which he would refrain from any further remarks, excepting this, that he was not certain but that other causes, well worthy of the consideration of the House, though he would not stop to specify them, might contribute towards effecting the delay of justice. There was another Court, besides that of the vice-chancellor, which might be considered the legitimate handmaid of equity. Between this court and Chancery there was no collision of practice. They sat at different times, and without any confusion of business. Whatever was done in this lesser jurisdiction must be clear gain. It did really assist in ridding that accumulation of causes, which no learning, no ability, no perseverance could work through. But he had this to state respecting the Rolls Court, that between the time of sir William Grant sitting there, and that of the present Master, there was a very considerable difference; insomuch, that he had been informed by practitioners that there was a falling-off in the efficient business of the court; some -alleging that not one-fourth, others that not one-tenth part of the business was performed now, compared with the time of sir W. Grant. Of that excellent Judge, he could not presume to speak in terms of sufficient praise. The patience he exercised in examining, was no less than his firmness and promptitude in decision. But one feature in his conduct, which proved the excellence of his mind, was this that he did not wait till years had manifested to all men the infirmities which he knew would overtake him. He retired with all his honours fresh and blooming upon him, at a time when no VOL. IX. deliberation should be used; and after that, they could proceed safely to legislate; not as they had done before, legislate first, and then proceed to examine the object. He next directed the attention of the House to the jurisdiction of appeals, which formed a joint ground for going into the inquiry sought for by his motion. He began with the case of Scotch appeals, of which it appeared that there were, between 1813 and 1823, the following numbers:-291 heard; 145 affirmed; 62 reversed; 80 remitted to the courts for consideration on fresh facts; 2 altered. Upon the total, it appeared, that the number of these appeals, compared with appeals from the English courts, was as five to one. It might form a very proper subject for inquiry in the committee, if the constitution and appointments in the courts which furnished so strange an accumulation of appeals from their jurisdiction, had not some defects which contributed to this result. The fact, that the numbers affirmed to those reversed, or sent back on some ground or other, were as 145 to 144, gave considerable force to that suggestion. He had said, that he would reserve the department of the vice3 A 66 injurious to the feelings of any parties, and without disguising those circumstances which it was material for the House to know.-The hon. and learned member then concluded, amidst loud cheers, with moving, "That a Select Committee be appointed to inquire into the Arrear of Business in the Court of Chancery, and the Appellate Jurisdiction of the House of Lords, and the causes thereof." chancellor for a separate consideration. The question respecting that jurisdiction had been before the House in 1813; and he believed no gentleman who had the recollection of the debate on his mind, together with the subsequent experience upon it, would now advise waiting for the decision of the other House, or recommend the Commons again to guide their decisions by the wisdom of that body. The bill for the erection of the vice-chan- The Attorney General commenced by cellor's court was introduced into the observing, that however various the topics House by the late marquis of Londonderry. introduced in support of his motion by It was opposed by the powerful talents his hon and learned friend, he finally and piercing wit of the right hon. secretary rested his case on the personal attack opposite (Mr. Canning), who exerted him- made upon the character of the lord chanself to the utmost to explode it from the cellor. Before, however, he met his hon. table. The right hon. gentleman had and learned friend upon that subject, he very truly prognosticated, that it would felt it necessary to allude to something turn out to be a bill for causing all causes which had been stated respecting a legisin Chancery to be heard twice over. The lative measure which was said to be in late lamented sir S. Romilly had opposed contemplation, in reference to the attenit, with the force of his profound wisdom. dance of the noble and learned lord in the He had said, that the true title of the bill court of Chancery. He had not heard of was a bill to give the lord chancellor that measure, but he did understand that, leisure, and to give the suitors the right in the other House, the accumulation of of appeal in his lordship's court." The Scotch appeals was so great as to make it present vice-chancellor, also, had given necessary to inquire how the inconvenihis strongest opposition to it. The argu- ence could be remedied; and one of the ments and too prophetic predictions of objects of that inquiry was, to allow the these able persons were all in vain. The lord chancellor more time to attend to House legislated on suggestions furnished the business of the court of Chancery. from the other House. They did indeed But, it was not on account of arrears of legislate; but it was only to legislate business in that court that a necessity for again upon the effects of their own error. greater despatch existed. There were, in To that bill there was this distinct and un- fact, no arrears of business in that court: answerable objection-that it had failed but there was an increase of business, in the object for which it was proposed, arising out of the increased population and had produced incalculable mischief. and wealth of the country, which proThe result which he offered, from all that duced a proportionate increase of litigahe had advanced, was this :-If the House tion. With respect to the vice-chancellor's could not at the time reach to that pro- court, which his hon. and learned friend phetic and prescient knowledge which had denied to give any ease to the suitor in been displayed by the right hon. gentle- the determination of chancery suits, he man, by his late lamented friend, and by would satisfy the House that that was very the present vice-chancellor, at least let far from being the case. So far from the them claim that every-day sort of wisdom, prophecies having been fulfilled which that homely intelligence, which would were pronounced before the establishment prevent them from falling into the unpitied of the court, as to its inefficiency, he was situation of being caught again in the sure he could convince the House, that same snare-not to legislate on the know-its utility had been practically proved, ledge of others, and without taking any and that his hon. and learned friend was light from the experience within their quite mistaken in his assertions. reach. He strongly defended the ne- allowed on all sides, at the time when the cessity of investigating the evil, and court was instituted, that the business of discovering the remedy in a committee chancery had increased to an extent which of the house. He had now discharged rendered it impracticable for any person, his duty to the best of his ability, having however gifted, to keep under the busirefrained, as much as the subject would ness of the court. It was believed by allow, from any statements likely to be many, that an effectual remedy would be, It was present lord chancellor in ten years, had decided on 2,450 lunatic petitions. Were these to be considered matters of course? [Mr. Williams said, they might become so.] His hon. and learned friend thought that lunatic petitions might become matters of course. If that were really his opinion, he could know little of the subject of lunacy, which involved some of the most intricate considerations of law; and (as he was reminded by his hon, and learned friend near him) were the more scrupulously attended to by the chancellor, because in those cases there was no appeal from his judgment. He was somewhat surprised that his hon. and learned friend had never once adverted to the subject of bankrupt petitions. Some of these were decided by the vice-chancellor, but all those which were of importance were heard and decided by the lord chancellor. the erection of a vice-chancellor's court. | There was a difference of opinion on the subject, but the preponderance was in favour of the establishment of that court. He was aware that the subject he had to enter on was one of dry details; but he was sure that when the House examined them, they would be convinced of the mis-statement of his hon. and learned friend as to the inutility of that court. It was evident that his hon. and learned friend had given his notice of motion first, and procured his information afterwards. His hon. and learned friend had alluded to particular cases in chancery; and he thought that, in fairness to the character of the noble and learned person at the head of that court, he ought to have given him some notice that such charges were to be made against him. He would give the House some information on those cases presently; but he must first observe, that his hon. and learned friend had stated the business of chancery to be as great now as before the establishment of the vice-chancellor's court. But how had he proved that? He said there was a certain number of causes now depending in chancery, and he called them arrears of business; but as to the great majority of those causes, they had not been set down for more than two terms. There was no court to which the hon. and learned mover could refer, in which he would not find a great number of causes depending, without any improper accumulation of business, or without any imputation on the character of the judge who presided. But his hon. and learned friend had gone so far as to allude to the age of a venerable judge of the Exchequer, in a manner which was intended to show him to be incapable of discharging the duties of his office. Now, he was of opinion that such a course of proceeding was objectionable, and that the judges of the land ought not to be dragged unnecessarily before the tribunal of parliament.-With respect to the charge of arrears of business in chancery, his hon. and learned friend had omitted all mention of lunatic petitions and of cause petitions. The House would be surprised when he stated, after what had been said of the dilatoriness of the lord chancellor, that for the last ten years there had been a great number of lunatic petitions, on which the lord chancellor had had to decide, and many of those had been contested. Lord Hardwicke in ten years, had decided on 484 lunatic petitions. The He should now proceed to state the quantity of business which had been done in the courts, and he would then leave the House to say, whether the attack which had been made upon the lord chancellor for his delay in the decision of cases was justifiable or not. In the year 1820, the lord chancellor had heard 136 bankrupt petitions, and the vice-chancellor, 366. In 1821, the lord chancellor had heard 103, and the vice-chancellor 449. Up to Easter-term, 1823, the lord chancellor had heard 164, and the vice-chancellor 465. From the year 1813 up to the present period, 5,820 bankrupt petitions had been disposed of, and of these the greater part had been heard before the lord chancellor. When his hon. and learned friend stated, that these petitions were twice heard, he was mistaken; because, it was only when cases were of high importance, and the parties had reason to be dissatisfied with the decision of the vice-chancellor, that they went before the lord chancellor. The case of Howard and Gibbs, to take a recent example, was one of those to which he alluded. This case alone had occupied many days. When, therefore, the number of cases disposed of by the lord chancellor was spoken of, it should not so much be taken numerically as with a reference to the intricacy and the number of points which the cases involved, and which of course required more discussion and deliberation than cases of an ordinary description.-It had been said, that the introduction of the vice-chancellor's court had only had the effect of making causes to be heard twice, |