EUI Working Paper: SPS, Issues 90-95European University Institute, 1990 - Europe |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 4
Page 4
If the agenda is crowded , general policies can be postponed , because the
decisionmakers will prefer not to engage in an effort which is electorally
unrewarding , and instead promote policies with more tangible gains. 7 Such
purely divisive ...
If the agenda is crowded , general policies can be postponed , because the
decisionmakers will prefer not to engage in an effort which is electorally
unrewarding , and instead promote policies with more tangible gains. 7 Such
purely divisive ...
Page 9
... especially the substantively difficult ones , that require more time to be
examined ; it is then necessary , for the policy to acquire a favourable position on
the agenda , to be or to become salient , hence more visible and maybe
ideologically ...
... especially the substantively difficult ones , that require more time to be
examined ; it is then necessary , for the policy to acquire a favourable position on
the agenda , to be or to become salient , hence more visible and maybe
ideologically ...
Page 13
2 ) Composite majorities , again ceteris paribus , favour : - some general policies
( only if they get on the agenda and are not controversial ; if ideological distances
between the partners are present , such policies could meet more difficulties ) ...
2 ) Composite majorities , again ceteris paribus , favour : - some general policies
( only if they get on the agenda and are not controversial ; if ideological distances
between the partners are present , such policies could meet more difficulties ) ...
What people are saying - Write a review
We haven't found any reviews in the usual places.
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
according adoption agenda allocated allow alteration Analysis avoid become benefits Blondel cabinet chances choice coalition committees competence complex composite concentrated benefits concentrated costs concerning Consequences consider controversial conversely debate decision-making decisions depends difficulty diffused discussion distributive policies divisive policies Economics effective electoral EUI Working Paper European European University Institute example favour formal gain given groups HAMMOND ideologically divisive ideologically divisive policies impact imply individual influential inside the cabinet instance interests issues Italy kinds of policy least Legislative losers majority Market measures ministers obstacles organized Padova party Peter policy outputs policy-making political position possible potential Power preferences prime principle Probability problems proposals Public Policy pure Reform regulatory regulatory-specific rules Science seen situation Social Solution specific SPINA Structures Studies style substantive success tend Theory transformed types of policy typology variable Wilson