EUI Working Paper: SPS, Issues 90-95European University Institute, 1990 - Europe |
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Page 10
... the Cabinet If ministers are specialists ( also in the sense of having enjoyed a long tenure in the same department ) , they will tend to avoid interfering in other ministers ' businesses , save in cases of intersectoral policy 11.
... the Cabinet If ministers are specialists ( also in the sense of having enjoyed a long tenure in the same department ) , they will tend to avoid interfering in other ministers ' businesses , save in cases of intersectoral policy 11.
Page 11
Otherwise , they will normally tend to avoid such choices , or to compensate the losers by transforming the concentrated costs into diffused ones . This transformation , however , takes place in pre - cabinet stages , in " iron ...
Otherwise , they will normally tend to avoid such choices , or to compensate the losers by transforming the concentrated costs into diffused ones . This transformation , however , takes place in pre - cabinet stages , in " iron ...
Page 16
The decision - makers , therefore , will stress unifying and vague principles , avoiding disturbing ends and means . This could seriously diminish the substantive accuracy of the general policies passed thanks to a consociational ...
The decision - makers , therefore , will stress unifying and vague principles , avoiding disturbing ends and means . This could seriously diminish the substantive accuracy of the general policies passed thanks to a consociational ...
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