EUI Working Paper: SPS, Issues 90-95European University Institute, 1990 - Europe |
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Page 6
But if the majority supporting the government is composite or consociational ( for this terminology see below ) , these " hot " issues will be systematically avoided , because they would undermine the stability of the coalition .
But if the majority supporting the government is composite or consociational ( for this terminology see below ) , these " hot " issues will be systematically avoided , because they would undermine the stability of the coalition .
Page 12
... or could also be the result of appropriate rules ( e.g. the German " constructive " no - confidence vote ) ; 2 ) composite : at least two , but normally more than two parties , ideologically more heterogeneous , in a very unstable ...
... or could also be the result of appropriate rules ( e.g. the German " constructive " no - confidence vote ) ; 2 ) composite : at least two , but normally more than two parties , ideologically more heterogeneous , in a very unstable ...
Page 16
Composite majorities fare well only on distributive policies , that is those policies that an external observer would probably consider the most trivial , from the point of view of their substantive difficulty , and the least relevant ...
Composite majorities fare well only on distributive policies , that is those policies that an external observer would probably consider the most trivial , from the point of view of their substantive difficulty , and the least relevant ...
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Bibliographic information
| Title | EUI Working Paper: SPS, Issues 90-95 EUI Working Paper: SPS, European University Institute. Department of Political and Social Sciences |
| Contributor | European University Institute. Department of Political and Social Sciences |
| Publisher | European University Institute, 1990 |
| Export Citation | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |