EUI Working Paper: SPS, Issues 90-95European University Institute, 1990 - Europe |
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Page 4
It may also be that the loser and the winner is the same person ( for instance a
taxpayer who at the same time is also the recipient of an health program ) . In
principle , such policies should be adopted fairly easily , because of the lack of
strong ...
It may also be that the loser and the winner is the same person ( for instance a
taxpayer who at the same time is also the recipient of an health program ) . In
principle , such policies should be adopted fairly easily , because of the lack of
strong ...
Page 5
For instance , a policy that begins , or could have begun , as regulatory - specific ,
can become divisive if the vast group of people who get the benefits acts in an
organized way ( with pressure , protests , lobbying , etc . ) . An even more ...
For instance , a policy that begins , or could have begun , as regulatory - specific ,
can become divisive if the vast group of people who get the benefits acts in an
organized way ( with pressure , protests , lobbying , etc . ) . An even more ...
Page 6
Again very roughly and tentatively ( because some concrete instances could
belie the following correlation ) , we could ... politician ( but many distributive
policies pose , of course , serious substantive problems , for instance of a
budgetary kind ) ...
Again very roughly and tentatively ( because some concrete instances could
belie the following correlation ) , we could ... politician ( but many distributive
policies pose , of course , serious substantive problems , for instance of a
budgetary kind ) ...
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according adoption agenda allocated allow alteration Analysis avoid become benefits Blondel cabinet chances choice coalition committees competence complex composite concentrated benefits concentrated costs concerning Consequences consider controversial conversely debate decision-making decisions depends difficulty diffused discussion distributive policies divisive policies Economics effective electoral EUI Working Paper European European University Institute example favour formal gain given groups HAMMOND ideologically divisive ideologically divisive policies impact imply individual influential inside the cabinet instance interests issues Italy kinds of policy least Legislative losers majority Market measures ministers obstacles organized Padova party Peter policy outputs policy-making political position possible potential Power preferences prime principle Probability problems proposals Public Policy pure Reform regulatory regulatory-specific rules Science seen situation Social Solution specific SPINA Structures Studies style substantive success tend Theory transformed types of policy typology variable Wilson