EUI Working Paper: SPS, Issues 90-95European University Institute, 1990 - Europe |
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Page 4
The potential losers , on the contrary , are attentive and warlike . So , if the policy
... It may also be that the loser and the winner is the same person ( for instance a
taxpayer who at the same time is also the recipient of an health program ) .
The potential losers , on the contrary , are attentive and warlike . So , if the policy
... It may also be that the loser and the winner is the same person ( for instance a
taxpayer who at the same time is also the recipient of an health program ) .
Page 5
Ideologically divisive policies , on the contrary , often reinforce the identification of
party followers , and could therefore be preferred , even if they create some
losers ( who would never vote for that party anyway ) . Again , the features of the ...
Ideologically divisive policies , on the contrary , often reinforce the identification of
party followers , and could therefore be preferred , even if they create some
losers ( who would never vote for that party anyway ) . Again , the features of the ...
Page 11
Otherwise , they will normally tend to avoid such choices , or to compensate the
losers by transforming the concentrated costs into diffused ones . This
transformation , however , takes place in pre - cabinet stages , in " iron triangles "
or " policy ...
Otherwise , they will normally tend to avoid such choices , or to compensate the
losers by transforming the concentrated costs into diffused ones . This
transformation , however , takes place in pre - cabinet stages , in " iron triangles "
or " policy ...
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according adoption agenda allocated allow alteration Analysis avoid become benefits Blondel cabinet chances choice coalition committees competence complex composite concentrated benefits concentrated costs concerning Consequences consider controversial conversely debate decision-making decisions depends difficulty diffused discussion distributive policies divisive policies Economics effective electoral EUI Working Paper European European University Institute example favour formal gain given groups HAMMOND ideologically divisive ideologically divisive policies impact imply individual influential inside the cabinet instance interests issues Italy kinds of policy least Legislative losers majority Market measures ministers obstacles organized Padova party Peter policy outputs policy-making political position possible potential Power preferences prime principle Probability problems proposals Public Policy pure Reform regulatory regulatory-specific rules Science seen situation Social Solution specific SPINA Structures Studies style substantive success tend Theory transformed types of policy typology variable Wilson