EUI Working Paper: SPS, Issues 90-95European University Institute, 1990 - Europe |
From inside the book
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Page 4
... means that the conflicting interests of the two groups ( that is those who bear the concentrated costs and those who hope to gain the concentrated benefits ) are actually defined in purely " material " terms . Think , for instance , of ...
... means that the conflicting interests of the two groups ( that is those who bear the concentrated costs and those who hope to gain the concentrated benefits ) are actually defined in purely " material " terms . Think , for instance , of ...
Page 6
... means , perverse side effects , etc. ) is very large . Again very roughly and tentatively ( because some concrete instances could belie the following correlation ) , we could choose to rank the above said types of policy , according to ...
... means , perverse side effects , etc. ) is very large . Again very roughly and tentatively ( because some concrete instances could belie the following correlation ) , we could choose to rank the above said types of policy , according to ...
Page 16
... means . This could seriously diminish the substantive accuracy of the general policies passed thanks to a consociational majority . Compact majorities appear to be the best suited to obtain policies which are both substantively and ...
... means . This could seriously diminish the substantive accuracy of the general policies passed thanks to a consociational majority . Compact majorities appear to be the best suited to obtain policies which are both substantively and ...
Common terms and phrases
adoption agenda allocated Analysis ANTONIO LA SPINA Author Title Blondel Cabinets and Policy-Making Cedam ceteris paribus coalition committees compact majorities Composite majorities concentrated benefits concentrated costs conflict Consequences for Policy Consiglio Consociational majorities controversial policies debate decision-making decisione legislativa decisions desired policies diffused costs discussion distributive policies Divisive Divisive Regulatory-specific Divisive Regulatory-specific Distributive electoral ESPING-ANDERSEN EUI Working Paper European Community European University Institute favour Features of Cabinets formal Giandomenico MAJONE government platform groups HAMMOND Ideologically Divisive Divisive ideologically divisive policies influential inside the cabinet Jean Blondel John MICKLEWRIGHT kinds of policy Lowi Majoritarian Market obstacles or facilitations Padova party Peter policies at issue Policies General Ideologically policy outputs policy process Policy Theory policy-making process Public Policy pure divisive Reflections on Cabinets regulatory regulatory-specific policies Social Stephen MARTIN substantive difficulty tend types of majority types of policy Typologies of Public Washington D.C. Wilson's typology workload