EUI Working Paper: SPS, Issues 90-95European University Institute, 1990 - Europe |
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Page 9
Two extreme situations can be imagined : 1 ) Many kinds of measure reserved to
administrative - ministerial ... the need for the cabinet to act as a filter , at least in
formal terms , for bills sponsored by the government and by individual ministers .
Two extreme situations can be imagined : 1 ) Many kinds of measure reserved to
administrative - ministerial ... the need for the cabinet to act as a filter , at least in
formal terms , for bills sponsored by the government and by individual ministers .
Page 10
The Members of the Cabinet If ministers are specialists ( also in the sense of
having enjoyed a long tenure in the same department ) , they will tend to avoid
interfering in other ministers ' businesses , save in cases of intersectoral policy 11
.
The Members of the Cabinet If ministers are specialists ( also in the sense of
having enjoyed a long tenure in the same department ) , they will tend to avoid
interfering in other ministers ' businesses , save in cases of intersectoral policy 11
.
Page 11
Ministers can sometimes be willing to allocate concentrated costs , especially if
these fall on groups which are not among the clients of the department ( but in
this case they can expect the opposition from other ministers , whose clients
stand to ...
Ministers can sometimes be willing to allocate concentrated costs , especially if
these fall on groups which are not among the clients of the department ( but in
this case they can expect the opposition from other ministers , whose clients
stand to ...
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