EUI Working Paper: SPS, Issues 90-95European University Institute, 1990 - Europe |
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Page 3
Here both costs and benefits fall on small groups , or on categories which are
rather numerous , but are already organized ( for instance by a trade union ) .
Again , the potential winners know that they are gaining something and are
expected ...
Here both costs and benefits fall on small groups , or on categories which are
rather numerous , but are already organized ( for instance by a trade union ) .
Again , the potential winners know that they are gaining something and are
expected ...
Page 4
So they will organize themselves in order to react and block the undesired policy
. It is understandable , then , that such policies imply strong conflict and painful
decisions . If there are no particular reasons for pressing these policies ( such as
...
So they will organize themselves in order to react and block the undesired policy
. It is understandable , then , that such policies imply strong conflict and painful
decisions . If there are no particular reasons for pressing these policies ( such as
...
Page 5
In such cases one type of policy process is transformed into another . For
instance , a policy that begins , or could have begun , as regulatory - specific ,
can become divisive if the vast group of people who get the benefits acts in an
organized ...
In such cases one type of policy process is transformed into another . For
instance , a policy that begins , or could have begun , as regulatory - specific ,
can become divisive if the vast group of people who get the benefits acts in an
organized ...
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Common terms and phrases
according adoption agenda allocated allow alteration Analysis avoid become benefits Blondel cabinet chances choice coalition committees competence complex composite concentrated benefits concentrated costs concerning Consequences consider controversial conversely debate decision-making decisions depends difficulty diffused discussion distributive policies divisive policies Economics effective electoral EUI Working Paper European European University Institute example favour formal gain given groups HAMMOND ideologically divisive ideologically divisive policies impact imply individual influential inside the cabinet instance interests issues Italy kinds of policy least Legislative losers majority Market measures ministers obstacles organized Padova party Peter policy outputs policy-making political position possible potential Power preferences prime principle Probability problems proposals Public Policy pure Reform regulatory regulatory-specific rules Science seen situation Social Solution specific SPINA Structures Studies style substantive success tend Theory transformed types of policy typology variable Wilson