EUI Working Paper: SPS, Issues 90-95European University Institute, 1990 - Europe |
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Page 3
Such policies will tend to be adopted rather easily , because the potential opponents are , in ideal conditions , a vast and disorganized group of persons ( e.g. the taxpayers ) not well aware of losing something on that particular ...
Such policies will tend to be adopted rather easily , because the potential opponents are , in ideal conditions , a vast and disorganized group of persons ( e.g. the taxpayers ) not well aware of losing something on that particular ...
Page 4
The potential losers , on the contrary , are attentive and warlike . So , if the policy preference of the decision - maker is not extraordinarily strong , such policies will be ( ceteris paribus ) rare and , even in those cases when ...
The potential losers , on the contrary , are attentive and warlike . So , if the policy preference of the decision - maker is not extraordinarily strong , such policies will be ( ceteris paribus ) rare and , even in those cases when ...
Page 11
... opposition from other ministers , whose clients stand to be the potential losers ) . Otherwise , they will normally tend to avoid such choices , or to compensate the losers by transforming the concentrated costs into diffused ones .
... opposition from other ministers , whose clients stand to be the potential losers ) . Otherwise , they will normally tend to avoid such choices , or to compensate the losers by transforming the concentrated costs into diffused ones .
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Bibliographic information
| Title | EUI Working Paper: SPS, Issues 90-95 EUI Working Paper: SPS, European University Institute. Department of Political and Social Sciences |
| Contributor | European University Institute. Department of Political and Social Sciences |
| Publisher | European University Institute, 1990 |
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