EUI Working Paper: SPS, Issues 90-95European University Institute, 1990 - Europe |
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Page 4
So , if the policy preference of the decision - maker is not extraordinarily strong ,
such policies will be ( ceteris paribus ) rare and , even in those cases when they
are discussed , will tend to be postponed , delegated , transformed , or framed as
...
So , if the policy preference of the decision - maker is not extraordinarily strong ,
such policies will be ( ceteris paribus ) rare and , even in those cases when they
are discussed , will tend to be postponed , delegated , transformed , or framed as
...
Page 11
... policies not consistent with the government program , or with the prime minister
' s preferences , will be ruled out , be they controversial or not ; some
controversial policies ( pure divisive , regulatory specific or ideologically divisive ,
which in ...
... policies not consistent with the government program , or with the prime minister
' s preferences , will be ruled out , be they controversial or not ; some
controversial policies ( pure divisive , regulatory specific or ideologically divisive ,
which in ...
Page 12
... some divisive policies , pure and ideological ( both if consistent with the
government platform and / or with the premier ' s policy preferences ) ; - some
regulatory - specific policies ; - many distributive policies ( but not so many if the
financial ...
... some divisive policies , pure and ideological ( both if consistent with the
government platform and / or with the premier ' s policy preferences ) ; - some
regulatory - specific policies ; - many distributive policies ( but not so many if the
financial ...
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according adoption agenda allocated allow alteration Analysis avoid become benefits Blondel cabinet chances choice coalition committees competence complex composite concentrated benefits concentrated costs concerning Consequences consider controversial conversely debate decision-making decisions depends difficulty diffused discussion distributive policies divisive policies Economics effective electoral EUI Working Paper European European University Institute example favour formal gain given groups HAMMOND ideologically divisive ideologically divisive policies impact imply individual influential inside the cabinet instance interests issues Italy kinds of policy least Legislative losers majority Market measures ministers obstacles organized Padova party Peter policy outputs policy-making political position possible potential Power preferences prime principle Probability problems proposals Public Policy pure Reform regulatory regulatory-specific rules Science seen situation Social Solution specific SPINA Structures Studies style substantive success tend Theory transformed types of policy typology variable Wilson