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abstraction act of perception action affirm analogy asked assertion axioms beauty believe body brain cause cognize the fact color condition conscious consequence consists contingent truths desire direct cognition distinction doctrine Dugald Stewart ence event exercise expression extension external objects faculties habit Hamilton imagination immediate inference inkstand intuitive cognitions intuitive perception knowledge known language material objects means memory mental act mental operations mind can cognize mind cognizes modifications moral motives nature necessary truths ness nize object of perception optic nerve organs of sense perceive philosophy philosophy of perception power of cognizing principle produce proposition qualities of matter question rays of light reasoning regard Reid relation RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE remember resemblance retina sensation simple SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON space substratum suppose syllogism take place term theory thing Thomas Brown thought tion tree true uncon unconscious mental unknown volition wrong
Page 51 - It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.
Page 235 - ... trepan. He was at the time in a state of perfect stupor ; and, after his recovery, retained no recollection either of the accident or of the operation. At the age of fifteen, during the delirium of a fever, he gave his mother a correct description of the operation, and the persons who were present at it, with their dress and other minute particulars. He had never been observed to allude to it before, and no means were known by which he could have acquired a knowledge of the circumstances which...
Page 205 - There exist no points without magnitude; no lines without breadth, nor perfectly straight; no circles with all their radii exactly equal, nor squares with all their angles perfectly right.
Page 52 - It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction.
Page 50 - And since the extension, figure, number, and motion of bodies of an observable bigness may be perceived at a distance by the sight, it is evident some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain some motion which produces these ideas which we have of them in us.
Page 91 - I cannot help thinking it more philosophical to suppose, that those actions which are originally voluntary, always continue so; although, in the case of operations which are become habitual in consequence of long practice, we may not be able to recollect every different volition. Thus, in the case of a performer on the harpsichord, I apprehend, that there is an act of the will preceding every motion of every finger, although he may not be able to recollect these volitions...
Page 205 - I answer that, according to any test we have of possibility, they are not even possible. Their existence, so far as we can form any judgment, would seem to be inconsistent with the physical constitution of our planet at least, if not of the universe.
Page 216 - ... whatever is predicated (ie affirmed or denied) universally, of any class of things, may be predicated, in like manner, (viz. affirmed or denied) of any thing comprehended in that class.
Page 53 - For, what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense ? and what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived ? 5.
Page 140 - We are utterly unable to realize in thought the possibility of the complement of existence being either increased or diminished. We are unable, on the one hand, to conceive nothing becoming something. — or, on the other, something becoming nothing. When God is said to create out of nothing, we construe this to thought by supposing that He evolves existence out of himself; we view the Creator as the cause of the universe. " Ex nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti " expresses, in its purest...