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ally, the infrastructure improvements to roads, hospitals, and schools and the construction of water wells on Basilan Island under DoD's humanitarian and civic assistance program provide positive impacts on local communities—highlighting America's positive role while assisting the Philippines in dealing with the socio-economic causes that entice disenfranchised Filipinos to support terrorist activities. As a result of this well integrated operation, the ASG is on the run on Basilan and its influence with the local populace there has been dampened.

We also continue our active Security Assistance program to help the Armed Forces of the Philippines build both the capabilities and capacity necessary to continue the courageous struggle against terrorism. Following this SA effort later this year, we will evaluate the effectiveness of our training, and feed back those results into our planning.

USPACOM's Antiterrorism Program is proactive and dynamic in its approach to protect our people and resources throughout the Pacific. It is an "active defense" because it has offensive qualities. Since 11 September, we have come a long way in better protecting DoD personnel and critical infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific region.

Our joint commanders for HLD/CS/CM in Hawaii and Alaska and Joint Area Coordinators in Korea and Japan are the focal points for force protection, coordinating security measures and intelligence fusion among the different services in their AORs. They provide the command and control construct to synchronize our DoD anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) efforts for military installations and property with federal, state, and local agencies and with the host nations in the cases of Japan and Korea. We are working continuously with US Northern Command to standardize and synchronize our efforts and procedures.

USPACOM has an aggressive vulnerability assessment program that covers DoD bases, ports, airfields, and training areas in the AOR that are not under U.S. control. We use assessment teams from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the services, and our components to ensure our facilities have current assessments and proactive antiterrorism plans. USPACOM personnel work closely with their Department of State counterparts to ensure host-nation support is adequate to protect our deployed forces and that all are employing the latest AT/FP procedures.

Force protection is "operationalized" in USPACOM. Our staff continually monitors threat information and the environment in which our forces are based. Theater and country specific Force Protection Conditions (FPCONs) are continually reviewed and upgraded as necessary. Random Antiterrorism Measures are employed to complicate terrorist planning. USPACOM also has a travel restriction program, providing a tool to declare entire countries or portions thereof "off-limits' to DoD members, thus keeping them out of harm's way. In addition, Force Protection plans are required for all travel in our AOR, from major unit deployments to individuals on leave. The resource drain from increased FPCONs is a formidable challenge to both manpower limitations and Force Protection Technology initiatives. Your continued support is necessary to sustain the progress we are making in this area.

Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) program and Homeland Security. Currently, we support Homeland Security and Forward Base security efforts primarily through Information Analysis, Infrastructure/Personnel Protection, and Quick Reaction Forces. The Critical Infrastructure Program is our operational initiative to improve security in the AOR. The program is on track in developing processes and methodologies. The first CIP Appendix to one of our theater Operational Plans (OPLAN) was submitted to the Joint Staff on 30 April 2003. Additionally, a comprehensive USPACOM CIP Operation Order (OPORD), our Theater Infrastructure Assurance Plan, is in final staffing. Notably, the program has resulted in a partnership with the Joint Program Office for Special Technology Countermeasures to develop and field a prototype Combatant Command CIP Database.

Homeland Defense and Civil Support (HLD/CS). With the recent direction to consolidate the security, defense, and support for the homeland, we are working to integrate existing functions as well as expanded mission requirements to enhance our protection of the USPACOM Homeland AOR that includes the State of Hawaii, the Territories of Guam and American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. Missions such as HLD/CS/CM, CIP, Homeland Air Security (HAS), Consequence Management for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and high yield Explosive (CBRNE), and Domestic Support Operations are but a few of those being combined into one plan to maximize our capabilities and still refine the use of our resources. USPACOM's HAS mission deters, prevents or interdicts aerial threats and aggression directed toward Hawaii, Alaska, Guam, and U.S. territories within USPACOM's AOR. The HAS air threat spectrum ranges from ballistic missiles and aircraft to future low-altitude cruise missiles and radio controlled sub-scale aircraft. The potential for a terrorist to gain this capability is rising. USPACOM has addressed this challenge with close integration, cooperation, coordination, and collaboration among international, federal, state, local agencies, and governments. This fusion of individual agency capabilities, including our military, into an integrated, multi-layered response is key to our collective success.

USPACOM also supports other non-Homeland Security functions. Civil Support operations will be an enhancement of our existing Domestic Support Operations to the Homeland. Although not directly related to securing the homeland against terrorism, this support affects the impact of terrorist action. With Secretary of Defense direction, we quickly support the Department of Homeland in mitigation and recovery efforts relating to natural disasters. Typhoon Pongsona in Guam is a good example. The USPACOM HLD/CS program has taken on a renewed effort with great scope and responsibilities. Our Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) will build on our processes for intelligence sharing, AT/FP, CIP, CBRNE and natural disasters as well as other requested support to the civilian sector, providing a comprehensive program for Hawaii, Guam, and all our territories in the AOR.

Information fusion. USPACOM's Counterintelligence Program remains the key link between DoD and Law Enforcement Agency efforts in the Pacific Theater. We are committed to furthering the integration efforts of the Joint Inter-Agency Coordination Group-Counter-Terrorism (JIACG-CT) and counterintelligence missions with the FBTs Joint Terrorism Task Forces and with allied international agencies. Along these lines, we are pioneering efforts to promulgate all-source intelligence fusion to connect local, state, national, and DoD intelligence, counterintelligence, and law enforcement agencies. These efforts, coupled with a joint international training regimen encompassing asymmetric warfare and analysis from multiple perspectives, hold great promise in developing an "actionable intelligence" capability.

Personnel Requirements. Legislation mandates reductions in Higher Headquarters (HHQ) staffs by 15 percent. USPACOM and our sub-unified commands are executing these reductions in ways that will minimize the impact on our missions. The need for intelligence gathering, analysis, production, coordination, dissemination, campaign planning, and capabilities testing in exercises and coalition building is greater than ever. Adequate personnel resources are essential to mission planning to counter emerging asymmetric threats. Achieving synergy of forces launched from around the globe during conflicts while providing effective reach-back for those forces creates high mission demand on our combatant headquarters (HQ) staff.

The GWOT has created additional personnel requirements. Increased security patrols, both shore-based and waterside, in response to enhanced FPCONs; non-U.S. controlled port and airfield assessment teams; 24/7 coverage for Crisis Action Teams; and the already expanding Homeland Defense, Civil Support and CT missions are a few examples of personnel generating tasks. Additional AT/FP billets are needed to address the full range of force protection, antiterrorism, and CT missions throughout USPACOM. As we continue to develop the Homeland Defense and Civil Support plan, we already see the need for enhanced information analysis capabilities and consequence management resources for CBRNE events.

Integrating Reservists. Throughout the 1990's, we increasingly relied on our Reserve and Guard members to help accomplish our mission. These outstanding service members/citizens contributed not only hard work, but also unique talents and perspectives. It is not an understatement to say that they have helped in every facet of the USPACOM mission. After 11 September, with the sharply increasing demands of the GWOT, we needed their support. Throughout USPACOM, we only mobilized about 5,000 Reservists—about 10% of the immediate 11 September mobilized force capability. They helped with force protection, logistics flow, and increased shifts in myriad areas. As we continue to tap into our Reservists and National Guardsmen to support operations, we need to ensure they receive benefits comparable to our active duty service members. America can be proud of how our Reserve and Guard forces have responded.

Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiatives Fund (CbT RIF). USPACOM received $4 million in CbT RIF funding in FY02. The FY03 worldwide allocation stands at $47 million. This initiative provides the Geographic and Functional Commanders additional avenues for resourcing against emergent and emergency terrorist threats. USPACOM received $4 million (10 projects) of the $32 million available in the first allocation of FY03 funding, not including $2.5 million (14 projects) for U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). USPACOM funded CbT RIF projects include emergency Explosive Ordnance Disposal responder gear for USARPAC; a perimeter wall for the new USPACOM Headquarters; vehicle gates and barriers for Tripler Army Hospital; mass notification system for Misawa Air Base (AB), Japan; closed circuit television for Fort Buckner; gates for Yokota AB, Japan flight line; barrier gates for Fort Shafter; crash barriers for Camp Zama, Japan; and a standoff initiative with HQs security upgrades for Yokota AB.

Special Operation Forces (SOF). Through Special Operations Command-Pacific and JTF-510, USPACOM maintains the ability to deploy SOF under the command of a general officer to any location to combat terrorism. We have used this capability in Operation Enduring Freedom—Philippines and continue to refine it to support the GWOT. This capability, however, depends on building and maintaining relations with supporting allies and friendly nations. We build and maintain these relationships through our Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) and other Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) programs. We look forward to working with the Congress to ensure these activities continue to receive future resource consideration.

Improving Readiness and Joint Warfighting Capability

Improving the readiness and joint warfighting capability of USPACOM forces is critical to assuring our friends and allies, dissuading future military competition, deterring threats and coercion against U.S. interests, and defeating an adversary if deterrence fails. It includes the force levels, spares, operating dollars, and training needed to maintain ready forces. It also means innovating, transforming, and improving our capabilities and developing operating concepts and technologies needed to keep our forces ready for a wide range of alternative futures.

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). The GWOT and traditional regional military threats demand ever-increasing agility and innovation in developing true all-source intelligence analysis capability. In the Asia-Pacific region, Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) remains our best means to provide timely information on threat developments and intentions. It is key to tracking terrorist activities in Indonesia and the Philippines, as well as maintaining warning indicators and situational awareness on areas such as Korea, tensions between India and Pakistan, and China's continuing military modernization and relations with Taiwan.

The ability to integrate National Security Agency (NSA) and service SIGINT is vital in peacetime and in crisis. Rapid advances in telecommunications technologies, and their use by adversaries, present a daunting SIGINT challenge. I strongly support NSA's transformation efforts to defeat any perspective gains the digital technology revolution may present to our enemies.

I strongly advocate the accelerated development and fielding of joint, interoperable, modular, rapidly reconfigurable tactical SIGINT equipment for land, sea, and air platforms. These improvements should be balanced by collaborative intelligence processing systems at national, theater, and tactical levels to make the best use of the increased data obtained.

Without concurrent improvements in NSA's capabilities and in service cryptologic systems it will be increasingly difficult to predict, find, and target the most serious threats in our region.

Substantial improvements are needed to enhance Human Intelligence (HUMINT) collection capability against key USPACOM Indications and Warning requirements, to include hard and deeply buried underground facilities supporting the adversary's command, control, and communications and WMD infrastructure. Focused and coordinated source development is critical. Sustained resources for both CIA and DoD (Defense HUMINT Services) will yield the progress we need. Our military commands must have insight into enemy plans and intentions that only good HUMINT can provide.

Cryptolinguists remain a long-standing shortfall, with Operation ENDURING FREEDOM proving the value of personnel fluent in languages and dialects. We are partially meeting the current challenges by training cryptolinguists to become familiar with low-density dialects and using speakers fluent in these dialects to augment our force. Ensuring the Defense Manpower Data Center's Automated Language Finder database tracks all USPACOM languages and dialects would significantly improve our ability to find speakers of languages/dialects required for future operations. Additionally, it is essential the Defense Language Institute develop tests for languages/dialects that accurately assess language skills of service personnel.

To support future contingencies, crises or OPLANs, we require a full-up and exercised joint ISR architecture with adequate ISR assets. One positive development sponsored by the U.S. Air Force is the multi-intelligence tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) environment with the Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) at Hickam Air Force Base (AFB). This system will distribute data from theater, commercial, and tactical ISR sensors to multiple users— national, joint, and combined—involved in a crisis. To fully benefit from the DCGS, additional funding is needed to ensure USPACOM service components have a sustained airborne ISR infrastructure, to include unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and extended tether U-2 high-altitude surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft.

Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4). Over the past 3 years, improving the C4 posture in the Pacific has been a top USPACOM priority and still is one of the most critical challenges we face today. The C4 infrastructure must be continually sustained and protected. We've invested heavily in command and control systems and equipment, communication devices, and computers across the command. We do this because our current and future requirements demand that we do. For example, the Air Force recently declared initial operating capability for a new Air Operations Center at Hickam AFB in Hawaii. This function can deploy in part or as a whole to operate through the full spectrum of contingency operations, reaching back for support from the rest of the Air Operations Center at Hickam. Every planning action, training event, operation, and weapon system in existence today relies heavily on the ability to communicate. Providing our fighting men and women with the weapons they need comes with a large price tag, but it's worth it. To do otherwise would be tantamount to denying them ammunition in the heat of battle.

C-4 Challenges. The GWOT demands effective communication systems and equipment to link national authorities and local first responders with real-time information. We have made great strides in improving C4 capabilities in the Pacific Theater, but we must continue improvements at a rapid pace to keep up with expanding requirements for connectivity, capacity and security. C4 ties all technology together and is the underpinning for Transformation, both directly and indirectly. We must enhance our information infrastructure to be more robust, able to rapidly capitalize on improving technology, and more cost efficient.

To achieve information superiority we need to move large volumes of information to and from the warfighter to maintain vivid and complete situational awareness and achieve understanding at a glance. Many folks envision large volumes of information as pages and pages of text messages, which can overwhelm users and result in "information overload." Instead, we are talking about maximum use of multimedia such as video, shared applications through collaboration software, and highresolution imagery. Through these types of tools, our operators can digest more information and we can collectively move towards a more knowledge-based environment.

This type of capability requires large network capacity. Our warfighting requirements for remote and austere locations require that this network capacity be robust and resilient. Enhanced satellite capability is one of USPACOM's most critical needs. Today we do not have enough bandwidth in any of the military satellite bands, Ultra, Super, or Extra High Frequency, to fully support our operational plans. Commercial SATCOM capacity can support much of this shortfall, however, commercial SATCOM availability is subject to market pressures and is not fully dependable. For example, an important commercial SATCOM service to the Navy was preempted by media coverage of the 2000 Olympics in Sydney, Australia.

Additionally, USPACOM principally relies on geo-stationary weather satellites to track destructive typhoons over the vast expanse of USPACOM's ocean areas. Our current geo-stationary satellite weather information comes from foreign-owned and operated satellites that are reaching their designed service lives.

Consequently, it is absolutely crucial to fully fund and keep on track satellite upgrades, launches of new communications and weather satellites, and new satellite programs.

Our terrestrial communication infrastructure also needs attention. Most of our bases, posts, camps and stations are supported by mid 20th century cable and wire technology. The Global Information Grid (GIG) Bandwidth Expansion Project promises to replace this legacy infrastructure with the fiber optic connectivity needed for our in-garrison forces, command centers and training facilities.

Radio communications that connect us with federal, state and local government agencies are also important for force protection, homeland security and disaster response. We appreciate the congressional support for the Pacific Mobile Emergency Radio System (PACMERS), which will help us meet National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) mandate for frequency consolidation and allow for excellent interoperability with non-military partners.

Information Assurance and Information Sharing. Communication connectivity and capacity are only part of the solution for network centric warfare. Communication and information security must be maintained while simultaneously sharing information and collaborating with bilateral and multilateral coalitions. Our ability to share information with coalition partners is inhibited by our need to restrict information within enclaves that are not accessible to coalition partners. To be network centric, we need the network to be agile and allow for the dynamic interconnection of nodes that support several communities of interest. Typically, we can have several simultaneous operations involving different coalition partners occurring in the Pacific at any given time. Being able to support these concurrently, with sufficient network capacity, is an information technology challenge.

Our Combined Operations Wide Area Network (COWAN) initiative is helping us achieve this goal by developing an information system that is interoperable with U.S. and coalition forces and is agile enough to allow us to selectively collaborate in multiple joint /multi-national environments simultaneously. We have formed a strong partnership with CENTCOM to roll our COWAN solution into the Combined Enterprise Information Exchange System, CENTRIXS, which may become the single network environment for all joint forces to support coalition operations and intelligence networking requirements. This single, highly meshed environment would be much more responsive and financially efficient than the multiple networks required today to support each individual coalition community.

Communication and information security measures are both part of our comprehensive Information Assurance strategy. As the Internet expands and becomes more pervasive, our adversaries are continuously finding ways of using computer vulnerabilities and network weaknesses to deny access to our information resources or exploit our information content. There are many programs focused on information assurance involving encryption, intrusion detection and network emergency response. Coordination of these programs and computer network defense activities requires a highly trained team of network professionals working around the clock with and a strong relationship with the Joint Task Force for Computer Network Operations (JTF CNO). I cannot cite any single program that is more important than any other in the Information Assurance area; however, emphasis in this area is a must if we expect to rely on network centric operations.

With regard to information sharing, we have made great strides in gathering and taking advantage of "open source" information and providing it to our coalition and inter-agency partners to build trust and improve understanding. The vast amount of this information necessitates focused collection and analytical efforts to identify accurate and relevant information to enhance security cooperation. Open source products provided by the Virtual Information Center (VIC) and the regional information exchanges conducted via the Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN) have increased our situational awareness of events and developments in the Asia-Pacific region that affect all of our operations. More importantly, these web-based activities have enabled us to expand our information base and share the results instantly with our foreign counterparts and potential coalition partners.

Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW). The Pacific undersea warfare challenge is growing at a significant rate. In recent years, the USPACOM AOR has seen the greatest increase in submarine order of battle in the world. A robust and integrated ASW architecture and more capable force structure are essential to counter the growing submarine threat. The premier ASW asset remains submarines. To ensure sufficient submarines are available to track and kill enemy forces, we must continue to support the refueling of 688-class submarines and follow through in reaching a VTRGINIA-class submarine build rate at two per year in FY 2007. I also strongly support the rapid transition to acquiring Automatic Periscope Detection technology for surface ships and Navy Maritime Patrol Aircraft employed in littoral regions. Congressional efforts last year resulted in funding for a welcomed and much needed 688-class submarine refueling overhaul program and funding that enabled the transition from a science and technology program to an acquisition program for airborne Automatic Periscope Detection technology. I appreciate your support as we make necessary improvements in our ASW war fighting capabilities.

Missile Defense (MD). Short and medium range ballistic missiles pose the most pervasive and challenging missile threat for USPACOM MD. Effectively defending against this threat requires a layered, complementary mix of sea and ground based lower tier and upper tier terminal phase defense systems. Until a robust upper tier system is fielded, lower tier systems remain paramount to successful execution of theater OPLANs. A mix of forward deployed ground systems and sea-based lower tier systems offers the lowest risk and earliest deployment opticns. Accordingly, I support delivery of a sea-based terminal system as soon as technologically feasible and a moderate increase in Patriot PAC-3/GEM+ missile production/conversion to meet current OPLAN and contingency plan (CONPLAN) warfighting requirements. From a homeland defense perspective, continued development and fielding of a Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) capable of intercepting missiles in all phases of flight (i.e. boost, midcourse, and terminal) against all known threats remains a top priority. Key capabilities that support these requirements, now and in the future (Missile Defense Agency's Block '04-'06 BMDS capabilities), for USPACOM include PATRIOT PAC-3, Sea Based Midcourse Defense Segment, Theater High Altitude Air Defense, and Airborne Laser 1/2 power. Congressional support of the BMDS programs remains vigilant, and I applaud your continued support of Ballistic Missile Defense initiatives.

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