Institutional incentives and sustainable development: infrastructure policies in perspective
Westview Press, 1993 - Business & Economics - 266 pages
Integrating recent research in the fields of public administration, public finance, institutional economics, and policy analysis, this book shows how institutional arrangements and the incentives they generate can help or hinder development efforts. The authors present a method for systematically comparing alternative institutional arrangements for the development of rural infrastructure. Their analysis reveals the special strengths and weaknesses of polycentric as compared to centralized or decentralized institutional arrangements. Descriptions of a variety of infrastructure projects—including roads, bridges, and irrigation systems—in geographical settings as diverse as Africa, Asia, and Latin America are used to illustrate key concepts.Perfect for courses on policy analysis, development administration, and economic development and for use by professional practitioners, Institutional Incentives contributes appreciably and practically to the understanding of sustainable development, infrastructure maintenance, institutional analysis, and the central importance of institutional arrangements.
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The Role of Infrastructure in Development
The Problem of Sustainable Infrastructure
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administrative adverse selection agencies allocation analysis areas attributes authority Bangladesh beneficiaries benefits canals capital Chapter communities consider contract contractors contribute coordination costs corruption decentralization decisionmaking decisions deterioration developing countries differentiated market discussion donor economies of scale effective efforts evaluation example factors farmers finance fiscal equivalence free riding funds important improve incentives increase indigenous institutions individuals information asymmetries infrastructure development infrastructure investments infrastructure projects inputs intermediate performance criteria involved irrigation irrigation system jurisdictions labor large-scale maintain mobilization monitoring moral hazard Nepal operation and maintenance organization Ostrom outcomes participants particular place information polycentric potential problems provision and production public officials public sector redistribution reduce rent seeking responsibility result revenues rules rural infrastructure facilities rural roads shirking specific strategic costs structure substantial Susan Wynne sustainable infrastructure taxes transaction costs transformation costs types USAID user group village World Bank zanjera