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The taking of Canada may be easy enough, if we attack it at once, both by sea and land; and not as it was done lately, by very unskilful people. The keeping of Canada, and settling and fortifying that large island of Newfoundland, will hinder the French from fishing upon the great bank, and consequently diminish greatly, if not totally ruin their maritime power.

Martinico is the only place of strength the French have in America; its Fort-Royal is impregnable any other way than by famine, but it may easily be bombarded, whereby you may ruin and burn the houses and buildings in it; and perhaps the very magazines and cisterns, after which they cannot subsist long, and will be forced to surrender.

Granada is of very little strength, having but few inhabitants: its fort is on the top of a hill, and was surprised and taken by one Erasmus, a single Dutch privateer. Its harbour is very large, and capable of holding many of the greatest ships. This island is not subject to hurricanes, its situation lying near Trinity island, and the Spanish coast; and those other places, by which most of the Spanish ships pass in going to the West-India plantations, make it very considerable.

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It has many rivers of excellent water; the land is hilly about the harbour, and the north side; but, towards the south and west, very level; cocoa trees, and the vanilio, grow there naturally.

In lieu of sending two regiments (as it is discoursed of) to Jamaica, I would only draw detachments from all the regiments here in England, and Ireland, perhaps, also, from Scotland; model them all into independent companies, and give them commanders out of the reformed and half-pay officers.

The regiments, keeping all their officers, would soon recruit, and be filled again, with new soldiers, who would presently be disciplined; and these independent companies would be as serviceable as if they were regimented, and be of less charge to the nation.

I would also propose to send these companies, as soon as possible, to the north continent of America: for example, two to Newfoundland, six to New-England, four to New-York, and so of all the other companies; it would make no great noise, and alarm no body, not being likely to be thought, or presumed to intend, farther than the defence of all those places. The transport from that northern continent, to the southward, is very easy, and may be done at any time, together with the provisions, all the parts of New-England having a great number of ships of their own.

The sending of two regiments to the island of Jamaica will cause many inconveniences. Jamaica is unhealthy, and many will be sick and die, before you can bring them to action. The northern parts of America are as healthy as England. Jamaica lies to the leeward of all the French colonies, so that it is very difficult and sometimes impossible, always very tedious, and long, to turn up to the windward; the winds are contrary, and the current is against you, very often so strong, that a brisk, favourable, westerly wind cannot make you overcome it.

I would gather all the forces to the islands of Barbadoes and the Caribbees: they lie to the westward of all the French and Spanish colonies; the wind is always favourable to go to them at pleasure.

I humbly propose the attacking of the French first. If a war breaks out towards the spring, most of the forces being ready in the continent of New England, I would begin, by attacking Canada by sea and land in the beginning of the summer; the conquest of it may be thoroughly perfected before the fit time of attempting any considerable action in the southern colonies.

The timing well your attempt is so very necessary, that, without it, you cannot, with any probability, succeed; yet it has been hitherto so little regarded, that all our fleets for the West Indies, in the late war, arrived always, and thought of some action, when the hurricanes began to be feared and expected.

It was very far in June, when we attacked St. Christophers; it was the beginning of it, also, when we landed at Martinico; and it was also in June, when Willmot and Lillingston attacked Port de Paix in Hispaniola.

Had Ruiter been at Martinico any other time but June, he would have certainly taken it. The Dutch committed many errors in their attack; but the only thing, which forced them to withdraw, was, that, it being hurricane time, Ruiter, seeing great appearance of a storm, would not venture his fleet, and caused that sudden retreat.

The French, who were but few, had no other defence, but a very bad pallisado, and a narrow trench, almost filled up in many places, could not possibly have resisted a brisk attack with sword and pistol in hand. But the Dutch must needs land in order, though they saw nobody to oppose their landing, and would not advance upon the enemy, until they had formed their battalions, as if they had been in a pitched battle; they were all this while exposed, from head to foot, to the musquets of the enemy, and the great and small guns of a man of war, which lay in the then careening place, commanded by Monsieur d'Amblimont, who died lately General for the French King in America. The same night the Dutch retreated, the French left and abandoned their fort, judging it untenable, and expecting the Dutch would have stormed it the next morning.

All things should be so ordered, that the fleet and forces may arrive where you intend to make your attack. In the beginning of October, the hurricane time is just over, and you may venture your fleet any where, during nine months, and you have then three months that the heat is but moderate, and the weather, for the most part, very clear and dry; the best time for action.

I would put the forces upon action and attack, as soon as they arrive; and so make the best use of their strength and health, and not stay until the heat of the weather, or any other cause, should pull their courage down, or they should fall sick, and be out of order.

In the West Indies, I would begin with Martinico; take that

island from the French, and you will ruin them in all their colonies there they keep all their stores for ships and land forces. It is easy to block up Fort Royal by sea and land; by falling upon the island unexpectedly, and landing near the fort of a sudden, you may hinder the people from going and carrying any provisions and water into the fort; and dry weather may happen, so that there may be but little water in the cistern. One may encamp round about it very well, and commodiously, all along a river of good water: the country about it is also full of provisions.

The fort being besieged and blocked up, I would ply them night and day with bombs and carcases, in order to burn and destroy their houses, magazines, and cisterns. From some of the neighbouring hills, guns may shoot at random into the fort, and, raking along, may do much damage.

Having left people enough to maintain and continue the siege, some considerable body of forces may be sent all over the island to subdue it; which I am confident would be easy enough, especially, if his Majesty, intending the conquest of all the colonies, would give out and proclaim, that he intends to keep the island to himself, and would receive its inhabitants into his protection as subjects, and so forbid burning and destroying of plantations and houses. Very many, if not all, would submit; and it would be easy afterwards to banish and force away those, that should be deemed unfit to be kept there as inhabitants.

I would also take, keep, and fortify, the island of Granada; it has an excellent large harbour; it is never troubled with hurricanes. And the Spanish ships, going to their western plantations, pass near and often in sight of it. That island is better than any of the English Caribbees, Barbadoes excepted. It might soon be settled, and made a profitable colony.

All the rest of the French colonies would easily be subdued. I would ruin them, and transport what I would keep of them, to Martinico, or Granada. There are still, in the French islands, many Protestants, French and Dutch, who may be trusted and depended upon.

The taking of Martinico would discourage the French, and, I am confident, would hinder them from assisting the Spaniards in the West Indies. How could they with reason venture out thither a considerable fleet, after the loss of Martinico, the only strong hold they have, being sensible that the English can be always their superiors in those parts, whensoever they please?

All our Caribbee islands being secured by the taking and keeping Martinico, some few frigates might suffice to protect and defend them from any insult, and they may spare some of their people to help to attack the Spaniards.

The island of Cuba is that of the Spanish I would begin with. The Havannah, its chief town, is very strong on the harbour and sea-side; but would be easily enough taken, if besieged on the country and land-side; and, as we commonly say, in form, with those preparations that are requisite in sieges. You may land in many places, and the march is easy from thence to the town: the

country abounds in cattle, sheep, goats, and hogs: the bays are well stored with fish, manatees, and turtles: the country provisions very plenty every where: the Bay of Mattancas would, perhaps, be the fittest place to land in, and to preserve the fleet, some few frigates being sufficient to stop and block up the harbour's mouth, during the siege.

The taking and keeping the Havannah would soon ruin the Spaniards in the West Indies: as their ships, coming, pass near Granada; going home, they must pass also near the Havannah, and so through the Bahamas: so that some frigates at Granada, and some at Havannah, would annoy the Spaniards going and coming.

I would, by all means, keep and settle Cuba, though forced to abandon some other settlements. It may, perhaps, be done, without deserting any other place, with some people out of New-England, the least profitable of all the colonies.

Having Cuba, we may easily seize Porto Bello, Chiagre, and Panama, and so command both the North and South Seas in America.

The design I propose is great, and may, perhaps, appear impossible to some people; but I am sincerely persuaded of the feasibleness of it to the English nation, so very populous, and so very strong in the West Indies.

Quod nemo promittere divum

Auderet volvenda dies certe afferet ultro.

There is nothing wanting for so great an undertaking, but a faithful, honest, hearty, and honourable disinterested mind in the commanding officers. The success of such an enterprise would inrich the English nation beyond measure, making her mistress of most of the mines of gold and silver, besides all the productions peculiar to that part of the world, as sugars, cocoa's, cotton, indigo, natto, tobacco, &c. What increase would it not bring to its navigation and shipping? All sorts of merchant-ships may be built in the northern America, or with timber brought from thence, whilst the English oak, so very excellent for building, may be kept and reserved only for building of men of war.

I am confident, and I dare maintain it, that the conquest of all the Spanish and French colonics, in America, would never cost England, what the taking of Namur did, in blood and money. It would, without doubt, make the English nation the strongest and the richest of the world: and, that it may be so, is the hearty wish of a faithful and devoted subject.

AN ACCOUNT

OF THE

ARRAIGNMENTS AND TRYALS

OF

COLONEL RICHARD KIRKBY, CAPTAIN JOHN CONSTABLE, CAP. TAIN COOPER WADE, CAPTAIN SAMUEL VINCENT, AND CAPTAIN CHRISTOPHER FOGG,

On a Complaint exhibited by the Judge-Advocate on Behalf of her Majesty, at a Court-Martial, held on Board the Ship, Bredah, in Port-Royal Harbour, in Jamaica, in America, the eighth, ninth, tenth, and twelfth Days of October, 1702, for Cowardice, Neglect of Duty, Breach of Orders, and other Crimes, committed by them in a Fight at Sea, commenced the Nineteenth of August, 1702, off St. Martha, in the Latitude of ten Degrees North, near the main Land of America, between the Honourable John Benbow, Esq. and Admiral Du Casse, with four French Ships of War; for which Colonel Kirkby and Captain Wade were sentenced to be shot to Death. Transmitted from two eminent Merchants at Port-Royal in Jamaica, to a Person of Quality in the City of London. From a Folio Edition, printed at London, 1703.

AT

Ta court-martial held on board her Majesty's ship, the Bredah, in Port-Royal harbour in Jamaica in America, the eighth, ninth, tenth, and twelfth days of October, 1702.

Present,

The Honourable William Whiston, Esq. Rear-Admiral of her Majesty's ships for the West-India squadron, president.

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Arnold Browne, Esq. Judge-Advocate.

Who being all duly sworn, pursuant to the Act of Parliament Proceeded to the tryal of John Arthur, gunner of the Defiance, on a complaint exhibited by Francis Knighton, third Lieutenant of the Defiance, and George Foster, gunner of for hiding and concealing forty-three barrels of powder in the wad-room, and covering them with wads and coins, &c. when a survey of her Majesty's stores of ammunition after an engagement was ordered

⚫ October 8th.

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