EUI Working Paper: SPSEuropean University Institute, 1996 - Europe |
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Page 6
... insiders " who participate in the policy process and " outsiders " who don't ... outsider ratio . Colluding to tax the outsiders makes more sense as the outsider group gets bigger ( as there is a greater tax base ) and the two insider ...
... insiders " who participate in the policy process and " outsiders " who don't ... outsider ratio . Colluding to tax the outsiders makes more sense as the outsider group gets bigger ( as there is a greater tax base ) and the two insider ...
Page 8
... outsiders that are left out . Imagine that individuals are lined up according to their respective organizational ... insider - to - outsider ratio shifts from lower to higher values , total transfers do at first increase , then peak ...
... outsiders that are left out . Imagine that individuals are lined up according to their respective organizational ... insider - to - outsider ratio shifts from lower to higher values , total transfers do at first increase , then peak ...
Page 32
... insider - to- outsider ratio . Only through the constitution of a distinct political market , in which the means of competition are normalized and standardized to the level of the least talented citizen , can the socioeconomic asymmetry ...
... insider - to- outsider ratio . Only through the constitution of a distinct political market , in which the means of competition are normalized and standardized to the level of the least talented citizen , can the socioeconomic asymmetry ...
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agrarians American Political Science Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Australia Austria Austria-Hungary autarky autocracies Belgium Britain Canada capital Caprivi chap coalition theory competition conservative contested democracy coopted crisis Daniel VERDIER Democratization and Trade Denmark depression dominant Economic election electoral European University Institute factor mobility farmers France free trade French Second Republic Germany Giandomenico MAJONE grain Heckscher-Ohlin model included Industrial Capitalist Countries industrialists insider-to-outsider ratio insiders International Italy labor land Liberalization in Industrial median voter monarchies Netherlands Non-demo Norway organizational talent OUTCOME REGIME TYPE outsiders partisan realignment party POLICY OUTCOME REGIME political contestation prediction present theory protection protectionist reflect REGIME TYPE low rent seeking rise in political Rogowski Russia scarce factor Schriften des Vereins Social Spain Stolper-Samuelson Theorem surge in political Sweden Switzerland tariff total transfers Trade Liberalization trade orientation Trade Policy trade preferences Type and Trade TYPE low rent United variable Vereins für Socialpolitik whereas Zealand