EUI working papers in political and social sciences, Issues 90-94European University Institute, 1996 - Europe |
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Page 3
Therefore trade, by raising the price of exportables, benefits the abundant factor(s
) and hurts the scarce factor(s), whereas protection, by raising the prices of
importables, benefits the scarce factor(s) and hurts the abundant factor(s) ...
Therefore trade, by raising the price of exportables, benefits the abundant factor(s
) and hurts the scarce factor(s), whereas protection, by raising the prices of
importables, benefits the scarce factor(s) and hurts the abundant factor(s) ...
Page 6
Competition between parties in a democracy leads each party to mobilize
outsiders on its side, whereas collusion in an autocracy is motivated by the desire
to exclude as many people from the policy process as possible. The logic behind
this ...
Competition between parties in a democracy leads each party to mobilize
outsiders on its side, whereas collusion in an autocracy is motivated by the desire
to exclude as many people from the policy process as possible. The logic behind
this ...
Page 24
[ Table 3 here ] Consider first the case of European countries, where labor was
abundant relative to land, and thus where socialist parties advocated free trade
whereas agrarians advocated protection. There were two possibilities,
depending ...
[ Table 3 here ] Consider first the case of European countries, where labor was
abundant relative to land, and thus where socialist parties advocated free trade
whereas agrarians advocated protection. There were two possibilities,
depending ...
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Common terms and phrases
agrarians American Political Science Australia Austria Austria-Hungary autarky autocracies Belgium Britain Canada Caprivi chap coalition theory competition conservative contested democracy crisis Democratization and Trade Denmark depression dominant Economic election electoral EUI Working Papers European University Institute factor mobility farmers France free trade French Second Republic Germany Giandomenico MAJONE grain Heckscher-Ohlin model high rent democracy Industrial Capitalist Countries industrialists insider-to-outsider ratio insiders International Italy labor land Liberalization in Industrial low rent high median voter monarchies Netherlands Non-demo Norway organizational talent OUTCOME REGIME TYPE outsiders partisan realignment party POLICY OUTCOME REGIME political contestation prediction present theory protection protectionist reflect REGIME TYPE low rent high rent rent seeking rise in political Rogowski Russia scarce factor Schriften des Vereins Social Spain Stolper-Samuelson Theorem surge in political Sweden Switzerland tariff total transfers Trade Liberalization trade orientation Trade Policy Type and Trade TYPE low rent United variable Vereins fur whereas Zealand
Bibliographic information
| Title | EUI working papers in political and social sciences, Issues 90-94 EUI Working Paper: SPS, European University Institute. Dept. of Political and Social Sciences |
| Author | European University Institute. Dept. of Political and Social Sciences |
| Publisher | European University Institute, 1996 |
| Subjects | Europe |
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