of the most distinguished citizens of the province was sent to Rome to testify by their presence to his virtues, and deprecate an unfavourable verdict. Thus when Cicero defended Balbus, he pointed to the deputies from Gades, men of the highest rank and character, who had come to avert, if possible, the calamity of a conviction. Although, in this point of view, the witnesses who were called to speak in favour of the accused might be called advocati, this name was not confined to such, but embraced all who rallied round him at the trial. In the early ages of the republic the litigant parties appeared personally in court, and carried on the cause themselves. They were not allowed to nominate another to act as their attorney in their behalf, except in three cases,-pro populo-pro libertate-pro pupillo,—that is to say, in actions where the whole community was concerned, or where some question of personal liberty or guardianship was involved. The inconvenience, however, of this rule, led to the substitution of persons, who, under the names of cognitores and procuratores, performed functions which bear some resemblance to those of attornies at the present day. The precise distinction between these is not accurately known; nor is it very important. It seems, however, that the cognitor acted for and managed the cause of a party resident at Rome; while the procurator was appointed in the place of one who was out of Italy, or whose absence from the city was occasioned by some public duty.' 1 Dig. 1. 126. § 2. 1. 73. § ult. Heinecc. Syntagma, lib. iv., x. 2. Heineccius thinks that the difference was, 1. that the cognitores were employed chiefly in questions connected with the status of individuals, the procuratores in other civil actions; 2. that the former were appointed in a particular form by the party in court; the latter without any such form, and without the presence of the party. CH. IV.] THE JURISCONSULTS. 99 1 Besides the Patroni Causarum, or advocates who appeared in courts, there was another important class of lawyers at Rome, called Juris Consulti, whom we might not improperly designate as chamber counsel. We have seen that the Jus Civile, properly so called, consisted of the oral or written opinions of lawyers, who, when applied to by parties, expounded the doctrines of the law, and informed their fellow citizens of their rights and liabilities. Their houses were frequented for this purpose, and some of them had such a reputation, that their dwellings were styled the oracles of the state. 1 When it was known that they were willing and competent to deliver opinions on points of law, they were, even in public, addressed by clients on the subject of their affairs, "de omni denique aut officio aut negotio,"2 and used sometimes to walk up and down the forum. in a most patriarchal fashion, for the express purpose of being consulted on legal difficulties. And under the tuition of these jurisconsults, the young men at Rome prepared themselves for practice in the courts. They assembled early in the morning in the atrium, and listened to the advice which was given to those who came to consult the lawyer. This mode of education is the best in all cases where it is practicable." Thus 66 3 'Est enim sine dubio domus juris consulti totius oraculum civitatis. -Cic. de Orat. i. 45. 2 Cic. Brut. 33. This peripatetic mode of doing business seems still to exist in Scotland, where the advocates pace every morning, during term time, the Parliament House in Edinburgh, and are there met by their clients. 4 Niebuhr, Lect. ii. 18. He adds, "although it is a very just remark that Cicero had no scientific knowledge of the law, still it was not without an important meaning that he said, If I wished to acquire a scientific knowledge of the law, it would not take me more than two months.' He may not have had a systematic and general view of it, but he had a good practical knowledge of it." 66 Cicero attached himself to Scævola, the greatest lawyer of his day; and, in his own strong language, he tells us, that he hardly ever quitted his side, until he had acquired a sufficient amount of legal instruction. And to complete their education they generally took, as their model, one of the famous advocates of the day, and assiduously attended him whenever he spoke in public, in order that they might become familiar with the proper style of forensic oratory. 2 The introduction to the forum or calling to the bar," as we may term it, was observed by the Romans as a most important epoch of life. At the age of seventeen the youthful student laid aside his boyish dress (prætexta), and assumed the garb of manhood (toga virilis). He then proceeded to the forum, attended by a festive company of friends, and was there brought forward by some distinguished citizen, generally of consular rank, and formally introduced as a practitioner in the courts of law. After this, he might at once undertake the conduct of causes; and we are told that Cotta publicly accused Carbo in a speech on the very day in which he made his first appearance there. * It may give some idea of the interest taken in the ceremony, to know that Augustus, when emperor, accepted his thirteenth consulship expressly for the purpose of ushering his two sons, Caius and Lucius, into the forum, and Tiberius returned from a foreign expedition to Rome in order to perform the same office for Drusus Germanicus. 5 3 The profession of a jurisconsult was in some families, as for instance that of the Scævolas, hereditary; the 1 De Amicitiâ. 2 Tacit. de Orat. Dialog. 34. 4 Valerius Max. v. 4. 5 Suet. in August. c. 26. in Tiber. c. 15. 3 Plin. ad Maximum. CH. IV.] CHAMBER COUNSEL. 101 members of which, with one exception, that of Quintus Mucius, seem not to have undertaken the conduct of causes in court. They contented themselves with the reputation which they gained as lawyers, to whom their fellow-citizens might resort with confidence for advice, or devoted themselves to the study of law, for the sake of the emoluments they were thereby enabled to acquire; for although there can be no doubt that in the majority of cases their opinions were given gratuitously, as a means of gaining popularity and influence, there seems to have been no law against their being paid by fees, which applied only to advocates; and in this respect they resembled the Rhetoricians of Athens, who, as we have seen, composed speeches for litigant parties, and by that means earned a livelihood. As this knowledge of the jus civile was possessed by few, the adepts in its mysteries seem to have had a sufficiently good opinion of themselves, and to have plumed themselves not a little on their black-letter lore.1 Cicero, however, ridicules their pretensions, and in his speech in defence of Murena says that three days are sufficient to master this kind of learning. "If, therefore, you put me on my mettle, overwhelmed with business as I am, I will in three days declare myself a jurisconsult." We can easily imagine that such men, either from inability to speak, or disinclination, or want of confidence in their own powers, or dislike of contentions and noisy strife, might decline to practise in the forum. This is what happens in England, where, as a distinct branch of the profession, there are many most able men, who have a large amount of practice at chambers, and yet do not appear in court, and pass their lives immersed in law as conveyancers or special pleaders, without ever arguing a single case. 1 De Orat., i. 58. But we are surprised to find such a broad line of distinction as was recognised at Rome between the jurisconsult and the advocate with regard to legal attainments. Not that the latter might not be and frequently was an able lawyer, but a knowledge of law was considered a very secondary object with him, in comparison with other qualifications. It appears at first sight inexplicable how the Roman advocates should have ventured to undertake causes involving nice and technical questions of law, without having previously prepared themselves by a careful study of its rules and principles, and that, notwithstanding, they should have been able to establish a reputation and attract clients. But a latitude was allowed in those days wholly unknown in the strict and formal system of judicial proceedings in England. Even when the cause depended upon the investigation of abstruse points of law,—on the interpretation of the Twelve Tables, or the construction of a will, the advocate employed arguments and indulged himself in appeals, addressed, not to the understanding, but to the feelings and passions of the court. A jest supplied the place of an authority, and loose declamatory harangues were sometimes permitted to influence decisions, which ought to have been formed upon the closest and most rigid investigation of legal principles. Rhetoric and logic had not then, as with us, distinct and separate domains. The former constantly invaded the province of the latter, and in cases where we should think it unworthy, as indeed it would be hopeless, to employ any other means for our clients than close and severe argument, the Roman counsel would condescend to the use of the most transparent sophistry, and endeavour, too often successfully, by raillery and wit, to obtain judgment in his favour. But we must |