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twenty-ninth; the refult of the councils of war on CHA P. the twenty-fifth and twenty-eighth; Sir Edward Hawke's letter to Sir John Mordaunt on the twentyfeventh, and the General's answer on the twentyninth after which Sir John Mordaunt was called upon to give his reafons for not putting his Majefty's inftructions and orders into execution. This he did in fubftance as follows: The attempt on Rochefort, he understood, was to have been on the footing of a coup de main or furprife, which it would be impoffible to execute if the defign was difcovered, or the alarm taken. He alfo understood that an attempt could not be made, nay, that his Majefty did not require it should, unless a proper place for debarking, and a fafe retreat for the troops was difcovered, particu larly where the fhips could protect them; and a fafe communication with the fleet, and conveyance of fupplies from it, were found. His fentiments, he faid, were confirmed by a paper to this purpose, delivered to him by Sir John Ligonier, on his first being appointed to command the expedition. It was likewife probable, he thought, that although Rochefort should have remained in the fituation in which Colonel Clark and the pilot Thierry had fent it three years before, yet that a few days preparation could make it fufficiently defenfible against à coup de main. Judging, therefore, the dependence on fuch an operation alone improper, he applied to the miniftry for two more old battalions, and artillery for a regular attack to force the place, which, from its conftruction, appeared as difficult to be made defenfible against the latter, as eafily fecured against the former. But this request being refused, he still thought it his duty to obey his orders on the footing on which the expedition was planned, efpecially as he understood his inftructions were difcretionary, regarding the circumftances of the time, the condition of the place, and the nature of the fervice. He recited the pofitive and credible intelligence

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BOOK ligence received, as well before the embarkation as HI. during the voyage, of the alarm given to France, and the preparations made along the French coasts from Breft and St. Maloes to Rochefort: the acci-dents that kept the fleet hovering along the coafts, and prevented the poffibility of an attempt by furprife: the reports of all the gentlemen employed in founding the coafts, fo contrary to the intelligence given by Thierry the pilot: the opinion of the council of war, by which he was enjoined to act, and with which his own judgment concurred: the endeavours used, after the twenty-fixth, to find out fome expedient for annoying the enemy and executing his Majesty's inftructions: the attempt made to land, in confequence of the refolution of the fecond council of war, which was prevented by boisterous and ftormy weather; and, laftly, the reafons that determined him, in concert with the other land officers, to return to England.

§ XII. Having confidered all these circumstances, and examined feveral officers who ferved in the expedition, the court of enquiry gave in the following report to his Majefty:-"It appears to us, that one caufe of the expedition having failed is, the not attacking Fort Fouras by fea, at the fame time that it could have been attacked by land, agreeably to the first defign, which certainly must have been of the greateft utility towards carrying your Majefty's inftructions into execution. It was at firft refolved by Admiral Hawke; (Thierry, the pilot, having undertaken the fafe conduct of a fhip to Fort Fouras for that purpofe,) but afterwards laid afide, upon the reprefentation of Vice-Admiral Knowles, that the Barfleur, the ship defigned for that fervice, was a-ground, at the diftance of between four and five miles from the fhore: but as neither Sir Edward Hawke nor the pilot could attend to give any information upon that head, we cannot prefume to offer any certain opinio thereupon. We conceive another caufe of the

failure

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failure of the expedition to have been, that, inftead CHA P. of attempting to land when the report was received, on the twenty-fourth of September, from Rear-Admiral Broderick, and the Captains who had been out to found and reconnoitre, a council of war was fummoned and held on the twenty-fifth, in which it was unanimously refolved not to land, as the attempt on Rochefort was neither advisable nor practicable but it does not appear to us that there were then or at any time afterwards, either a body of troops or batteries on fhore fufficient to have prevented the attempting a defcent, in pursuance of the inftructions figned by your Majesty: neither does it appear to us that there were any reafons fufficient to induce the council of war to believe that Rochefort was fo changed in refpect to its ftrength, or pofture of defence, fince the expedition was firft refolved on in England, as to prevent all attempts of an attack upon the place, in order to burn and deftroy the docks, magazines, arfenals, and fhipping, in obedience to your Majefty's command. And we think ourfelyes obliged to remark, in the council of war on the twenty-eighth of September, that no reason could have exifted fufficient to prevent the attempt of landing the troops, as the council then unanimously refolved to land with all poffible difpatch. We beg leave alfo to remark, that after its being unanimously refolved to land, in the council of war of the twenty-eighth of September, the refolution was taken of returning to England, without any regular or general meeting of the faid council: but as the whole operation was of fo inconfiderable a nature, we do not offer this to your Majefty as a caufe of the failure of the expedition; fince we can-. not but look upon the expedition to have failed from the time the great object of it was laid afide in the council of war of the twenty-fifth."

§ XIII. This report, figned by the general officers, Marlborough, Sackville, and Waldegrave, proba

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BOOK bly laid the foundation for the Court-martial which fat foon after upon the conduct of the Commander in chief on the expedition. The enemies of the minifter, made a handle of the mifcarriage to leffen him in the efteem of the publick, by laying the whole blame on his forming a project fo expenfive to the nation, on intelligence not only flight at the first view, but falfe upon further examination. But the people were still his advocates; they difcerned fomething myfterious in the whole conduct of the Commander in chief. They plainly perceived that caution took place of vigour, and that the hours for action were spent in deliberations and councils of war. Had he debarked the troops, and made fuch an attack as would have distinguished his courage, the voice of the people would have acquitted him, however unfuccefsful, though prudence, perhaps, might have condemned him. Even Braddock's rathness they deemed preferable to Mordaunt's inactivity: the lofs of fo many brave lives was thought lefs injurious and difgraceful to the nation, than the too fafe return of the prefent armament. The one demonftrated that the British spirit ftill exifted; the other feemed to indicate the too powerful influence, of wealth, luxury, and thofe manners which tend to debauch and emafculate the mind. A publick trial, of the Commander in chief was expected by the people, and it was graciously granted by his Majefty. It is even thought that Sir John Mordaunt himself demanded to have his conduct fcrutinized, by which method alone he was fenfible his character could be re-established. His Majefty's warrant for holding a Court-martial was accordingly figned on the third day of December. The Court was compofed of nine Lieutenant-generals, nine Major-generals, and three Colonels, who fat on the fourteenth, and continued, by feveral adjournments, to the twentieth. Lieute nant-general Sir John Mordaunt came prifoner be fore the Court, and the following charge was exhibited

against him: namely, That he being appointed, by CHA P. the King, Commander in chief of his Majefty's forces VII. fent on an expedition to the coaft of France, and 1757having received orders and inftructions relative thereto from his Majefty, under his royal fignmanual, and alfo by one of his principal Secretaries of State, had disobeyed his Majesty's faid orders and inftructions. The proceedings of this court were nearly fimilar to thofe of the court of enquiry. The fame evidences were examined, with the addition of Sir Edward Hawke's depofition; and a defence, differing in no effential point from the former, made by the prifoner, but the judgment given was clear and explicit. Sir John Mordaunt was unanimously found Not guilty, and therefore acquitted, while the publick opinion remained unaltered, and many perfons inveighed as bitterly against the lenity of the prefent Court-martial as they had formerly against the feverity of the fentence paffed upon a late unfortunate Admiral. The evidence of one gentleman in particular drew attention: he was accufed of tergiverfation, and of fhowing that partial indulgence which his own conduct required. He publickly defended his character: his performance was cenfured, and himfelf difmiffed the fervice of his Sovereign.

§ XIV. Befides the diverfion intended by a defcent on the coaft of France, feveral other methods were employed to amufe the enemy, as well as to protect the trade of the kingdom, fecure our colonies in the Weft-Indies, and infure the continuance of the extraordinary fuccefs which had lately bleffed his Majefty's arms in the Eaft-Indies; but thefe we could not mention before without breaking the thread of our narration. On the ninth of February Admiral Weft failed with a fquadron of men of war to the Weftward, as did Admiral Coates with the feet under his convoy to the Weft-Indies, and Commodore Steevens with the trade to the EaftIndies, in the month of March, Admiral Holbourn