The Problems of Philosophy

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Cosimo, Inc., Jan 1, 2007 - Philosophy - 128 pages
One of his great works, and a must-read for any student of philosophy, The Problems of Philosophy was written in 1912 as an introduction to Russell's thought. As an empiricist, Russell starts at the beginning with this question: Is there any knowledge in the world that is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it? This, according to Russell, is where the work of philosophy begins. He covers topics such as reality, the nature of matter, inductive reasoning, truth, and the limits of philosophical knowledge. As one of the greatest minds in Western philosophy, Russell's thoughts are profoundly informative and provocative and suitable for anyone wishing to expand his mind. British philosopher and mathematician BERTRAND ARTHUR WILLIAM RUSSELL (1872-1970) won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1950. Among his many works are Why I Am Not a Christian (1927), Power: A New Social Analysis (1938), and My Philosophical Development (1959).

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Contents

Appearance and Reality
1
The Existence of Matter
9
The Nature of Matter
17
Idealism
24
Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge
30
by Description
31
On Induction
41
On Our Knowledge of General Principles
49
On Our Knowledge of Universals
73
On Intuitive Knowledge
80
Truth and Falsehood
86
Knowledge Error and Probable Opinion
95
The Limits of Philosophical Knowledge
103
The Value of Philosophy
111
Bibliographical Note
118
Index
119

HOW A PRIORI Knowledge is Possible
58
The World of Universals
65

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Page 37 - Common words, even proper names, are usually really descriptions. That is to say, the thought in the mind of a person using a proper name correctly can generally only be expressed explicitly if we replace the proper name by a description.
Page 31 - We shall say that we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths.
Page 32 - There is no state of mind in which we are directly aware of the table; all our knowledge of the table is really knowledge of truths, and the actual thing which is the table is not, strictly speaking, known to us at all. We know a description, and we know that there is just one object to which this description applies, though the object itself is not directly known to us. In such a case, we say that our knowledge of the object is knowledge by description. All our knowledge, both knowledge of things...
Page 38 - The first Chancellor of the German Empire was an astute diplomatist', we can only be assured of the truth of our judgment in virtue of something with which we are acquainted — usually a testimony heard or read.
Page 46 - ... (a) the greater the number of cases in which a thing of the sort A has been found associated with a thing of the sort B, the more probable it is (if no cases of failure of association are known) that A is always associated with B; (b) Under the same circumstances, a sufficient number of cases of the association of A with B will make it nearly certain that A is always associated with B, and will make this general law approach certainty without limit.
Page 40 - Every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted.
Page 45 - ... (a) When a thing of a certain sort A has been found to be associated with a thing of a certain other sort B, and has never been found dissociated from a thing of the sort B, the greater the number of cases in which A and B have been associated, the greater is the probability that they will be associated in a fresh case in which one of them is known to be present...
Page 43 - The man who has fed the chicken every day throughout its life at last wrings its neck instead, showing that more refined views as to the uniformity of nature would have been useful to the chicken.
Page 36 - We shall say that an object is 'known by description' when we know that it is 'the so-and-so,' ie, when we know that there is one object, and no more, having a certain property; and it will generally be implied that we do not have knowledge of the same object by acquaintance.
Page 45 - The most we can hope is that the oftener things are found together, the more probable it becomes that they will be found together another time, and that, if they have been found together often enough, the probability will amount almost to certainty.

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