standing of the decision. It is very easy to embody the entire statement of facts from the briefs of the counsel; but that frequently, indeed generally, results in the inclusion of much that is not material. Here it is that the laborious art of condensation should be ruthlessly practiced. What is needed is "the art of packing within a sentence the phosphorescence of a page.

It is not necessary to follow much further Judge Cardozo's classification, for most of the types he mentions do not unduly swell the pages of law reports; but in his reference to "the type refined or artificial, smelling of the lamp, verging upon preciosity or euphuism," we may detect an apt, if delicate, satire upon a pedantry of his craft which bears the seeds of a meticulousness which may flower far beyond the limits of reasonable exposition.

With a word more as to dissenting opinions I shall have finished these hints to judges. In some jurisdictions dissenting opinions are prohibited. There is something to be said in favor of such a restriction; but there are some loose-thinking modernist writers upon the subject who might regard it as an encroachment upon the right of freedom of speech. The custom of writing dissenting opinions goes far back in the history of our jurisprudence. But they are now sometimes indulged in to air irrelevant economic or social views; for impatience with reactionary or fallacious views of the majority of the court excites a sort of fervor not easily cooled. Dissenting opinions do not form precedents. Inevitably, therefore, they are written without the responsibility that should both actuate and restrain judicial action. But arguments used by dissenting judges are seized upon in future cases in such a way that the authority of the

majority opinion becomes less stable. In the highest court of the country the tendency of dissent expressed in amplitude of language unfettered by the circumspection born of judicial responsibility, has sometimes run so far as to seem at vital periods to impair the authority of the court. But while a ban cannot be put upon dissenting opinions, our system of jurisprudence would be improved and the bulk of our law reports reduced if dissenting judges would give less thought to vindicating their individual views.

But I would add a word for the dissenting judge.

The great merit of the common law is that it is not frozen into code formulation. It seeks to envelop the body of human rights with a protective garment which expands or contracts according to the needs of civilization. It even applies itself to the conditions wholly alien to our own. For example, in England, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the highest court of England in such cases, held that an idol established by an act of a Hindu as a household god was not a mere chattel, but had a personality and was "a juristic entity," and through a guardian could sue and be sued. What the idol itself wanted was what the court was to secure. The court ascertained its attributes according to the ancient customs and law of India and found simple principles of the common law which could be applied to them in the settlement of the contentions of the litigants. No more striking instance could be cited of the flexibility and pervasiveness of the principles of the common law in their applicability to situations new to the literature of our jurisprudence. And in the development of our civilization through the ages these sit

uations may conceivably change, and to the changes the common law must in the end adjust itself.

But from conservatism and tenacious adherence to tradition the law must always lag behind the needs created by swift development of our social, industrial and economic life. And here a great dissenting judge may perform a service of a high order. In his impatience with the result of applying the established rules to new situations, sometimes with prophetic vision and with amplitude of reason, he may point out the insufficiency of an old rule. And if he is capable of profound analysis and luminous reasoning, and is gifted in the art of persuasive expression, he may in a dissenting opinion promote discussion of a needed change and thus perform a valuable service, albeit under our system of precedents it is not a part of the judicial function.

Our statutes, state and federal, can not go on increasing without plunging us into a jungle of laws out of which neither indexes nor digests can rescue us. In the complications of modern American life there must frequently arise situations in which new laws are imperatively needed. As our social, political, economic and industrial activities increase, laws governing them frequently must be changed to fit their urgent needs. The very rapidity of our development in the period of our comparative adolescence as a nation requires far more statute law than England or any European nation. But it is also clear to any student of the traits of the peoples of other nations of the world that there is a more universal tendency here than elsewhere to resort to legislation for the correction of all manner of abuses, and for the regulation of or restriction upon the conduct of our personal and business affairs. Thus in spite of the tradi

tional right of free religious worship, we have lately seen mediaeval attempts in Tennessee by statute to place shackles upon freedom of instruction or learning in our schools, and in Oregon to prohibit parents from sending their children to schools of their choice. This tendency accounts not only for the great and growing volume of statutes throughout the country, but also for many unrepealed, unenforced and unenforceable laws upon our statute books which are archaic, or the mere expression of a passing whim of a legislature. Reforms initiated by lawyers and judges will not change the national tendency to legislate. But in matters relating to our system of jurisprudence and the administration of justice, much may be accomplished by agreeing upon some kind of systematic regulation which will avoid haphazard enactments.

Reforms, to accomplish such things as these, start readily in my own state of New York, though they do not always progress to a successful end. For some years there has been in that state a Bureau of Statutory Drafting which has done much to eliminate careless drafting of laws and to call attention to conflicting and inconsistent statutes. The movement is advancing still further through the work and recommendations of the Law Revision Commission already referred to. The Commission in recommending the appointment of a permanent Commission has thus described its functions, viz:

"A disinterested agency should exist to survey the body of our law patiently and calmly and deliberately, attempting no sudden transformation, not cutting at the roots the growths of centuries, the products of a people's life in its gradual evolution, but pruning and trans

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planting here and there with careful and loving hands. * * * It is not to busy itself with schemes of legislation unrelated to the existing body of our law. It is not to take sides as between one view and another where the point at issue is the wisdom of some untried experiment involving fundamental change of the existing legal structure."

In mere drafting and in checking against repetition, incongruity and inconsistency, the English Parliamentary system is more scientific than ours. But in the larger constructive improvement in the science of legislation, England still lags behind the ideal foreshadowed by the New York Commission. In America, however, the growing volume of statute law has not disturbed the equanimity of the ordinary citizen in his daily occupation. With him the proposal of a Ministry of Justice will probably be regarded at first as a counsel of perfection and it will make its way slowly; for he will not readily abandon the idea that all manner of desirable results may be achieved by mere legislation.

One obstacle law reformers encounter is the "impression in the public mind" mentioned by Dr. Pritchett "that the members of the legal profession have not, through their organization, contributed . . . . . to the improvement of justice to that extent which society has the right to expect." It would be of little service now to attempt a vindication of the legal profession; for in almost every form of literature and from ancient times its members have been the subject of aspersion. But what does concern the public is that an ill-founded impression of the extent of the responsibility of the bar shall not impede needed reform measures by deflecting attention from other responsible groups in the com