PREFAC E.

T

HE Author af the following Effay has endeavoured to draw into one continued fcheme the whole ftate of the prefent war, and the methods that appear to bim the most proper for bringing it to a happy conclufion.

After having confidered that the French are the conftant and most dangerous enemies to the British nation, and that the danger from them is now greater than ever, and will fill increase till their prefent Union with Spain be broken, he fets forth the feveral advantages which this Union has already given France, and taken from Great-Britain, in relation to the Weft-Indies, the woolen manufacture, the trade of the Levant, and the naval power of the

two nations.

He fhews how thefe Advantages will ftill rife higher after a peace, notwithstanding our prefent conquefts, with new additions, fhould be confirmed to us, as well because the monarchy of Spain would not be weakened by fuch conceffions, as because no Guarantee could be found fufficient to fecure them to us. For which reasons he lays it down as a fist Rule, that no peace is to be made without an entire difunion of the French and Spanish Monarchies.

That this may be brought about, he endeavours to prove from the progress we have already made toward it, and the fucceffes we have purchased in

the

the prefent war, which are very confiderable if well purfued, but of no effect if we acquiefce in them.

In order to complete this difunion in which we have gone fo far, he would not have us rely upon exhausting the French Treafury, Attempts on the Spanish Indies, Defcents on France, but chiefly upon out-numbering them in troops, France being already drained of her best fupplies, and the confederates mafters of much greater forces for multitude and strength, both in men and horse, and provided with Generals of greater fame and abilities.

He then confiders the wrong measures we have hitherto taken in making too small levies after a fuccefsful campaign, in regulating their number by that of the enemies forces, and hiring them of our confederates; fhewing at the fame time the inconveniences we fuffer from fuch hired troops, and feveral advantages we might receive from employing those of our own nation.

He further recommends this augmentation of our forces, to prevent the keeping up a standing body of them in times of peace, to enable us to make an impreffion on the Enemy in the prefent posture of the war, and to fecure ourselves against a Prince, who is now at the head of a powerful army, and has not yet declared himself.

In the last place, he answers by feveral confiderations thofe two popular objections, That we furnish more towards the war than the rest of the Allies, and That we are not able to contribute more than we do already.

These are the most material heads of the following essay, in which there are many other fubordinate reflexions that naturally grow out of fo copious a fubject.

November 1707.

THE

THE

PRESENT

STATE of the WAR,

AND

The Neceffity of an Augmentation confider'd.

T

HE French are certainly the most implacable, and the most dangerous enemies of the British nation. Their form of government, their religion, their jealoufy of the British power, as well as their profecutions of commerce, and purfuits of univerfal Monarchy, will fix them for ever in their animofities and averfions towards us, and make them catch at all opportunities of fubverting our conftitution, destroying our religion, ruining our trade, and finking the figure which we make among the nations of VOL. III.

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Europe:

Europe: Not to mention the particular ties of honour that lie on their prefent King to impofe on us a Prince, who muft prove fatal to our country if he ever reigns over us.

As we are thus in a natural flate of war if I may fo call it, with the French nation; it is our misfortune, that they are not only the most inveterate, but most formidable of our enemies; and have the greatest power, as well as the ftrongeft inclination, to ruin us. No other ftate equals them in the force of their fleets and armies, in the nearness and conveniency of their fituation, and in the number of friends and well-wishers, which, it is to be feared, they have among us.

For these reasons, our wars with France have always affected us in our most tender interests, and concerned us more than those we have had with any other nation; but I may venture to say, this Kingdom was never yet engaged in a war of fo great confequence, as that which now lies upon our hands. Our All is at ftake, and irretrievably loft, if we fail of fuccefs. At other times, if a war ended in a dishonourable peace, or with equal lofs, we could comfort ourselves with the hopes of a more favourable juncture, that might fet the balance right, or turn it to our advantage. We had fill the profpect of forming the fame alliance, or perhaps ftrengthning it with new confederacies, and by that means of trying our fortune a fecond time, in cafe the injuftice or ambition of the enemy forced us into the field. At prefent, if we make a drawn game of it, or procure but moderate advantages, we are in a condition which every British heart must tremble at the thought of There are no second trials,

no

no wars in reserve, no knew schemes of alliance to which we can have recourse. Should the French King be able to bear down fuch an united force as now makes head against him, at a time when Spain affords him no greater affiftance; what will he do when the trade of the Levant lies at his mercy; when the whole kingdom of Spain is fupplied with his manufactures, and the wealth of the Indies flows into his coffers; and, what is yet worfe, when this additional ftrength muft arife in all its particulars from a proportionable decay in the States that now make war upon him? It is no wonder therefore that our late King of glorious memory, who, by the confeffion of his greatest enemies, was a Prince that perfectly understood the intereft of Europe, fhould in his laft Speech recommend to his Parliament the declaring war against France in thofe memorable words: You have yet an opportunity, by God's bleffing, to fecure to you and your pofterity the quiet enjoyment of your religion and liberties, if you are not wanting to yourfelves, but will exert the ancient vigour of the English nation: but I tell you plainly, my opinion is, if you do not lay hold on this occafion, you have no reafon to hope for another.

We have already a dreadful proof of the increase of power that accrues to France from its conjunction with Spain. So expenfive a war as that which the French Monarchy hath been carrying on in fo many and fo remote parts at once, muft long fince have drained and exhausted all its fubftance, had there not been feveral fecret fprings, that fwelled their treasury from time to time, in proportion as the war has funk it. The King's

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coffers