EUI Working Paper: SPS, Issues 93-99European University Institute, 1993 - Europe |
From inside the book
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Page 3
... commissioners can be removed from office only for official misbehaviour , not for disagreement with presidential policy . In fact , the IRCS were created by Congress precisely to ensure agency independence from presidential control and 3.
... commissioners can be removed from office only for official misbehaviour , not for disagreement with presidential policy . In fact , the IRCS were created by Congress precisely to ensure agency independence from presidential control and 3.
Page 4
SPS. Congress precisely to ensure agency independence from presidential control and short - term political considerations . In the discussion over the degree of independence which regulatory agencies should enjoy , the majority of ...
SPS. Congress precisely to ensure agency independence from presidential control and short - term political considerations . In the discussion over the degree of independence which regulatory agencies should enjoy , the majority of ...
Page 9
SPS. stronger presidential control like Cass Sunstein , favor a bigger role for the courts in controlling agency discretion through procedural and substantive review of rule making ( Ackerman and Hassler 1981 ; Shapiro 1988 ; Edley 1990 ...
SPS. stronger presidential control like Cass Sunstein , favor a bigger role for the courts in controlling agency discretion through procedural and substantive review of rule making ( Ackerman and Hassler 1981 ; Shapiro 1988 ; Edley 1990 ...
Common terms and phrases
adjudication Administrative Procedures Act administrative regulation agency independence American Arpád SZAKOLCZAI Author Title branch of government budget constraint budgetary bureaucracy Cass Sunstein Commission Committee Common Agricultural Policy Community regulation Congress coordination costs Council court-like courts credibility of national directive EC authorities EC policy EC regulation economic effectiveness elected enforcement EUI Working Paper European Agency European chemical industry European Community European University Institute export-oriented industries Federal Republic function Gatsios and Seabright Gestaltbeschreibung Giandomenico MAJONE Hans-Peter BLOSSFELD independence and accountability independent agencies independent fourth branch international regulatory failure Ipsen Jean BLONDEL judicial review lack legislation market failure merger mergers and acquisitions microeconomic efficiency mutual recognition national regulators president presidential control privatization and deregulation problems proposed regulated firms regulation in Europe regulatory budget regulatory discretion regulatory policy regulatory powers regulatory programmes Republic of Germany rule San Domenico serious Shapiro social regulation standard statutory subsidiarity Sunstein supranational traditional TSCA