Freedom and ReasonConcerns the apparent antinomy between freedom and reason. Rationality appears to be a restraint on freedom, whereas freedom seems to be incompatible with rationality. Rejecting rationality to preserve freedom is the mark of subjectivist/emotivist theories of ethics. Rejecting freedom to emphasize rationality belongs to the naturalist/descriptivist theories. This book aims to reconcile these positions and do away with the alleged antinomy. |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
accept action actual aesthetic judgements answer argue arise Aristotelian Society assent ciple claim committed concepts consider descriptive judgements descriptive meaning descriptive term descriptivist desires discussion ethics evaluative example express fact fanatic give golden-rule happy Heliogabalus Hume's Law hypothetical ideals imagine imperatives imply important incapsulated inclinations J. O. Urmson Jews kind liberal manœuvre matter maxim ments merely miscegenation moral arguments moral judge moral judgements moral language moral opinions moral philosophers moral principles moral questions moral reasoning moral thinking moral thought moral weakness moral words morally relevant naturalist Nazi non-moral object particular people's interests perhaps person possible predictable premisses prescribe universally prescriptivism prison problem relevant respects relevant to moral rule salizability sense similar singular prescription situation sort suppose theory thing tion tive treat true trumpeter universal prescription universal proposition UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA utilitarian value-judgements value-word