Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and FiascoesGroupthink - the psychological drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses disagreement and prevents the appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decision-making groups. In the first edition (Victims of groupthink), Iriving L. Janis showed how this phenomenon contributed to some of the major U.S. foreign policy fiascos of recent decades: the Korean War stalemate, the escalation of the Vietnam War, the failure to be prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Bay of Pigs blunder. He also examined cases, such as the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the formulation of the Marshall Plan, where groupthink was avoided. Here, in this revised and expanded edition, Janis applies his hypothesis to the Watergate cover-up, portraying in detail how groupthink helped to put the participants on a disastrous couurse and keep them there. In addition, he presents some fresh ideas on how and why groupthink occurs and offers suggestions for avoiding it. |
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Page 24
... Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell confined their remarks almost entirely to the positive side of the picture . They relayed the unsubstantiated reports of their secret agents claiming that more than twenty - five hundred people were in ...
... Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell confined their remarks almost entirely to the positive side of the picture . They relayed the unsubstantiated reports of their secret agents claiming that more than twenty - five hundred people were in ...
Page 41
... Allen Dulles and strongly warned Secretary Rusk of the dangers . He asked Rusk for permission to allow the Cuban experts in his department to scrutinize thoroughly the assumptions relevant to their exper- tise . " I'm sorry , " Rusk ...
... Allen Dulles and strongly warned Secretary Rusk of the dangers . He asked Rusk for permission to allow the Cuban experts in his department to scrutinize thoroughly the assumptions relevant to their exper- tise . " I'm sorry , " Rusk ...
Page 45
... Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell , despite being holdovers from the Eisenhower administration , were not considered outsiders by the inner core of the Kennedy team . President Kennedy and his closest associates did not place these two ...
... Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell , despite being holdovers from the Eisenhower administration , were not considered outsiders by the inner core of the Kennedy team . President Kennedy and his closest associates did not place these two ...
Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
Acheson administration Admiral Kimmel advisers advisory group Allen Dulles alternative American assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs bombing Castro Chiefs of Staff Chinese cohesive group Communist concurrence-seeking consensus course of action critical Cuba Cuban missile crisis danger Dean Defense deliberations discussion effect Ehrlichman enemy evidence Executive Committee expected fiasco group dynamics groupthink hypothesis groupthink syndrome groupthink tendencies Haldeman Hawaii Ibid in-group inner circle invasion plan Japanese Johnson Joint Chiefs judgment Kennan Kennedy's Korean War leader MacArthur's major Marshall Plan McNamara meetings military moral naval Navy group Nixon norms North Korea North Vietnam officers participants Pearl Harbor Pentagon Papers policy-making group political present President Kennedy President's pressures problem procedures psychological questions responsible risks Robert Kennedy role Rusk Schlesinger Secretary shared social Sorensen Soviet Union stereotypes stress symptoms of groupthink thinking threat tion transcripts Truman Vietnam Vietnam War warning Watergate cover-up White House group Wohlstetter