Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and FiascoesGroupthink - the psychological drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses disagreement and prevents the appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decision-making groups. In the first edition (Victims of groupthink), Iriving L. Janis showed how this phenomenon contributed to some of the major U.S. foreign policy fiascos of recent decades: the Korean War stalemate, the escalation of the Vietnam War, the failure to be prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Bay of Pigs blunder. He also examined cases, such as the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the formulation of the Marshall Plan, where groupthink was avoided. Here, in this revised and expanded edition, Janis applies his hypothesis to the Watergate cover-up, portraying in detail how groupthink helped to put the participants on a disastrous couurse and keep them there. In addition, he presents some fresh ideas on how and why groupthink occurs and offers suggestions for avoiding it. |
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Page 44
... President Kennedy . Some of Bowles ' friends had told the press that he had opposed the Cuban venture and had been right in his forecasts about the outcome . Evidently this news an- noyed the President greatly . Bowles ' opponents in ...
... President Kennedy . Some of Bowles ' friends had told the press that he had opposed the Cuban venture and had been right in his forecasts about the outcome . Evidently this news an- noyed the President greatly . Bowles ' opponents in ...
Page 68
... President set the tone at all the meetings with his advisers , strongly shaping the group consensus as each successive step was taken to deepen America's involvement in North Korea . The President's vociferous advocacy of a hard ...
... President set the tone at all the meetings with his advisers , strongly shaping the group consensus as each successive step was taken to deepen America's involvement in North Korea . The President's vociferous advocacy of a hard ...
Page 144
... President's exclusion of a noncoercive response and argued that no coercive action was necessary because " a missile is a missile " whether it is launched from Cuba or from the Soviet Union . Nitze and others soon convinced McNamara ...
... President's exclusion of a noncoercive response and argued that no coercive action was necessary because " a missile is a missile " whether it is launched from Cuba or from the Soviet Union . Nitze and others soon convinced McNamara ...
Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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Acheson administration Admiral Kimmel advisers advisory group Allen Dulles alternative American assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs bombing Castro Chiefs of Staff Chinese cohesive group Communist concurrence-seeking consensus course of action critical Cuba Cuban missile crisis danger Dean Defense deliberations discussion effect Ehrlichman enemy evidence Executive Committee expected fiasco group dynamics groupthink hypothesis groupthink syndrome groupthink tendencies Haldeman Hawaii Ibid in-group inner circle invasion plan Japanese Johnson Joint Chiefs judgment Kennan Kennedy's Korean War leader MacArthur's major Marshall Plan McNamara meetings military moral naval Navy group Nixon norms North Korea North Vietnam officers participants Pearl Harbor Pentagon Papers policy-making group political present President Kennedy President's pressures problem procedures psychological questions responsible risks Robert Kennedy role Rusk Schlesinger Secretary shared social Sorensen Soviet Union stereotypes stress symptoms of groupthink thinking threat tion transcripts Truman Vietnam Vietnam War warning Watergate cover-up White House group Wohlstetter