Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and FiascoesGroupthink - the psychological drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses disagreement and prevents the appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decision-making groups. In the first edition (Victims of groupthink), Iriving L. Janis showed how this phenomenon contributed to some of the major U.S. foreign policy fiascos of recent decades: the Korean War stalemate, the escalation of the Vietnam War, the failure to be prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Bay of Pigs blunder. He also examined cases, such as the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the formulation of the Marshall Plan, where groupthink was avoided. Here, in this revised and expanded edition, Janis applies his hypothesis to the Watergate cover-up, portraying in detail how groupthink helped to put the participants on a disastrous couurse and keep them there. In addition, he presents some fresh ideas on how and why groupthink occurs and offers suggestions for avoiding it. |
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Page 24
... asked to estimate the chances of an invasion's being supported by the resistance move- ment or by popular uprisings behind the lines . Nor were any of the experts on the Cuban desk of the State Department , who kept a daily surveillance ...
... asked to estimate the chances of an invasion's being supported by the resistance move- ment or by popular uprisings behind the lines . Nor were any of the experts on the Cuban desk of the State Department , who kept a daily surveillance ...
Page 73
... asked whether any thought had been given to the possibility of a surprise attack by the Japanese , he responded , " we all felt that the contingency was remote . . . and . . . the feeling strongly existed that the Fleet would have ...
... asked whether any thought had been given to the possibility of a surprise attack by the Japanese , he responded , " we all felt that the contingency was remote . . . and . . . the feeling strongly existed that the Fleet would have ...
Page 282
... asked if the large - scale air strikes were really essential ( Wyden , p . 139 ) ; ( 4 ) during the meeting on April 4 at which he asked his advisers to vote and was given a go - ahead consensus , his skeptical questioning of the ...
... asked if the large - scale air strikes were really essential ( Wyden , p . 139 ) ; ( 4 ) during the meeting on April 4 at which he asked his advisers to vote and was given a go - ahead consensus , his skeptical questioning of the ...
Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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Acheson administration Admiral Kimmel advisers advisory group Allen Dulles alternative American assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs bombing Castro Chiefs of Staff Chinese cohesive group Communist concurrence-seeking consensus course of action critical Cuba Cuban missile crisis danger Dean Defense deliberations discussion effect Ehrlichman enemy evidence Executive Committee expected fiasco forces group dynamics groupthink hypothesis groupthink syndrome groupthink tendencies Haldeman Hawaii Ibid in-group inner circle invasion plan Japanese Johnson Joint Chiefs judgment Kennan Kennedy's Korean War leader MacArthur's major Marshall Plan McNamara meetings military moral naval Nixon norms North Korea North Vietnam officers participants Pearl Harbor Pentagon Papers policy-making group political present President Kennedy President's pressures problem procedures psychological questions responsible risks Robert Kennedy role Rusk Schlesinger Secretary social Sorensen Soviet Union stereotypes stress symptoms of groupthink thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam Vietnam War warning Watergate cover-up White House group Wohlstetter