Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and FiascoesGroupthink - the psychological drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses disagreement and prevents the appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decision-making groups. In the first edition (Victims of groupthink), Iriving L. Janis showed how this phenomenon contributed to some of the major U.S. foreign policy fiascos of recent decades: the Korean War stalemate, the escalation of the Vietnam War, the failure to be prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Bay of Pigs blunder. He also examined cases, such as the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the formulation of the Marshall Plan, where groupthink was avoided. Here, in this revised and expanded edition, Janis applies his hypothesis to the Watergate cover-up, portraying in detail how groupthink helped to put the participants on a disastrous couurse and keep them there. In addition, he presents some fresh ideas on how and why groupthink occurs and offers suggestions for avoiding it. |
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Page 170
We can make only some tentative surmises about the critical conditions that
make a difference . One such condition involves setting up a group norm that
gives highest priority to critical appraisal . In the policy - appraising committee ...
We can make only some tentative surmises about the critical conditions that
make a difference . One such condition involves setting up a group norm that
gives highest priority to critical appraisal . In the policy - appraising committee ...
Page 282
Almost all of his skeptical and critical comments were in this category . Here are
the five main instances of Kennedy ' s critical stance : ( 1 ) in early March 1961 ,
he told the planners that the landing site they had selected ( Trinidad ) would ...
Almost all of his skeptical and critical comments were in this category . Here are
the five main instances of Kennedy ' s critical stance : ( 1 ) in early March 1961 ,
he told the planners that the landing site they had selected ( Trinidad ) would ...
Page 309
7 Wheeler and Janis ( 1980 ) raise the following question : In the absence of
standard operating procedures to promote critical assessment of the pros and
cons of each viable alternative , what could an individual member do if he or she
...
7 Wheeler and Janis ( 1980 ) raise the following question : In the absence of
standard operating procedures to promote critical assessment of the pros and
cons of each viable alternative , what could an individual member do if he or she
...
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Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Or Why the Fortress Slept | 72 |
Copyright | |
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Common terms and phrases
accepted according action administration Admiral advisers alternative American appears asked assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs become called Chiefs cohesive Committee concerning consensus consequences continued course cover-up crisis critical Cuba Cuban danger Dean decision decision-making Defense deliberations Department direct discussion effect errors evidence example Executive expected fact factors feel fiasco forces give going groupthink Haldeman invasion involved issues Japanese Johnson judgment Kennedy leader leading major March meetings military missile moral Nixon norms North objections officers operation participants Pearl Harbor policy-making political position possible present President pressures probably problem procedures proposed questions responsible result risks role says Secretary seems Senator shared social sources Soviet staff stress strong suggested thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam warning Watergate White House