Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and FiascoesGroupthink - the psychological drive for consensus at any cost that suppresses disagreement and prevents the appraisal of alternatives in cohesive decision-making groups. In the first edition (Victims of groupthink), Iriving L. Janis showed how this phenomenon contributed to some of the major U.S. foreign policy fiascos of recent decades: the Korean War stalemate, the escalation of the Vietnam War, the failure to be prepared for the attack on Pearl Harbor, and the Bay of Pigs blunder. He also examined cases, such as the handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the formulation of the Marshall Plan, where groupthink was avoided. Here, in this revised and expanded edition, Janis applies his hypothesis to the Watergate cover-up, portraying in detail how groupthink helped to put the participants on a disastrous couurse and keep them there. In addition, he presents some fresh ideas on how and why groupthink occurs and offers suggestions for avoiding it. |
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Page 111
... probably held these attitudes strongly and others probably had somewhat dif- ferent views . In the course of interaction , the former may have influenced the latter . For example , as Thomson suggests , the few members who had spent ...
... probably held these attitudes strongly and others probably had somewhat dif- ferent views . In the course of interaction , the former may have influenced the latter . For example , as Thomson suggests , the few members who had spent ...
Page 170
... probably help to create an appropriate social atmosphere that fosters healthy skepticism and open critical discussion of controversial issues . One major factor appears to be the leader's capacity to abstain from pushing his own views ...
... probably help to create an appropriate social atmosphere that fosters healthy skepticism and open critical discussion of controversial issues . One major factor appears to be the leader's capacity to abstain from pushing his own views ...
Page 246
... probably reacted the way most people do in a group of high - status people who are strangers , before cohesiveness and feelings of security have developed . The highly ac- cepted members probably reacted like members of cohesive groups ...
... probably reacted the way most people do in a group of high - status people who are strangers , before cohesiveness and feelings of security have developed . The highly ac- cepted members probably reacted like members of cohesive groups ...
Contents
Why So Many Miscalculations? | 2 |
The Bay of Pigs | 14 |
The Wrong | 48 |
Copyright | |
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Acheson administration Admiral Kimmel advisers advisory group Allen Dulles alternative American assumptions attack avoid Bay of Pigs bombing Castro Chiefs of Staff Chinese cohesive group Communist concurrence-seeking consensus course of action critical Cuba Cuban missile crisis danger Dean Defense deliberations discussion effect Ehrlichman enemy evidence Executive Committee expected fiasco group dynamics groupthink hypothesis groupthink syndrome groupthink tendencies Haldeman Hawaii Ibid in-group inner circle invasion plan Japanese Johnson Joint Chiefs judgment Kennan Kennedy's Korean War leader MacArthur's major Marshall Plan McNamara meetings military moral naval Nixon norms North Korea North Vietnam officers participants Pearl Harbor Pentagon Papers policy-making group political present President Kennedy President's pressures problem procedures psychological questions responsible risks Robert Kennedy role Rusk Schlesinger Secretary shared social Sorensen Soviet Union stereotypes stress symptoms of groupthink thinking threat tion transcripts Truman United Vietnam Vietnam War warning Watergate cover-up White House group Wohlstetter