become matter of utility; but if it should be said that these relations exist only because of their utility, there will not be wanting frequent occasions to prove that these relations may be infinitely more useful to some individuals, if they are made to yield to the exigencies, or the utility, or the profit, of those individuals. Throughout this debate our opponents have acted upon this principle, and thereby attempted to destroy the voluntary condition of servitude, with what folly we may presently show, forgetting that the permanent utility of these relations flows from their being immutable; and, ceasing to be immutable, they cease to be useful. Utility having been by its advocates treated apparently too favourable, and transformed into a cause instead of remaining as an effect, it is very soon entirely dissipated; it ceases to be; and therefore utility is not utility which is an absurdity. Is it thus with right or justice? Utility is destroyed by raising it to the first rank-to the rank of a moral principle.

Apply the foregoing observations to the term "right" or "justice." The relations which exist in an aggregation of individuals, truly exist only because they are matters of right, and their immutability flows from their being matters of right. Right is thus shown to be a cause of immutability; but we have previously shown utility to be the result of immutability; hence the impropriety of substituting the term "utility" for the term "right" in any question of moral science. Bentham, in reducing all moral motive to utility, has condemned himself to a forced valuation of that which is the result of human action. When he speaks of fraud, robbery, &c., he is obliged to agree, if there is loss to one there is gain to another; and then, to protect his favourite, "utility," he affirms that the good obtained by the gain is not equal to the evil suffered by the loss. But we affirm that, the good and the evil being separated, he who has committed the fraud or theft finds that the gain to him is greater than his estimate of the loss suffered by the other. All idea of justice is put out of the question; he only calculates on the gain he has made, or the utility of the fraud or theft to himself. All moral motive is entirely destroyed by this system of utility.

Utility, associated with sacerdotal power and error, produces caste; united with com

mercial or social power it produces slavery; and with political power its fruit is serfdom, or villanage; in none of which states is the will of the subject thereof at all considered. Authorized utility is the power of might exercised over right.

We have established the fact that individuals have rights, and that these rights are independent of all social authority-that no authority, individual or social, can interfere with or injure those rights without incurring the guilt of usurpation and injustice. Hence slavery is unjustifiable under any circumstances. Leaving for one moment the abstract question, we follow the principle of natural right into political society, and we find it then assumes the double aspect of personal liberty and the rights of property; and the relation of both these principles to government, or authority, is precisely the same; each individual consents to sacrifice a part of his possessions or property as his contribution towards the public expenses, in order to secure, by the protection of authority, the peaceable enjoyment of the remainder of his property; but if the State exacts the whole of his property, the guarantee which the State has given becomes an illusion, because that guarantee can have no application. In like manner, each individual consents to sacrifice a portion of his liberty in order to secure the rest; but, if the State takes by force all his liberty, the sacrifice is a folly, because it has no good result.

The consistency of our pro-slavery advocates is not very remarkable. X. observes that slavery is not "a desirable state," and it is not "consistent with the highest developments of humanity" (p. 23); but he "would remind his friends that justice and injustice are the same at all times" (p. 24); and then on page 25 he runs into a panegyric on expediency, and the benefit this expediency— this state not desirable—has conferred upon the United States of America;—here is a state of being not desirable producing that which is very desirable or very beneficial. What an astounding admixture of incongruities! "Benjamin" has rather confusedly argued upon the improper use of the terms "natural rights" and "equality." We will heartily join him in his crusade against such improprieties, where they are clearly, unmistakeably proved to be such; but let us see what we have called natural rights? The possession and

exercise of our faculties and powers?-good. Benjamin" has equal right to his which we have to ours, and the poorest wanderer has equal right to his own faculties and powers with either of us. Ah! but we are not free to use them as we please.-True. And then the authority of the State steps in and limits our freedom.-True. Is not this, then, a a triumph for me? exclaims Benjamin. By no means: the State justly restrains our freedom from injuring our fellow-subject; we may freely do him good, and the State will not restrain us so long as he is willing to receive our offered service: we may freely pursue our own pleasure or profit in the exercise of our faculties and powers, but we must respect to an equal extent the personal rights of our fellow-subjects-we must accord to them the same measure of freedom in their pursuit of pleasure and profit as we demand for ourselves; to secure this is the real aim of all political society-the true end of government; similar conclusions result from a similar examination of the other natural rights we have mentioned. We consider it evidence of insanity in any individual arguing for or against that equality which makes all minds, all hearts, all fortunes the same; which stamps the impress of uniformity after a communistic fashion upon all intellect, affection, art, science, commerce, law, politics, and upon all nature; but at the same time, it is egregious folly to confound those things, necessarily equal in all the subjects thereof, with things which are of necessity different and in different subjects; yet such is the tendency of "Benjamin's" remarks upon equality, and his misapplication of the quotation from "Tupper." We can consistently with our views of equality re-echo the sentiment "Tupper" has so quaintly expressed.

To H. B. remains the chief honour of inconsistency: he says, "I detest slavery," it is "in the abstract bad;" slavery. is purely a creature of circumstances; in them it may find palliation and justification, and from them it may arise as a matter of pure necessity." Here he pronounces slavery bad, yet circumstances may justify the existence of this injustice-may permit the commission of evil that good may come. Such principles, carried out into every day practice, would destroy the peace and happiness of this present life and blot out the name of man from the book of eternal life.

Let us remember the apostle's emphatic repudiation of the false principle, "Let us do evil that good may come." It is altogether unnecessary we should on the present occasion further discuss the topic of servitude, as this has been clearly shown to be based upon a voluntary agreement between the person serving and the person served. We have also shown that punishment for crime is foreign to our present question: we add further, that the criminal having forfeited his right to personal liberty as a punishment for his criminality, has no rights in his possession to be forcibly taken from him during the continuance of his punishment. This case is not two persons of equal condition, the one depriving the other forcibly of his rights, but it is the injured defending right and the injurer making reparation according to the plan laid down by the supreme power in the state.

As an authority which none will question, we extract the following from Archer Polson's "Principles of the Law of Nations," p. 42. "A prisoner of war is entitled to protection and good usage, but may be strictly confined if he attempt to escape. Officers are frequently liberated on their parole, or word of honour that they will not serve against the power by which they are released, during the war or during a stipulated time. The exchange of prisoners during the continuance of hostilities is a practice common to all civilized states. The persons of artizans, labourers, merchants, and persons whose occupations are peaceful, it is customary to respect." Further comment upon this topic as a pro-slavery advocate, is needless.

We intended to have examined at some length the scriptural view of slavery, as our opponents have made the Scriptures speak so strangely upon the subject, but space forbids that we should do more than offer a few cursory remarks as suggestive to friends to pursue farther their inquiries into the character of biblical servitude.

Our pro-slavery advocates remind us of the quaint expression of an Old Divine, who said, "Satan is never at fault for a text of scripture with which to bait a sin." The great fact that the volume of inspiration came into a world full of sin and dealt with sin as it found it there-not as theological or moral essayists do, by systematic definitions and consecutive arguments, proscrib

ing all the practices not in accordance with their authors' views-is entirely lost sight of by those who prove slavery from scripture. There is no doubt that cruel slavery and harsh servitude existed in all the surrounding nations, but we find the patriarchs hiring their servants for money, or buying their service by paying the servant for his voluntary service (Gen. xvii. 13). It is a fallacy to suppose that whatever costs money is property; the children of Israel purchased their first-born (Numb. xviii. 15, 16; iii. 45, 51; Exod. xiii. 13; xxxiv. 20); they paid money for their own souls, and when they vowed themselves or their children to the Lord, the price of their release was fixed (Lev. xxvii. 2, 8). Boaz bought Ruth (Ruth iv. 10). Hosea bought his wife (Hos. iii. 2). Jacob bought both his wives by servitude (Gen. xxix. 16—23; but the idea of property is not to be found in any of these purchases. For the various ways in which the terms “buy,” “bought,” and “bought with money" are used, see Neh. v. 8; Gen. xlvii. 18-26, &c.; in accordance with such a view as this, are the actions and sayings of the patriarchs: they never reckoned servants as wealth or property; they occupied the position of chiefs or princes, being proportionately great to the number of their servants; but their property and their servants are never confounded, as by that junction constituting their wealth; on the contrary, the servants of the patriarchs enjoyed many privileges; they enjoyed great confidence (Gen. xxiv. 1-9), were treated with great respect, and, failing the issue of their master, they became his heirs (Gen. xv. 2-4); they were admitted into the same religious privileges, and received the seal of the covenant with their master (Gen. xvii. 9, 14, 24, 27), “For I know, saith the Lord, that he (Abraham) will command his children and his household after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord, to do justice and judgment; that the Lord may bring upon Abraham that which he hath spoken of him," Gen. xviii. 19. In addition to what has been so judiciously argued by G. F. and "Onward," bearing upon Jewish servitude under the Mosaic law, we refer to the moral law as a revelation of great principles, requiring supreme love to God and universal love and justice among men-and whatever accords not therewith is condemned by that law; hence, no sooner had the majesty and glory of

Sinai faded from the sight of the Jews than God forbad all slavery and slave-trading, preparatory to their more immediate contact and intercourse with the slave-holding and slave-trading heathen then inhabiting the land of Canaan, and to preclude the possibility of their ever claiming, by the rights of conquest, the power of the slave-owner over the conquered Canaanites. In Exod. xxi. 16; Deut. xxiv. 7, we read, "He that stealeth a man, and selleth him, or if he be found in his hands, he shall surely be put to death." The crime is man-stealing, selling, and holding, the penalty for either of which is death. Is not stealing the taking forcible or fraudulent possession of that which is belonging to another. Can any phase of slavery be found which comes not within the curse of this law. Property might, if stolen, be legally compensated by a two-fold or a five-fold restitution, but not so with either of the threefold forms of slavery, death alone can compensate for the crime. Such is the Mosaic law; and can that which is called in comparison with the gospel of grace, the "taskmaster," be made by these pro-slavery sophisms milder than the gospel of lovemore just and true than the teachings of Him who is the source of truth-more merciful than the sweet message of mercy which He came to exhibit in his life of vicarious suffering and death? Facts both in the early history of the church and at the present time, evidence that in proportion as the love of Christ dwells in the heart, so will love to man be found in the life. "That the reciprocal rights of masters and servants (Greek, douloi) were inculcated, admits, indeed, of no doubt (Col. iii. 22; iv. 1; Tit. ii. 9; 1 Pet. ii. 18; Ephes. vi. 5—9), but the perforinance of these duties on the part of the masters, supposing them to have been slave-masters, would have been tantamount to the utter subversion of the relation."

How far we have succeeded in the pursuit of truth upon this question our friends must now judge; the verdict is with them. Again we would remind them that in all matters of moral science and social economy, justice must be our guide, right our sheet anchornot expediency, nor utility, nor circumstance, but principle-recollecting the words of Old Ben Jonson, that

"A good man should and must

Sit rather down with loss, than rise unjust."

and "

L'OUVRIER.

NOTE.-Those of our friends who may wish to prosecute this subject further, will do well to consult Taylor's "Elements of Canon

of genius more manifest than when it becomes subject to the ennobling love, lofty devotion, mighty faith, and pure principles of Christianity. We repeat it from the deepest conviction, that Christianity is the highest manifestation of spiritual sublimity, and that genius itself is never more glorious than when reposing beneath its broad ægis!

A christian genius stands on an elevation from which he looks down upon man, nature, life, and death, into spirituality, and up to Divinity, in a light which cannot deceive or lead astray. We have been led to these remarks from contemplating the lovely image of the pious poet, as seen in the modern poem, "In Memoriam." Poetry, like history, has its great epochs, its ebb and flow, its revolutions, its apparent declensions, and ultimate progression. Every age has its peculiar manifestation of genius. Though it lie latent for a time, it is that it may acquire vigour that it may, when its era dawns, burst forth like the orb of day from the Orient. Another sun has risen in the regions of poesy; its radiance is peculiar to itself. It is the genius of Tennyson. He is the originator of a new school in poetry, distinct from the Shaksperian, the Byronic, the Wordsworthian, and the Goethean; but embodying, more or less, the sublimity of each.

Among the many agencies which form and bias the spiritual character of man, sorrow is one. Its existence is a terrible mystery, and perplexes all who would solve it. Although the mysteries of its existence cannot be fathomed, the experience of humanity indicates a divine superintendence over the

""Tis held that sorrow makes us wise."

Oft

The cup of human sorrow is often sweetened by the breathings of the muse. does the spirit overwhelmed with unutterable distress find solace under the divine influence of poesy. Sorrow often leads the poet to give vent to his feelings and sentiments in the most touching strains of sweetest melody. Sorrow is often silent; but when it speaks, its utterances are always eloquent, and, coming from the heart of the writer, go direct to the heart of the reader. It would appear that sorrow, as a general rule, has given a mighty impulse to the genius of the poet, at whatever period of his life it casts its gloomy mantle over his spiritual being. This mysterious element appears to mingle more profusely in the cup of the poet than in that of other men.

The true poet is not only the higher man in thought, but in feeling also. The depth of his insight into his own nature, and his acquaintance with the mind and heart of man, give constant impulse to the emotional feelings within his bosom. He not only sees as the philosopher, but feels as the lover of the good and beautiful. He weeps with those who weep, and his great heart thrills with the plaintive notes of the long and deep wail of humanity in distress! How oft is the grief of the captive, the misery of the sunburnt slave, the sorrow of the exile-patriot, the agony of the orphan and widow, objects of the poet's thought and feeling!

Profundity of thought, combined with depth of feeling, is the lofty point where God

and man meet and commune. Poesy ever appears to us sacred and divine, for it is

"Itself a thing of God;"

but never more so than when it is the expression of the soul's vast grief, though it

"Is given in outline, and no more.' Hence we are accustomed to consider the Redeemer's memorable lament over apostate Jerusalem as the finest specimen of divine poetry to be found in literature. Vast as was the guilt of Jerusalem, Christ's agony over her was more vast. "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem!" The thought contained is illimitable; the passion expressed is commensurate with the thought. "How oft!" "The heart knoweth its own bitterness." The sentiment contained in these words the poet fathoms; and, impelled by his insight into their import, enters the more fully into the half-told tales of human woe. It were impossible to account for such productions as "The Wanderer," by Wordsworth; "The Orphans," "Be hushed," &c., and "Sleep, baby mine," &c., by H. K. White, on any other hypothesis.

We intend to glance at a few of those beautiful poetic compositions found in the tome of English poesy, the prevailing feature of which is intense sorrow. The most remarkable production, for beauty of sentiment, depth of meaning, simplicity of expression, and terseness of diction, in modern poetry, is the volume before us, "In Memoriam." It has long ago found its way, not

yond this it would seem impossible for human friendship to pass. Is it not the climax of love? It is evident, from many parts of the book before us, that the friendship of its author towards the departed had reached this point. Yea, this seems to be the exponent of every section. Love less intense, pure, and unwavering could have never thus inspired the poet to express himself. Behold here, then, ye lovers of grandeur and beauty, the two combined in exquisite harmony! See here the highest love and deepest sorrow shadowed forth "in outline," wedded in bonds which nought but the fiat of the Almighty can dissolve. The poet, the friend, the bereaved; the three in one speak as few speak, in unbroken unity, sweetest poesy, highest friendship, and deepest sorrow.

"It is the saddest and the sorest sight,
One's own love weeping."

Many passages might we quote indicative of the calm depth of the poet's sanctified sorrow; one must suffice, as it embodies the spirit of all the rest:

"In words, like weeds, I'll wrap me o'er,
Like coarsest clothes against the cold;
But that large grief which these enfold
Is given in outline and no more."
So of his intense affection:-

"My Arthur, whom I shall not see
Till all my widow'd race be run;
Dear as the mother to the son,
More than my brothers are to me."

An attempt to find out the spring of that

We dishonour not the name of that true, pure, and immortal principle which flourishes in the noblest souls, the ties of which are stronger than death, when we compare the author of "In Memoriam" and his beloved friend Arthur to Orestes and Pylades, the hero-friends of profane history, or to David and Jonathan, the hero-friends of sacred history. David's eloquent and passionate language over the death of Jonathan, and the heart-touching sentiments found in the book before us, sparkling "like jewels from the depths" in such rich profusion, are the breathings of kindred spirits, influenced by the same great and immortal principle love. Of Jonathan it is said, he loved David as his own soul! 66 Thy love to me was wonderful, passing the love of women," said David, in the desolation of his spirit. Be

the reader, in the nature of the poetry, is difficult, for we cannot ascribe it to any particular characteristic. It is the one result of the whole. It is the felicitous effect of combined love and sorrow, devotion and piety, flowing like the deepest rivers, with the least perturbation, through the media of true poetic melody. The devotional and religious spirit which pervades the whole of this production is, perhaps, the great source of its power and beauty, seeming to add sacredness to the sacred, and loveliness to the lovely.

Oft have we read the dedicatory stanzas, to catch the poet's devotional inspirationto grasp more fully its mighty truths-to imbibe its sacred import, and enjoy the blessed influence which its few verses cannot fail to exert on the intelligent mind. These stanzas contain the cardinal truths of the poet's creed. We feel them to be the essential